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Abstract:  This paper presents the latest update of our aggregate governance 
indicators, together with new analysis of several issues related to the use of these 
measures.  The governance indicators measure the following six dimensions of 
governance: (i) voice and accountability; (ii) political Instability and violence; (iii) 
government effectiveness; (iv) regulatory quality; (v) rule of law, and, (vi) control of 
corruption.   They cover 209 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 
2004. They are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of 
governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 organizations.  We 
present estimates of the six dimensions of governance for each period, as well as 
margins of error capturing the range of likely values for each country.  These margins of 
error are not unique to perceptions-based measures of governance, but are an important 
feature of all efforts to measure governance, including objective indicators.  In fact, we 
provide examples of how individual objective measures provide an incomplete picture of 
even the quite particular dimensions of governance that they are intended to measure.    
We also analyze in some detail changes over time in our estimates of 
governance; provide a framework for assessing the statistical significance of changes in 
governance; and suggest a simple rule of thumb for identifying statistically significant 
changes in country governance over time.  The ability to identify significant changes in 
governance over time is much higher for our aggregate indicators than for any individual 
indicator.  While we find that the quality of governance in a number of countries has 
changed significantly (in both directions), we also provide evidence suggesting that there 
are no trends, for better or worse, in global averages of governance.  Finally, we 
interpret the strong observed correlation between income and governance, and argue 
against recent efforts to apply a discount to governance performance in low-income 
countries. 
 
The data, as well as a web-based graphical interface, are available at: 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/.  The Appendices and a synthesis of the 
paper are available at: www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html.    2
1.  Introduction   
 
 This paper presents the latest update of our aggregate governance indicators, 
together with new results on the relative importance of perceptions-based and objective 
indicators; the significance of measured changes over time in governance; and the role 
of per capita income in cross-country governance comparisons.  The governance 
indicators measure the following six dimensions of governance: (i) voice and 
accountability; (ii) political Instability and violence; (iii) government effectiveness; (iv) 
regulatory quality; (v) rule of law, and, (vi) control of corruption.   They cover 209 
countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. The indicators are based 
on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn 
from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different organizations. We assign 
these individual measures of governance to categories capturing key dimensions of 
governance, and use an unobserved components model to construct six aggregate 
governance indicators in each period. We present the point estimates of the dimensions 
of governance as well as the margins of errors for each country and period.   
 
We begin by describing the data used to construct this round of the governance 
indicators in Section 2.  As discussed in more detail below, we have incorporated 
information from a substantial number of new data sources, relative to our last set of 
indicators for the period 1996-2002.  Since some of these data sources are also 
available in earlier periods, we have updated our governance estimates for this earlier 
period as well.  As we have emphasized in our previous work, an attractive feature of the 
aggregation method we use is that it provides us with not only estimates of governance 
for each country, but also with measures of the precision or reliability of these estimates, 
for every country, indicator, and year.  The addition of data has improved the precision of 
our governance indicators relative to previous years.  However, the margins of error 
associated with estimates of governance are not trivial.  This implies that cross-country 
comparisons of levels of governance should continue to be made with due caution.  We 
also underscore that these margins of error are not unique to perceptions-based 
measures of governance, but are an important feature of all efforts to measure 
governance, including objective indicators.  
  3
Reformers in many governments as well as civil society and investors 
increasingly view governance as key for development and the investment climate, which 
in turn has increased the demand for monitoring the quality of governance in a country 
over time.  Further, aid donors have also come to the view that aid flows have a stronger 
impact on development in countries with good institutional quality, and thus increasingly 
utilize measurable performance indicators –within which governance features 
prominently-- for monitoring, evaluation and decision-making at a country level.
1  In light 
of this, it is also important to measure and interpret trends over time in governance.  This 
we address in Section 3 of the paper, where we discuss how the inevitable 
measurement error in both subjective and objective indicators of governance affects the 
conclusions that can be drawn from observed changes over time in such measures.   
 
The most basic insight is that measurement error should temper the conclusions 
about actual changes in governance based on changes in any individual indicator, while 
aggregate indicators such as those we develop here can be more informative about 
changes over time in governance.  In addition to this basic insight, we highlight two 
opposing forces that affect the interpretation of changes over time.  On the one hand, if 
governance itself changes very slowly over time, then observed changes in the data will 
overstate the magnitude of actual changes in governance.  On the other hand, if 
measurement error is also very persistent over time, then observed changes in the data 
will understate changes in governance.  By providing a framework for assessing the 
statistical significance of changes in governance over time, we show how these key 
parameters can be estimated and argue that the former effect dominates, suggesting 
that changes over time in the governance indicators should be interpreted with some 
caution.  We suggest a simple rule of thumb for identifying statistically significant 
changes in country governance over time, and find that governance in a number of 
countries has either significantly improved or deteriorate over the relative short eight-
year time span covered by our data.  We also document that there is little evidence of 
any trends – for better or worse – in global averages of governance. 
 
                                                  
1 For example, the International Development Association (the highly concessional loan window 
of the World Bank) relies heavily on the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment, one of the ingredients in our aggregate governance indicators.  The U.S. 
government’s Millennium Challenge Account bases country eligibility in part on five of our 
governance indicators.  4
The margins of error we emphasize are not unique to the perceptions data we 
use to construct our aggregate governance indicators: measurement error is pervasive 
among all measures of governance and institutional quality.  An advantage of our 
measures of governance is that we are able to be explicit about the accompanying 
margins of error, whereas these are most often left implicit with objective measures of 
governance.  In Section 4 of this paper we investigate in more detail discrepancies 
between subjective and objective measures of very specific dimensions of the regulatory 
environment.  We show that firms’ survey responses about their tax burden, and the 
ease of starting a new business, reflect not only the de jure regulations governing these 
issues, but also the overall institutional and governance environment in which these 
regulations are applied.  This finding emphasizes the importance of relying on a full 
range of measures of governance, and not exclusively subjective or objective measures, 
when assessing the quality of governance across countries. 
 
In the final section of the paper we turn to two issues that arise when interpreting 
the strong positive correlation observed between measures of governance and per 
capita incomes.  One critique of subjective or perceptions-based governance measures 
is that they are subject to “halo effects” – respondents rating countries might provide 
good governance scores to richer countries simply because they are richer.  While this is 
certainly a possible source of bias, we show that it will lead to a significant upward bias 
in the correlation between income and governance only if these halo effects are 
implausibly strong.  The second issue concerns the interpretation of the quality of 
governance in low income countries, with particular application to Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where the international community is rightly focusing its attention in the effort to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals of halving poverty by 2015.  Although countries in the 
region on average tend to score quite poorly on most measures of governance, some 
observers have argued that this poor governance performance should be discounted 
because per capita incomes in the region are also low.  Implicit in this argument is the 
view that there is a strong causal impact of incomes on governance.  However, we argue 
that existing evidence does not support a strong causal channel operating in this 
direction – most of the correlation between governance and per capita incomes reflects 
causation from the former to the latter.  In light of this we suggest that it would be 
inappropriate to divert attention from the weak average governance performance of the 
region (while also recognizing the individual countries that are strong governance  5
performers in the region), simply because the region is poor.  While we focus on Africa 
because of the recent emphasis in the aid community on the region, the fallacy of 
discounting the extent of misgovernance in a country or region due to low incomes 
applies more generally to any setting with poor governance and low incomes.   
 
We conclude by summarizing the key findings and noting the policy implications 
of our work. 
 
 
2.  Updated Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 
 
  In this section we briefly describe the update of our governance indicators for 
2004, as well as some minor backwards revisions to the indicators for 1996-2002.  Our 
basic methodology has not changed from past years, and a detailed discussion can be 
found in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004).  We construct measures of six 
dimensions governance: 
 
1.  Voice and Accountability – measuring political, civil and human rights 
2.  Political Instability and Violence – measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, 
or changes in, government, including terrorism 
3.  Government Effectiveness – measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and 
the quality of public service delivery 
4.  Regulatory Burden – measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies 
5.  Rule of Law – measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
6.  Control of Corruption – measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption and state capture 
 
In Appendix D we define these six dimensions of governance in more detail. 
 
2.1  Data and Methodology 
 
As in past years we rely on a large number of individual data sources which 
provide us with information on perceptions of governance.  These data sources consist  6
of surveys of firms and individuals, as well as the assessments of commercial risk rating 
agencies, non-governmental organizations, and a number of multilateral aid agencies.  A 
full list of these sources is presented in Table 1.  For this round of the data, we rely on a 
total of 352 individual variables measuring different dimensions of governance.  These 
are taken from 37 different sources, produced by 31 different organizations.  Appendices 
A and B provide a detailed description of each data source, and document how we have 
assigned individual data sources to our six aggregate indicators. 
 
These 37 sources include 12 new data sources for 2004, indicated with asterisks 
in Table 1.  The new sources come from a diverse set of organizations.  Three of these 
come from international organizations, in the form of country assessments prepared by 
economists at the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.  Another three are from commercial 
consultancies:  IJET Travel Consultancies, Merchant International Group, and Political 
and Economic Risk Consultancy.
2  The remaining six come from a mix of NGOs and 
universities:  Bertelsmann Foundation, Brown University Center for Public Policy, the 
Countries at the Crossroads publication of Freedom House, Fundar, the International 
Research and Exchanges Board, and Vanderbilt University.
3  Several of these new 
sources also have data available prior to 2004. In order to make full use of this additional 
data, as well as to improve the comparability of the governance indicators over time, we 
have revised our previous indicators for all periods to incorporate these sources.  
Typically the addition of these sources has very little effect on our past indicators, but it 
does make them more comparable over time. 
 
  It is also important to note that our data sources reflect the perceptions of a very 
diverse group of respondents.  Several of our data sources are surveys of individuals or 
domestic firms with first-hand knowledge of the governance situation in the country.  
These include the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, the Institute 
for Management Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, the World Bank’s 
                                                  
2 The last of these, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, is not quite a “new” source as it 
appeared in our 1998 and 2000 indicators in the past, but not in the 2002 and 2004 indicators.  
3 It is worth noting that we do not use the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) as a component of our aggregate corruption indicator. This is because the CPI is 
itself an aggregate of a number of individual sources, all of which we have already included in our 
corruption indicator. 
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business environment surveys, and a variety of global polls of individuals conducted by 
Gallup, Latinobarometro, and Afrobarometro.  We also capture the perceptions of 
country analysts at the major multilateral development agencies (the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the African Development Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and the World Bank), 
reflecting these individuals’ in-depth experience working on the countries they assess.  
Other data sources from NGOs (such as Amnesty International, Reporters Without 
Borders, and Freedom House), as well as commercial risk rating agencies (such as EIU 
and DRI) base their assessments on a global network of correspondents typically living 
in the country they are rating. 
As in our past work, we combine the many individual data sources into six 
aggregate governance indicators.  The premise underlying this statistical approach 
should not be too controversial – each of the individual data sources we have provides 
an imperfect signal of some deep underlying notion of governance that is difficult to 
observe directly.  This means that as users of the individual sources, we face a signal-
extraction problem – how do we isolate the informative signal about governance from 
each individual data source, and how do we optimally combine the many data sources to 
get the best possible signal of governance in a country based on all the available data?  
In Appendix D we describe in detail the statistical procedure we use to perform this 
aggregation, known as the unobserved components model.  The main advantage of this 
approach is that the aggregate indicators are more informative about unobserved 
governance than any individual data source.  Moreover, the methodology allows us to be 
explicit about the precision – or imprecision – of our estimates of governance in each 
country.   As we discuss in more detail throughout the paper, this imprecision is not a 
consequence of our reliance on subjective or perceptions data on governance – rather 
imprecision is an issue that should be squarely addressed in all efforts to measure the 
quality of governance. 
2.2  Estimates of Governance 1996 - 2004 
In Appendix C we report the aggregate governance indicators, for all countries, 
for each of the six indicators and for all five periods. The governance estimates are 
normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. 
This implies that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores  8
corresponding to better outcomes.
4   This also implies that our aggregate estimates 
convey no information about trends in global averages of governance, but they are of 
course informative about changes in individual countries’ relative positions over time.  
Below we discuss the information in our individual indicators regarding trends over time 
in global averages of governance. 
 
  Table 2 summarizes some of the key features of our governance indicators. In 
the top panel we show the number of countries included in each of the six indicators and 
four periods. In 2004 the Government Effectiveness indicator covers the largest set of 
209 countries, with the other sources covering between 204 and 208 countries.
5 Over 
time, there has been a steady increase in the number of sources included in each of our 
indicators. This increase in the number of data sources is reflected in an increase in the 
median number of sources available per country, which, depending on the governance 
component, ranges from four to six in 1996, and from eight to eleven in 2004. Thanks to 
the increase in sources, the proportion of countries in our sample for which our 
governance estimates are based on only one source has also declined considerably, to 
an average of only 7 percent of the sample in 2004.   
 
An important consequence of this expanding data availability is that the margins 
of error for the governance indicators have declined, as shown in the final panel of Table 
2.   Depending on the governance component, in 1996 the average (for all countries) of 
the standard error
6 ranged from 0.26 to 0.36, while in 2004 the corresponding range is 
from 0.18 to 0.27. These declines in margins of error illustrate the benefits in terms of 
precision of constructing composite indicators based on as much information as 
possible.  Of course, since our aggregate indicators combine information from all of 
these sources, they have greater precision than any individual underlying data source.   
Looking across all five time periods, the median standard error of the individual data 
                                                  
4 For a handful of cases, individual country ratings can exceed these boundaries when estimates 
of governance are particularly high or low. 
5 A few of the entities covered by our indicators are not fully independent states (Puerto Rico, 
Hong Kong, West Bank/Gaza, Martinique, and French Guyana). A handful of very small 
independent principalities (Monaco, San Marino, and Andorra) are also included. For stylistic 
convenience all 209 entities are often referred in this paper as “countries”. 
6 As described in detail in Appendix D, our outcome of aggregation procedure is a distribution of 
possible values of governance for a country, conditional on the observed data for that country.  
The mean of this conditional distribution is our estimate of governance, and we refer to the 
standard deviation of this conditional distribution as the “standard error” of the governance 
estimate.  9
sources for the governance indicators was 0.58, with an interquartile range from 0.45 to 
0.84.   
 
Despite this increase in precision as a benefit of aggregation, the margins of 
error for the aggregate governance indicators are non-trivial.  We illustrate this point in 
Figure 1. In the two panels of Figure 1, we order countries in ascending order according 
to their point estimates of governance in 2002 on the horizontal axis, and on the vertical 
axis we plot the estimate of governance and the associated 90% confidence interval 
described above. We do this for two of the six governance indicators, political stability, 
and control of corruption.  The size of these confidence intervals varies across countries, 
as different countries appear in different numbers of sources with different levels of 
precision. The resulting confidence intervals are substantial relative to the units in which 
governance is measured. To emphasize this point, the horizontal lines in Figure 1 
delineate the quartiles of the distribution of governance estimates. Even though the 
differences between countries in the bottom and top quartiles are substantial, the 
number of countries that have 90% confidence intervals that lie entirely within a given 
quartile is not large.  From Figure 1 it should also be evident that many of the small 
differences in estimates of governance across countries are not likely to be statistically 
significant at reasonable confidence levels. For many applications, instead of merely 
observing the point estimates, it is therefore more useful to focus on the range of 
possible governance values for each country (as summarized in the 90% confidence 
intervals shown in Figure 1).   
 
As an illustration of the importance of margins of error in governance 
comparisons, consider the eligibility criteria for the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA).  Countries’ eligibility for grants from the MCA is determined by their relative 
positions on 16 different measures of country performance.  One of these is our Control 
of Corruption indicator, where countries are required to score above the median among 
all potentially eligible countries in order to qualify for MCA funding.  As we have noted 
elsewhere, this procedure risks misclassifying countries around the median because the 
margins of error for such countries often includes the median score.  In contrast, for 
countries near the top and the bottom of potential MCA beneficiaries, we can be quite 
confident that they do in fact fall above and below the median, respectively.   
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Table 3 illustrates the role of margins of error in this calculation.  We focus 
attention on the set of 70 countries identified as potential MCA beneficiaries for the 2005 
fiscal year.
7  For these countries, we calculate the median score on our Control of 
Corruption indicator for 2004.  Next, using our governance estimates and their 
accompanying standard errors, for each country we calculate the probability that the 
country’s level of corruption falls above the median for this group.  The results of this 
calculation are summarized in the first column of Table 3.  For 17 poorly-performing 
countries, or about one-quarter of the sample, there is less than a 10 percent chance 
that corruption in these countries actually falls above the median.  For another 23 
countries, or about a third of the sample, we are quite confident that corruption in these 
countries falls above the median, with a probability of at least 90 percent.  In contrast, for 
the remaining 30 countries, the probability that they fall above the median is somewhere 
between 10 percent and 90 percent, and so we have less confidence that these 
countries are correctly classified.  If we relax our standards of significance to 25 percent 
and 75 percent, we find that only about 20 countries out of 70, or 29 percent of countries 
fall in this zone of uncertainty.
8   
 
This example illustrates the importance of taking margins of error into account 
when making governance comparisons across countries.  Our aggregate governance 
indicator is able to identify with a fairly substantial degree of confidence groups of 
countries where the probability that corruption is above or below the median is large.  
But at the same time there remains an intermediate group of countries where we can be 
less confident that they are correctly classified as being “good” or “bad” performers 
based on their point estimates of governance alone.   
 
It is also important to note how this example illustrates the benefit of aggregating 
many sources of data on corruption, as we do.  The remaining columns of Table 3 show 
perform the same calculations, but relying on successively less precise measures of 
governance.  The second and third columns use our own Control of Corruption 
                                                  
7 See http://www.mcc.gov/ for details on the MCA eligibility criteria. 
8 We first performed these MCA-related calculations in late 2002, shortly after the announcement 
of the initial MCA eligibility criteria.  At that time, using the older version of our 2000 Control of 
Corruption indicator, we found that 23 out of 61 countries (or 38 percent of countries) fell in this 
intermediate zone.  This much higher proportion of intermediate countries reflected the fact that 
the old version of or 2000 Control of Corruption indicator relied on substantially fewer data 
sources than we now have available to us for both 2000 and 2004.  11
indicators for 2000 and 1996.  These indicators cover fewer countries, and because they 
rely on a smaller set of sources available at the time, the margins of error for individual 
countries are higher than in 2004 (see the standard errors reported in the last row).  In 
1996, for example, 35 percent of the countries for which data is available fall in the 
intermediate category where the probability that they fall in the top half of the sample is 
between 25 percent and 75 percent – as opposed to only 29 percent of countries falling 
in this grey area with the 2004 indicator.  The last three columns of the table show the 
same information for three of our individual sources, WMO, DRI, and GCS.  These 
individual sources have substantially higher margins of error than our aggregate 
indicators, and in the case of DRI and GCS also cover substantially fewer countries.  In 
addition, we see that there is greater uncertainty about country rankings when relying on 
just a single indicator:  for GCS, for example, the fraction of countries falling in the 
intermediate category rises to 40 percent.  This illustrates the benefit of relying on 
aggregate indicators which are more informative than individual indicators when trying to 
classify countries according to their levels of governance. 
 
 
2.3  Changes over Time in Governance at the Country Level 
 
 
We now turn to the changes over time in our estimates of governance in 
individual countries.  Figure 2 illustrates these changes for two selected governance 
indicators over the period 1996-2004.  In both panels, we plot the 2004 score on the 
horizontal axis, and the 1996 score on the vertical axis. We also plot the 45-degree line, 
so that countries above this line correspond to declines in the quality of governance, 
while countries below the line correspond to improvements in governance.   The first 
feature of this graph is that most countries are clustered quite close to the 45-degree 
line, indicating that changes in our estimates of governance in these countries are 
relatively small over the eight-year period covered by the graph.  A similar pattern 
emerges for the other four dimensions of governance (not shown in Figure 2), and, not 
surprisingly the correlation between current and lagged estimates of governance is even 
higher when we consider shorter time periods. 
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However, our estimates of governance do change substantially for some 
countries in some periods.  For example, from 1996 to 2004, countries like Cote d’Ivoire, 
Zimbabwe, Nepal and the Central African Republic show substantial declines in, among 
others, the Voice and Accountability measure, while countries like Argentina and Sierra 
Leone deteriorate on Regulatory Quality,  and Zimbabwe, Cyprus, Israel, and Moldova 
decline on Control of Corruption measures, contrasting countries like Latvia and Bahrain 
which show substantial improvements in Control of Corruption, while Croatia, Nigeria, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina improve in Voice and Accountability, for instance.
 9   
 
In Figure 2 we have labeled those countries for which the change in estimated 
governance over the 1996-2004 period is sufficiently large that the 90% confidence 
intervals for governance in the two periods do not overlap.  While this is not a formal test 
of the statistical significance of changes over time in governance, it is a very simple and 
transparent rule of thumb for identifying large changes in governance.  In the next 
section of this paper we will discuss in more detail how to assess the statistical 
significance of changes in governance.  We also note that there are of course more 
“large” changes in governance if we relax our standards to asking whether, say, 75 
percent confidence intervals overlap or not.  In this case, we would identify an average 
of 35 large changes per indicator, as opposed to an average of 15 per indicator for non-
overlapping 90 percent confidence intervals. 
 
For the rest of this subsection we provide details on why our estimates of 
governance have changed for those countries where changes are large according to this 
simple rule of thumb. In Table 4 we provide more detail on all of the large changes in our 
six governance indicators over the period 1996-2004. The first three columns report the 
level of governance in the two periods, and the change.  The remaining columns provide 
information on the two main potential sources of changes in our estimates of governance 
for a particular country:  (1) changes over time in individual data sources’ assessments 
                                                  
9 Focusing on the shorter 1998-2004 period (yet one which has a larger country overlap) also 
yields a number of countries that have undergone large changes, such as the decline exhibited in 
Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law for West Bank/Gaza (for which 
there was no data in 1996), Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe and Eritrea, and the deterioration in Voice 
and Accountability during the period in Nepal, Kyrgyz Republic, and Russia, contrasting the 
improvements in Control of Corruption in the Slovak Republic, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, 
Madagascar and Colombia, or in Political Stability/Violence in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Angola, 
Turkey, South Africa and Senegal, for instance.  13
of governance, and (2) changes due to the addition of new data sources for a country.    
Consider first changes over time in the underlying data sources that are available in both 
periods for a country.  In the column labeled “Agree” we report the number of sources 
available in both periods which move in the same direction as the aggregate indicator. 
The columns labeled “No Change” and “Disagree” report the number of sources on 
which that country’s score does not change or moves in the opposite direction to the 
aggregate indicator. For each country we also summarize the extent to which changes in 
the individual sources agree with the direction of change in the aggregate indicator by 
calculating the “Agreement Ratio”, or “Agree” / (“Agree” + “Disagree”). 
 
The agreement ratio is quite high for countries with large changes in governance. 
Averaging across all countries and indicators, we find an average agreement ratio of 
0.86 for the period 1996-2004, as reported in Table 5.  For the six indicators the 
agreement ratio ranges from a low of 0.76 for Government Effectiveness to a high of 
0.93 for Voice and Accountability.  This provides some confidence that for countries with 
large changes in our governance estimates, these changes are being driven primarily by 
changes in underlying sources.   In fact, there are only three cases where the agreement 
ratio is less than one-half:  Indonesia and Zambia for Regulatory Quality, and Iceland for 
Control of Corruption.
10  It is also worth noting that the agreement ratios for large 
changes in governance are much higher than the agreement ratios for all changes in 
governance.  This can also be seen in Table 5 which computes the same agreement 
ratio, but for all countries over the period 1996-2004.  The agreement ratio averages 64 
percent, suggesting that for the more typical smaller changes in our governance 
estimates, there is much more disagreement across individual sources about the 
direction of the change than there is for large changes. 
 
  The remaining columns of Table 4 measure how the addition of new sources of 
governance data in 2004 contributes to the change in the estimate of governance for a 
country.   We do this by first calculating what our estimate of governance in the second 
                                                  
10 For Indonesia, the large decline in the overall score was due to a fairly substantial decline in 
one underlying source, HER, as well as the addition of new sources in 2004 that provided lower 
scores than the ones available in both periods.  In the case of Iceland, the large improvement 
seems to be driven entirely by Iceland’s big improvement, from an unusually low base, in the 
score assigned to it by GCS in 1996.  Finally, in the case of Zambia the three sources that move 
in the opposite direction from the aggregate indicator do so only very slightly and these very small 
improvements are strongly offset by worsening in the remaining two sources.  14
period would have been had we used only sources available in both periods.  We also 
calculate what our estimate of governance would be if we were to rely only on the new 
sources added in the second period relative to the first period.
11  If this latter score is 
higher (lower) than the former, then we know that the new data sources on average rate 
the country better (worse) than do the existing sources available in both periods, and this 
effect on its own will contribute to an improvement (decline) in estimated governance for 
the country.  The overall score for the country in the second period is just a weighted 
average of these two scores.  We report these two scores, and the accompanying 
weights, in the last four columns of Table 4. 
  Interestingly, and reassuringly, the addition of new sources does not appear to 
have very substantial effects on the changes over time in the governance estimates.  To 
assess this, we have computed the absolute difference between the “balanced” score 
and the score based on new sources, and expressed this as a fraction of the absolute 
change in the overall governance estimate over the two periods.  Averaging across all 
the entries in Table 4 gives a figure of 9 percent.  Taken together, this evidence 
suggests that for the large changes in governance shown in this table, we can have a 
good deal of confidence that it is mostly driven by changes in the underlying sources on 
which the aggregate indicators are based.  In contrast, we should be much more 
cautious in our interpretation of many of the smaller changes in our aggregate 
governance indicators. 
2.4  Trends in Global Governance 
  
We now examine the limited available evidence on trends in global averages of 
governance.  As we have already noted, our aggregate governance indicators are not 
informative about trends in global averages because we have normalized these 
averages to zero in each period, as a choice of units.  While the aggregate indicators are 
of course informative about the relative performance of individual (or groups of) 
countries, in order to assess trends in global governance we need to return to our 
underlying individual data sources. 
 
                                                  
11 Of all the large changes we identify in this way, there is only one case where a data source was 
dropped: Israel, which was dropped by BERI in 2000.  For all the remaining cases changes in the 
composition of data sources reflect only the addition of new sources.  15
  In Table 6 we summarize trends in world averages in a number of our individual 
data sources.   Most of the sources in this table are polls of experts, with data extending 
over the whole period 1996-2004.  Only one of them, GCS, is a survey with sufficiently 
standard format to enable comparisons over this period of time.   The first five columns 
present the average across all countries of each of the sources in each of the years. The 
underlying data have been rescaled to run from zero to one, and for each source and 
governance component, we report the score on the same question or average of 
questions that we use in the aggregate indicator. The next five columns report the 
standard deviation across countries for each source. The final column reports the t-
statistic associated with a test of the null hypothesis that the world average score is the 
same in 1996 as in 2004.  
 
The picture that emerges from Table 6 is sobering.  There is very little evidence 
of statistically significant improvements in governance worldwide.  The 22 eight-year 
changes reported here are divided exactly in half into 11 improvements and 11 declines 
in global averages.  Interesting there are nine cases of statistically significant changes at 
the 10 percent level or better (t-statistics greater than 1.64 in absolute value), and these 
are split between three improvements and six declines.  It is not clear how much 
importance ought to be ascribed to these trends in world averages. On the one hand, 
these statistics represent the only information we have on trends over time, and so they 
should be taken seriously. On the other hand, it is also clear that there is substantial 
disagreement among sources about even the direction of changes in global averages of 
governance.   For now we cautiously conclude that we certainly do not have any 
evidence of any significant improvement in governance worldwide, and if anything the 
evidence is suggestive of a deterioration, at the very least in key dimensions such as 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.   
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3.  Statistical Significance of Changes in Governance over Time 
 
  Reformers in many governments as well as civil society and investors 
increasingly view governance as key for development and the investment climate, which 
in turn has increased the demand for monitoring the quality of governance in a country 
over time.  Further, aid donors have also come to the view that aid flows have a stronger 
impact on development in countries with good institutional quality.    In light of this, it is 
important not only to measure levels, but also to assess trends over time in governance. 
The presence of measurement error in all types of governance indicators, including our 
own, makes assessing trends in governance a challenging undertaking.  In this section 
we develop a formal statistical methodology, as well as some simple rules of thumb, for 
identifying changes in governance that are likely to be statistically and practically 
significant.   
 
  In our description of the data in the previous section we have emphasized the 
importance of measurement error in governance indicators, and its consequences for 
interpreting cross-country differences in measures of governance.  We have also 
identified a limited number of episodes in which changes over time in our aggregate 
governance indicators are large relative to the associated margins of error.  In this 
section of the paper we provide a more formal statistical analysis of changes over time in 
governance.  At a most basic level, it should be clear that the presence of measurement 
error in the underlying data implies that we should be cautious about reading too much 
into observed changes in individual and composite measures of governance, both 
subjective and objective.  In this section we formalize this common-sense notion and 
expand it to consider how persistence over time in both governance and measurement 
error affect the statistical inferences we can make about changes over time in 
governance from the available data.   
 
3.1  Changes in Individual Indicators 
  
  It is useful to begin our discussion with the simplest possible example of how 
measurement error impacts our interpretation of changes over time in observed 
governance indicators, both subjective and objective.   Suppose that we have only one 
source of governance data observed at two points in time, and we want to make  17
inferences about how governance has changed in a country.  To keep notation as simple 
as possible, we suppress country subscripts and write the observed data at time t, y(t), 
as the sum of true unobserved governance in that period, g(t), and an error term 
capturing measurement error: 
 
(1)  2 , 1 t , ) t ( ) t ( g ) t ( y = ε + =  
 
As a choice of units, we assume that true governance has mean zero and standard 
deviation one, and that the error term has zero mean.  For simplicity we assume that the 
variance of the error term is the same in both periods and is equal to σ
2.  Note that σ
2 is 
the noise-to-signal ratio in the observed governance data (the ratio of the variance of the 
error to the variance of unobserved governance).  We also allow for the possibility that 
both governance and the error term are correlated over time, with correlations ρ and r, 
respectively.  Finally we assume that both governance and the error term are normally 
distributed.  With these simplifying assumptions, consider the problem of making 
inferences about the change in unobserved governance, g(t)-g(t-1), conditional on 
observing data y(t) and y(t-1) in the two periods.  Using the fact that unobserved 
governance and the data are jointly normally distributed, we can use the properties of 
the multivariate normal distribution to arrive at the following expressions for the mean 
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It is natural to use this conditional mean as our best estimate of the change in 
governance, and the conditional variance as an indicator of the confidence we have in 
the estimate.  This is in fact exactly analogous to how we obtain estimates of levels of 
governance and associated standard errors using the unobserved components model 
described in Appendix D.   
 
                                                  
12 The simple example here is a special case of a more general model we discuss below.  18
To interpret these expressions, consider first the case where there is no 
persistence in governance or in the error terms, i.e. ρ=r=0.  In this case, our estimate of 
the change in governance is simply 
2 1
) 1 t ( y ) t ( y
σ +
− −
.  In particular, we should take the 




 to reflect 
the fact that the data measures governance with error.  It is also clear from Equation (2) 
that the higher is ρ, the more we should discount observed changes in governance.  
Intuitively, if we knew that governance changes very slowly over time, then any observed 
change in the data is more likely to reflect changes in the error term, and so we should 
discount this observed change more heavily.  In the limit where governance is perfectly 
correlated in the two periods, we would know for sure that any change observed in the 
data must reflect only fluctuations in the error term, and so we would completely 
discount the observed change in the data.  That is, our estimate of the change in 
governance would be zero regardless of the observed change in the data. 
 
The effect of persistence in the error terms works in the opposite direction:  we 
should scale down the observed change in the data by less the larger is the correlation 
over time in the error terms.  Again the intuition for this is simple – if we know that the 
error with which a given source measures governance is persistent over time, then any 
observed change in the source is likely to understate the true change in unobserved 
governance.  As a result our best estimate of the change in governance will be larger 
than the observed change in the data.  Interestingly, if the correlation in unobserved 
governance and the error term are equal to each other, i.e. ρ=r, then these two effects 






  How much confidence should we have in the statistical significance of the 
change in unobserved governance based on the observed data?  Suppose that we 
observe a change in the indicator equal to k standard deviations of the changes in this 
variable, i.e.  ( ) ρ − − ⋅ σ + ⋅ ⋅ = − − ) r 1 ( 1 2 k ) 1 t ( y ) t ( y
2 .  Does this signal a significant 
change in governance?  In order to test the null hypothesis that the change in 
governance is zero, we can construct the usual z-statistic associated with this  19
hypothesis, i.e. the ratio of the mean of the change in governance conditional on the 
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Not surprisingly, the observed change in the data is more likely to signal a significant 
change in unobserved governance the larger is the observed change in the data (i.e. the 
larger is k), and the lower is the signal-to-noise ratio in the data (i.e. the smaller is σ).  
And building on the intuitions above, the observed change in the data is also more likely 
to signal a significant change in unobserved governance the lower is the persistence in 
unobserved governance, ρ, and the higher is the persistence in the error term, r. 
 
  Figure 3 puts some numbers to this simple calculation.  We graph the number of 
standard deviations of the observed change in the data, k, on the horizontal axis, and we 
plot the z-statistic in Equation (3) on the vertical axis for different values of the key 
parameters.  We set σ
2=0.36, as this is the median value for the noise-to-signal ratio 
across all of the individual data sources we use to construct our six governance 
indicators in each of the five periods.  In an earlier paper we have argued that the noise-
to-signal ratio in objective measures of governance is likely to be at least as large as 
this.
13  The thin upward-sloping line traces out the z-statistic as a function of k for this 
value of the noise-to-signal ratio, but assuming that the correlation in governance and 
the error term are zero, i.e. ρ=r=0.  The z-statistic is greater than the 90-percent critical 
value for changes in the observed data that are more than one standard deviation away 
from the mean change.  This suggests that if there is no persistence in governance or in 
the error terms, quite a large proportion of observed changes in individual governance 
indicators would in fact signal a significant change in unobserved governance.  In fact, if 
changes in the observed governance indicator are approximately normally distributed, 
the largest one-third of all absolute changes would signal changes in governance that 
are significant at the 90% level. 
 
                                                  
13 See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004)  20
  The bold upward-sloping line corresponds to the more empirically relevant case 
where there is persistence in both governance and the error terms.  The line is drawn for 
the same noise-to-signal ratio as before, and in addition we assume that the correlation 
of unobserved governance over time is ρ=0.9 and the correlation in the error term is 
r=0.4.  In the next subsection we show how these parameters can be estimated using 
our governance data, and find that these values are typical ones.  In particular, we shall 
see shortly that unobserved governance tends to be highly persistent over the eight-year 
period spanned by our dataset, and although the error terms are also typically positively 
correlated over time they are much less so than governance.  Based on the intuitions 
developed above, this suggests that much larger observed changes in governance 
indicators would be required to signal statistically significant changes in unobserved 
governance.  This is exactly what we find.  The bold line crosses the 90% critical value 
at k=2.5, indicating that only those observed changes in the data more than 2.5 standard 
deviations away from the mean would signal a statistically significant change in 
governance.  Again, if changes in the observed governance indicators are normally 
distributed, this would imply that only the top one percent of all absolute changes would 
correspond to significant changes in governance.  This in turn suggests that drawing 
conclusions about changes in governance based on changes in individual governance 
indicators should be done with an abundance of caution. 
 
  In Figure 4 we use de jure and de facto data on business entry (discussed in 
more detail in the next section) as an illustration of the difficulty of identifying statistically 
significant changes over time in governance using individual indicators.  In this graph, 
we plot the change between 2003 and 2004 in the Global Competitiveness Survey 
question regarding the ease of business entry, against the change in the number of days 
required to start a business from the Doing Business project of the World Bank (see 
World Bank (2004)), taken over the same period.
14  We interpret both of these measures 
as providing noisy signals of changes in the regulatory environment.  From the 
discussion above, only the largest of these changes (in absolute value) are likely to 
signal statistically significant changes in underlying governance.  In particular, if we take 
our representative assumptions regarding the persistence in governance and in the error 
terms, we saw that only the top one percent of changes in the observed indicators signal 
                                                  
14 We would like to thank Caralee McLiesh for kindly providing the unpublished regulation of entry 
data for 2003.    21
changes in governance that are significant at the 90 percent level. Even if we relax our 
standards of significance to 75 percent, only changes in the observed data that are more 
than 1.8 standard deviations away from the mean, or about the top seven percent of all 
changes, will signal significant changes in governance in each individual indicator. This 
translates to roughly five large changes per indicator.  We have labeled the top five 
changes in absolute value for both indicators in Figure 4.   
 
Another striking observation from Figure 4 is that the correlation between the 
changes over time in these measures is virtually zero.   This illustrates the likelihood  
that relying on individual measures of governance to assess changes over time may 
lead to very different conclusions depending on which measure is chosen.  Further, it 
also suggests that aggregate indicators which combine information from several different 
sources might provide a more robust indicator of changes over time in governance.  In 
the next subsection we extend our discussion of the significance of changes over time in 
governance to the case of composite indicators in order to explore this more fully. 
 
 
3.2  Changes in Aggregate Indicators 
 
  We now elaborate on the previous discussion to address the problem of making 
inferences about changes over time in country governance based on our aggregate 
indicators.  Just as we found that aggregate indicators are more informative about levels 
of governance than individual indicators, changes over time in aggregate indicators can 
be more informative about trends in governance than changes in individual indicators.  
To formalize this we develop a two-period version of the unobserved components model 
that we have used to construct the aggregate indicators in each period.  We then use it 
to be more precise about the statistical significance of changes over time in our 
estimates of governance.   
 
Let y(j,k,t) denote the governance assessment provided by individual data source 
k in period t for country j.  We use a two-period version of the unobserved components 
model to express this observed data as a linear function of unobserved governance in 
country j at time t, g(j,t), and an error term capturing the various sources of 
measurement error that we have been discussing, ε(j,k,t):    22
 
(4)  ( ) ) t , k , j ( ) t , j ( g ) t , k ( ) t , k ( ) t , k , j ( y ε + ⋅ β + α =  
 
The intercept and slope parameters α(k,t) and β(k,t) vary by data source and over time.  
As in our single-period model we assume that unobserved governance and the error 
terms are normally distributed with mean zero.  We maintain the identifying assumption 
that unobserved governance and the all the error terms are mutually independent, i.e. 
[] 0 ) s , k , j ( ) t , j ( g E = ε ⋅  for all sources k and periods t and s, and  [ ] 0 ) s , m , j ( ) t , k , j ( E = ε ⋅ ε  for 
all sources k different from m and for all periods t and s.  We also maintain as a choice 
of units that the variance of unobserved governance is one in each period, i.e. 
[ ] 0 ) t , j ( g E
2 =  for all t.  Our only substantive new assumption is that unobserved 
governance is correlated over time, as are the error terms, i.e.  [ ] ρ = − ⋅ ) 1 t , j ( g ) t , j ( g E , and 
[] ) 1 t , k ( ) t , k ( r ) 1 t , k , j ( ) t , k , j ( E k − σ ⋅ σ ⋅ = − ε ⋅ ε , so that ρ and rk are the correlations over 
time of governance and the error term in source k, respectively. 
 
  Next let y(j,t) denote the Kx1 vector of observed data for each country; α(t), β(t), 
σ(t)
2 and r denote the Kx1 vectors of the parameters in period t; and let B(t), Σ(t) and R 
denote KxK matrices with the vectors β(t), σ(t)
2 and r on their diagonals.  Then using the 
properties of the multivariate normal distribution, the joint distribution of unobserved 
governance in the two periods in a country, conditional on the observed data for that 
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where B is a block-diagonal matrix with B(t) and B(t-1) on the diagonal, and ι is a Kx1 
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The conditional mean and variance in Equation (5) are just the two-period 
generalizations of the estimates of governance and their precision based on the one-
period unobserved components model that we used in Section 2, i.e. Equation (5) is the 
exact analog of Equations D2 and D3 in Appendix D.  In fact, if we set ρ=rk=0 for all 
sources k, then we recover exactly the estimates of governance that we had before.  
The advantage of this two-period formulation is that we now have specified the joint 
distribution of governance in the two periods for each country, conditional on the 
observed data in the two periods.  Since we have modeled the joint distribution over the 
two periods of governance, we can base inferences about governance in the two 
periods, as well as changes in governance, on this joint distribution.   We also note that 
the discussion of inference about changes over time in governance based on individual 




  We implement this two-period model using our actual dataset, over the period 
1996-2004.  We restrict attention to a balanced set of sources that are available in both 
periods for the two indicators.  In order to implement this calculation, we need to have 
estimates of the parameters of the model in both periods (the α’s, β’s, and σ’s), as well 
as estimates of the correlation over time of the errors in the individual sources (the r’s) 
and the correlation of unobserved governance itself, ρ.  We obtain these parameters in 
                                                  
15 To obtain Equation (5), note that the (2K+2)x1 vector( )' ) 1 t ( y ), t ( y ), 1 t ( g ), t ( g − −  is normally 
distributed with mean () ' ) 1 t ( ), t ( , 0 , 0 − α α  and variance-covariance matrix V with the following 
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= , and  ' B B V22 Ω = .  Standard results for the 
partitioned multivariate normal distribution imply that the distribution of governance conditional on 
the observed data is normal with mean and variance given by Equation (5). 
16 To see this, set the number of sources K=1 and assume that α(t)=0, β(t)=1, and σ(t)=σ for this 
one source.  Equation (5) then gives the conditional mean and variance of the level of 
governance in the two periods based on this single source.    The expected change in 
governance conditional on the data is then just the difference between the conditional means in 
the two periods, and the conditional variance of the change is just the sum of the variances in the 
two periods less twice the covariance.    24
two steps.  First, we estimate the one-period unobserved components model in 1996 
and in 2004, to obtain estimates of the α’s, β’s, and σ’s.  We refer to this as the “static 
model” estimates.  We also retrieve the estimates of governance and standard errors 
from the static model, to use as a basis for comparisons with the two-period model.  
Second, we calculate the correlation over time of these static estimates of governance 
as an estimate of ρ.  In this second step we also insert the estimated parameters of the 
static model into Equation (4) and retrieve estimates of the errors in the sources in the 
two periods as residuals.  The correlation over time in these estimated residuals serves 
as our estimate of the correlation in the errors.  We then insert all the estimated 
parameters, together with the data, into Equation (5) to obtain our final estimates of 
governance in the two periods conditional on the data, as well as the variance-
covariance matrix of these estimates.  We refer to these as the “dynamic model” 
estimates. 
 
  Table 7 summarizes the results of this calculation for the six governance 
indicators.  In the top panel we present some summary statistics to aid in the 
comparison of governance estimates based on the single-period, or static model, and 
the two-period, or dynamic model.  In the first two columns we report the correlation 
between the estimates of governance based on the static and dynamic models, in the 
two periods, 2004 and 1996.  These correlations are virtually one for all six indicators in 
both periods, suggesting that our estimates of the levels governance do not change very 
much if we take into account persistence in governance and in the error terms.  The third 
column reports the correlation of the change over time in the estimates of governance 
according to the two models.  In light of the high correlations in levels between the two 
models, it is not very surprising that the correlation of changes is also very high, 
averaging 0.93 across the six indicators. 
 
  The next two columns of Table 7 report the average absolute change in the 
governance estimates for the static and dynamic models.  These changes are roughly 
half as large in the dynamic model than in the static model, averaging 0.17 and 0.32 
respectively.  The reason the dynamic model gives much smaller estimates of the 
change in governance over time is because the estimated persistence in governance is 
quite strong relative to the estimated persistence in the error terms.  Averaging across 
the six indicators, the persistence in unobserved governance is estimated to be 0.89.   25
This is over twice as large as the persistence in the error terms, which averages 0.42 
across all sources and indicators.  Based on our intuitions from the simple example 
above, we should expect to find substantially smaller estimates of the change in 
governance when we take this pattern of persistence into account, and this is in fact 
what happens. 
 
  The bottom panel of Table 7 summarizes the consequences of this persistence 
for inference about changes in governance.  Formally our objective is to test the null 
hypothesis that the change in unobserved governance is zero conditional on the 
observed data.  We begin by calculating the z-statistic associated with this hypothesis 
for each country, using the static and dynamic models.  For the static model, we simply 
take the absolute change in our estimate of governance, and divide by the square root of 
the sum of the variances of the estimate of governance in the two periods.  For the 
dynamic model, we calculate the variance of the change in governance as the sum of 
the estimated variances in the two periods, minus twice the estimated covariance 
between the two periods.  The square root of this variance becomes the denominator of 
the z-statistic for the dynamic model.  The average z-statistics are smaller in the 
dynamic model than in the static model, again consistent with the intuitions developed 
above.  For the static model, the z-statistics average 0.82, as opposed to 0.59 for the 
dynamic model.  This in turn implies fewer statistically significant changes in governance 
based on the dynamic model, as reported in the next two columns.  The average number 
of significant changes at the 10 percent level falls by half from 21 to 10 once we take 
persistence into account.  
 
  Although a relatively small number of changes in the aggregate indicators signal 
statistically significant changes in unobserved governance, it is worth noting that the 
proportion of significant changes is much higher for the aggregate indicator than it is for 
individual indicators.  Recall from the previous subsection that only the top one percent 
of changes in an individual indicator with typical persistence in unobserved governance 
and the error term would be significant at the 90 percent level.  This is not because 
individual indicators do not register large changes for individual countries – in fact 
frequently they do so.  Rather, it is because the margins of error associated with 
changes in individual data sources are large.  In contrast, for the aggregate indicators 
we find that between five and seven percent of all changes signal statistically significant  26
changes in governance at the same significance level, reflecting the greater precision of 
the aggregate indicators.  This illustrates the benefits of aggregation for assessing 
changes over time, as well as levels, of governance.   
 
  We also note that a substantially larger proportion of changes in governance are 
significant if we relax the standard of significance to 75 percent, for example.  For the 
case of a typical individual indicator, we have already seen that the top seven percent of 
changes in the observed data would signal significant changes in unobserved 
governance.  For our composite indicators this fraction is higher.  For example, for the 
Voice and Accountability measure, seven percent of the changes are significant at the 
90 percent level, while 12 percent of changes, or 23 cases, would be significant at the 75 
percent level.  Finally, these calculations somewhat understate the number of significant 
changes because they are based on a subset of our data sources that are available in 
both periods – had more of our sources in 2004 been available in 1996, we would have 
had even more significant changes over time.
17  
 
  Finally, it is useful to compare the statistically significant changes in governance 
identified by the dynamic model with the “large” changes in governance we identified in 
Section 2.3 of this paper using a very simple rule of thumb.  We begin by identifying all 
changes in governance based on the static model for which the 90 percent confidence 
intervals in the two periods do not overlap, as per the rule of thumb.  Note that this is a 
more stringent condition for identifying significant changes in governance than the t-tests 
for the static model we have just discussed.
18  On average, there are nine significant 
changes in governance per indicator according to this rule of thumb applied to the simple 
static model, as compared with 10 in the dynamic model.  There is a remarkable degree 
of overlap between the significant changes identified by the rule of thumb and the 
dynamic model.  On average, eight of the nine changes identified by the rule of thumb 
are also significant in the dynamic model.  Moreover, comparing the second and third-
                                                  
17 We have also analyzed changes over the period 1998-2004, and find a similar proportion of 
changes to be statistically significant.  While on the one hand we are looking at changes in 
governance over a shorter period of time, on the other hand we have more data sources available 
in both periods on which to base our assessment of changes. 
18 Requiring 90 percent confidence intervals not to overlap is equivalent to requiring the absolute 
change in estimated governance to be larger than the sum of the standard errors in the two 
periods.  This sum is always larger than the square root of the sum of the squares of these 
standard errors.  27
last columns of this panel, it is clear that the dynamic model turns up very few significant 
changes not identified by the rule of thumb.  Although the simple rule of thumb and the 
more formal model turn up more or less the same set of significant changes in 
governance, it is important to note that the magnitude of these changes is substantially 
smaller in the formal dynamic model.  
In summary, we have developed a dynamic version of the single-period 
unobserved components model that we have used to construct our aggregate 
governance indicators.  The advantage of specifying a dynamic version of the model is 
that it allows us to make formal statistical inferences about changes in unobserved 
governance based on our changes in the composite governance indicators.  But this 
advantage comes at a cost.  The two-period model is substantially more complicated to 
implement, particularly when the set of underlying data sources is not the same in both 
periods.  Given that the number of data sources we use has expanded substantially over 
time, this is a significant limitation.  Fortunately, however, we have seen that using a 
simple rule of thumb for identifying large changes over time in our static or single-period 
estimates of governance corresponds quite closely to formal inference regarding the 
significance of changes in governance.   Because of this, we continue to use the single-
period unobserved components model to construct the aggregate governance indicators 
in each period, and recommend using the simple rule of thumb that 90 percent 
confidence intervals do not overlap for identifying changes in governance that are likely 
to be statistically significant. 28
4.  De Jure vs. De Facto Measures of Governance 
A recurrent theme in this paper is that individual sources of governance data are 
imperfect and provide only noisy signals of unobserved governance.  We emphasize at 
the outset that this problem is not unique to the subjective or perceptions-based 
measures of governance on which we rely.  Rather, it is pervasive in all efforts to 
measure governance, or any other socioeconomic variable for that matter.  What are the 
sources of this measurement error?  In the case of our governance data, we emphasize 
two distinct sources.  First, as always, specific concepts may be imperfectly measured.  
Survey responses to a question such as “is it difficult to start a business?” reflect 
sampling variation in the survey.  Expert assessments of the difficulty of starting a 
business rely on the imperfect information available to such experts, and hence also 
contain measurement error.  Second, and perhaps more important, is that there are 
inevitably gaps between the specific concept being measured and the broader notion of 
governance that it is intended to proxy.  For example, the ease of starting a business is 
just one of many dimensions of the regulatory environment, and as such is an imperfect 
proxy even if the narrow concept of business entry regulation were perfectly measured.   
This broad notion of measurement error clearly also applies to “objective” or 
quantifiable measures of governance.  Consider for example the very useful “Doing 
Business” project of the World Bank, which has compiled objective measures of various 
dimensions of the regulatory environment across countries, by interviewing law firms 
around the world about formal rules and regulations in their countries.  These measures 
are subject to the same two sources of measurement error.  As always there may be 
gaps between the de jure rules on the books, and their de facto application.  And as with 
the subjective measures, there are gaps between this specific dimension of regulation 
and the overall quality of the regulatory environment.  The same limitations apply to 
many other objective measures of governance that have been proposed.   Trade taxes 
as a share of total tax revenue has been suggested as a proxy variable for the ability 
and willingness of the government to broaden its tax base.  This measure is also subject 
to measurement error given the dubious quality of data on public finances in many 
developing countries, and moreover is an imperfect proxy of a government’s fiscal 
capability.  Similarly, although it is easy to observe whether a country has an 
independent anti-corruption commission, it is much more difficult to measure whether 
such a commission is in fact independent or empowered to act.  29
 
   Although objective indicators of governance are subject to measurement error, 
this uncertainty is rarely quantified or made explicit.  In an earlier paper we made an 
effort to quantify the margins of error associated with several leading objective indicators 
of governance.
19  We found that this broad notion of measurement error was as 
important for objective indicators as for the subjective indicators we develop.  We did not 
however attempt to distinguish between the two sources of measurement error:  difficulty 
in measuring specific concepts, on the one hand, and the gap between specific concepts 
and broader notions of governance, on the other.  In this section of the paper we make 
an effort to focus on the first source of measurement error.  In particular, we focus on 
understanding the gaps between de facto perceptions of quite specific dimensions of 
governance, and the corresponding de jure regulations. 
 
We consider two measures of the de facto environment facing firms, taken from 
the survey of over 8000 firms in 104 countries carried out by the World Economic Forum 
in 2004 as an input to their Global Competitive Report.  These two variables capture 
firms’ assessment of the ease of starting a business, as well as their reported tax 
burden.
 20  We match these with two closely-related de jure measures from other 
sources.  For ease of starting a business, we draw on the Doing Business project at the 
World Bank discussed above.  From this dataset we take the number of days required to 
start a business.  For perceptions of the tax burden, we have independently collected 
statutory tax rates for the sampled countries, and within it, for the types of firms by 
sector, and mapped these rates into the firm level data.  We then aggregate these up to 
the country level to obtain average measures of the statutory tax burden.
21   
                                                  
19 See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004). 
20 For the past number of years, collaboration between WBI and the WEF has resulted in an in-
depth coverage of governance in the survey, and in the WBI contribution of a governance chapter 
for each GCR.  For details on the data we use for the text described above, and the related 
coverage of these governance issues at the micro-level, see the Governance chapter in the GCR 
2004, at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/gcr2004.html. 
21 The main source for the effective tax rates was the PricewaterhouseCoopers report “Corporate 
taxes: worldwide summaries (2003-2004)”, covering 85 of our sample of 104 countries. As some 
countries have differential tax rates, to map the country-level data from the report to the individual 
firm-level data from the GCS we used, in addition to country criterion, individual characteristics 
such as size, sector, and whether the firm exports or not. For those countries for which the report 
has no information we used the country average calculated by KPMG in their “Corporate tax rate 
survey”.  30
We begin with simple ordinary least squares regressions of perceptions of ease 
of starting a business on the corresponding objective measure (first column of Table 8).  
Not surprisingly, the objective measure enters negatively and is highly statistically 
significant with a t-statistic of more than five, indicating that firms perceive it more difficult 
to start a business in countries where the number of days required to do so is large.  
More interesting for our purposes is the observation that the R-squared of the regression 
is very modest, at only 0.23.   
 
We cannot say at this point whether this reflects measurement error in the 
subjective or the objective measure, as either one would contribute to a low R-squared.  
One hypothesis however is that the objective measure fails to capture the extent to 
which the formal requirements to start a business are altered by the presence of 
corruption or other forms of informality in their application.  To investigate this possibility 
we add our aggregate measure of Control of Corruption to the regression.
22  We find that 
this variable enters positively and highly significantly, indicating that perceptions of the 
ease of starting a business are significantly better in countries with less corruption, even 
after controlling for the de jure rules governing business entry.  Once we add corruption, 
the coefficient on the de jure rules falls by half, and its significance also drops to the 10 
percent level.  Moreover the adjusted R-squared of the regression doubles to 0.44, 
indicating substantial explanatory power for this additional variable. 
 
There is however an obvious difficulty with this result.  It could well be the case 
that firms’ responses to the question regarding business entry are non-specific, in the 
sense that they will provide low responses if their assessment of the overall business 
environment is negative.  This generalized dissatisfaction could account for the 
significance of the corruption variable, rather than the extent to which business entry 
procedures are tainted by corruption.  We address this possibility in the next three 
columns.  One test for this problem of non-specificity is to ask whether unrelated 
objective measures of the business environment also predict perceptions about ease of 
entry.  We do this in the third column by adding the objective tax burden question to the 
regression.  If firm responses reflect generalized dissatisfaction, we might expect this 
variable also to enter significantly, yet it does not.  In the fourth column we instead add 
                                                  
22 Recognizing that the dependent variable is one of many individual data sources entering in the 
regression, we lag the corruption measure and use the 2002 version.  31
firms’ responses to a question about the overall regulatory environment that they face.  
Again we find that corruption remains highly significant, and in this case the general 
question about regulation is also highly significant.  This suggests that while non-
specificity of responses may be a concern, it does not fully account for the significance 
of the corruption measure in the previous specifications.  Interestingly, in both 
specifications, we find that the coefficient on the objective entry measure becomes larger 
and more significant as we add these control variables.  Finally we note that all these 
results go through when we put all four variables in the regression. 
 
  The second and third panels of Table 8 reveal interesting differences between 
developing countries on the one hand, and OECD and newly-industrialized countries, on 
the other.  In the developing country sample, the results described above go through for 
the most part.  However, it is interesting to note that the magnitude and significance of 
the objective measure is in general smaller in the developing country sample, and larger 
in the industrial country sample, while the converse is true for the corruption variable.  
Taken together these results suggest that firm perceptions of the ease of starting a 
business depend on both de jure rules, as well as the institutional environment in which 
those rules are applied.  Moreover, the relative importance of de jure rules seems to be 
higher in industrial than in developing countries.  More broadly, the lesson from this 
simple exercise is that it can be misleading to rely exclusively on either perceptions of de 
facto governance or objective measures of the de jure rules. 
 
  We perform the same sequence of regressions using the question on 
perceptions of tax burdens from GCS as the dependent variable.  The results are 
broadly similar to those discussed above, and are reported in the continuation of Table 
8.  In the full sample of countries, we find that perceptions of tax burdens are strongly 
correlated with our de jure measure of statutory tax rates.  While in the full sample of 
countries we do not find corruption to enter significantly, it does in the developing 
country sample where we might expect corruption to matter more for perceptions of the 
tax burden.  As before, we address the possibility that the tax burden question captures 
generalized dissatisfaction rather than a specific concern with taxation by including the 
objective measure of days to start a business, and we find that the corruption variable 
remains significant.  Also consistent with our priors, we find that differences in statutory 
tax rates have much stronger explanatory power for perceptions of tax burden in the  32
industrial country sample.  While the overall results are not quite as strong as for the 
business entry example discussed above, qualitatively the picture that emerges is quite 
similar. 
 
In sum, the results suggest that assessments of governance should not be based 
solely on objective measures of the de jure situation.  We have seen that firms’ 
perceptions of the ease of starting a business, and the weight of their tax burden, 
depend not only on the de jure regulations that they face, but also on the environment in 
which these regulations are applied.  Many laws and regulations are often adopted, yet 
implementation is subverted due to the many informal mechanisms that often prevail.  In 
these settings frequently the essence of how policies and regulations are actually 
implemented may be missed by objective indicators.  This is not to say, of course, that 
firm-based surveys of perceptions are devoid of margins of error and related challenges.  
Rather, the results we have shown emphasize the importance of relying on a range of 
measures to assess governance, and on recognizing that no single measure is a perfect 
proxy for governance.   
 
   33
5.  Interpreting Governance-Income Correlations 
 
  In this section of the paper we briefly discuss two methodological issues that 
arise in interpreting the strong positive correlation observed between measures of 
governance and per capita income across countries.  We first consider – and discount – 
the possibility that these strong correlations are a consequence of “halo effects”, i.e. an 
upward bias in perceptions of governance in rich countries simply because they are rich.  
We also discuss – and refute – the argument that the weak governance performance of 
countries in Africa should be discounted in some sense because these countries are 
poor. 
 
5.1  Halo Effects 
 
  Perceptions-based measures of governance such as the ones we develop here 
are potentially subject to a number of biases.  One common critique is that perceptions 
of governance are biased upwards in rich countries because respondents view the 
development success of the country in question as evidence that institutional quality is 
good.  This type of bias is sometimes referred to as a “halo effect”.
23  This in turn implies 
that part of the observed high correlation between per capita incomes and governance 
spuriously reflects this bias.   
 
  To formalize the idea of halo effects, suppose that we can write our observed 
estimates of governance, g*, as the sum of true governance, g, and an error term, u: 
 
(6)  u g * g + =  
 
The essence of the halo effect argument is that this error term u is correlated with per 
capita incomes, y.  The relevant question then is the extent to which this spurious 
correlation can account for the high observed correlation between measured governance 
and per capita incomes.  Intuitively, it should be clear that in order for halo effects to 
substantially account for the correlation between incomes and measured governance, it 
                                                  
23 A recent statement of this critique can be found in Glaeser , La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2004), who assert that much of the correlation between subjective measures of 
governance and levels of development is attributable to this type of bias.  34
must be the case that the correlation between the error and income is large.  Perhaps 
less obviously, it must also be the case that the variance of the error term is large 
relative to the variation in governance.  Otherwise, even if the error term is strongly 
correlated with income, the fact that it accounts for little of the variance in measured 
governance means that it will have little impact on the correlation between measured 
governance and per capita income.  Our argument in a nutshell is that for reasonable 
assumptions on the importance of measurement error, this measurement error would 
have to be implausibly highly correlated with per capita incomes in order to constitute a 
significant source of bias. 
 
To formalize this intuition, we decompose the observed correlation between 
measured governance and per capita income into a term reflecting the true correlation 
between governance and income, and a term attributable to the halo effect: 
 
(7)  ) y , u ( CORR s ) y , g ( CORR s 1 ) y *, g ( CORR ⋅ + ⋅ − =  
 
where  *] g [ V / ] u [ V s=  is a measure of how noisy the governance indicator is.  Note also 
that the correlation between measured governance and per capita income that we see in 
the data is around 0.8. 
 
  To understand this expression, suppose that the true correlation between 
governance and income were zero, so that all of the observed correlation between 
income and governance is due to the second term capturing halo effects.  This consists 
of two ingredients:  the actual correlation of the error term with per capita income, which 
is multiplied by the square root of the share of the variance in governance due to the 
error term.  Suppose that the governance indicator is very noisy so that the share of the 
variance approaches one.  Then the correlation of the error term with per capita income 
must be equal to the observed correlation in the data.  Suppose however that the 
governance indicator is at least somewhat informative, so that s is less than one.  Then 
in order to match the observed correlation in the data, the halo effect correlation in the 
error term must be even larger than the 0.8 observed in the data.  This example 
illustrates how the importance of halo effects in accounting for the observed correlation 
between governance and per capita income depends on both the strength of the halo  35
effect itself, as well as the relative importance of measurement error in the governance 
indicator.  
 
  This example is extreme because we have assumed that the true correlation 
between governance and income is zero.  We now relax this assumption and revisit the 
question of how strong halo effects need to be to account for the observed correlation 
between measured governance and per capita income of 0.8.  We do this with the help 
of Figure 5, which graphs the strength of the halo effect, i.e. CORR[u,y], on the vertical 
axis, against the share of the variance in governance due to the residual, i.e. s, on the 
horizontal axis.  The different lines on the graph correspond to different assumptions for 
the true correlation between governance and income.  We have already discussed the 
intuition for the case where this correlation is zero, shown as the highest line in the 
graph.  When the share of the variance in governance due to measurement error is one, 
the halo effect correlation must be equal to 0.8.  As we move to the left and the 
governance indicator becomes more informative, the required correlation increases.  
 
  The lines corresponding to successively higher true correlations between 
governance and income fall everywhere below the first series.  This is because once we 
allow for some correlation between true governance and income, the halo effect needed 
to account for the correlation between observed governance and income is weaker.  
Interestingly, however, even if the true correlation is quite substantial at 0.6, the lowest 
line in Figure 5 tells us that halo effects must still be quite considerable, with a 
correlation of at least 0.5, to match the observed data.
24   This lower bound occurs for 
intermediate values of the share of the variance of governance due to measurement 
error.  It is also interesting to ask what a reasonable value for this share might be, in 
order to pin down more precisely how strong halo effects must be.  One way to do so is 
to consider the standard errors of the governance estimates, which average around 0.25 
as compared with the standard deviation of measured governance of 1.  This suggests 
that the share of the variance of governance due to the error term is in fact quite small at 
s=0.25
2=0.06.   For this low variance share, the halo effect correlation would need to be 
                                                  
24 We do not consider higher values for the true correlation than 0.6.  This is because we are 
trying to see the extent to which halo effects might result in an observed correlation of 0.8 which 
is substantially higher than the true correlation.  If the observed correlation and the true 
correlation are close to each other, then the halo effects argument becomes unimportant 
empirically.  36
0.9 in order to match the observed data.  If the true correlation between governance and 
income were much lower, for example at 0.4, then even if measurement error in 
governance were perfectly correlated with per capita income it would not be possible to 
generate the observed correlation between governance and per capita incomes.   
 
This strong conclusion is driven by the assumption that that measurement error 
accounts for a relatively small portion of the variation in observed governance.  As a 
result this measurement error needs to be very highly correlated with incomes in order to 
match the data.  One could argue that we are understating the importance of 
measurement error by relying on the estimated standard errors from our governance 
indicators.  After all, these are based on the assumption that measurement error is 
uncorrelated across different sources of governance data.  However, if halo effects are 
important, the measurement error in individual sources will be correlated not only with 
per capita income, but also with each other.  This in turn would imply a greater 
imprecision of the governance estimates.  To capture this possibility, suppose that the 
standard error of the governance estimates were twice as large as what we actually 
have, at 0.5.
25  This implies s=0.25, and for this value of s we can see from Figure 5 that 
the halo effect correlation would still need to be very high at almost 0.6 in order to match 
the data. 
 
  In summary, these results suggest to us that although halo effects may well be 
present in perceptions-based measures of governance, these halo effects need to be 
implausibly strong in order to impart a substantial upward bias in the correlation between 
measured governance and per capita incomes.  Moreover, it is worth noting that there 
may well be other factors offsetting such halo effects.  One is the tendency of survey 
respondents in developed countries to be particularly critical of their own institutions.
26  It 
is also worth noting that some cross-country polls of experts deliberately apply higher 
standards to rich countries when assessing their governance.
27  Overall, then, we do not 
                                                  
25 In Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), Table 5, we show that the estimated margins of 
error would be roughly twice as large if we assume that the correlation of error terms across 
sources is 0.5 instead of 0. 
26 For treatments of these effects in survey data, see Kaufmann and  Wei (1999) and Hellman, 
Kaufmann  and Schankerman (2000)  
27 For example, in our discussions with PRS, we learned that this source penalizes rich countries 
that in their view have the resources to reduce corruption but fail to do so.  37
think that halo effects are a significant source of bias in the correlations between 
governance and per capita incomes our data.
28 
 
5.2  Controlling for Income in Governance Comparisons 
 
  In a recent paper, Sachs and others (2004) have argued that weak governance is 
not a major factor in Africa’s poor growth performance.  The argument is that, once we 
control for per capita income, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have particularly 
poor governance indicators.  This point is illustrated in Figure 6, which plots our 2004 
Rule of Law measure (on the vertical axis) against the logarithm of real per capita GDP 
in the mid-1990s (on the horizontal axis).   Note that the per capita income variable has 
been rescaled to have mean zero and standard deviation of one, as does the 
governance indicator. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are highlighted in red.  A striking 
observation from this graph is that over half (27 out of 46) of the countries in the region 
actually fall above the simple ordinary least squares regression line, shown in black.  At 
first glance, this appears to lend credence to the argument that governance in Africa is 
on average what one might expect given the region’s low income levels.   
 
  However, it is misleading to conclude from this simple graph that Africa’s 
governance performance is reasonable given its per capita income.  This interpretation 
of the graph is valid only to the extent that the OLS regression line would capture a 
causal relationship from higher income to better governance.  But a large body of 
research indicates that there is substantial causation in the other direction as well – 
better governance leads to higher incomes.  Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated 
effect of governance on per capita incomes in the long run is large.
29 Available estimates 
suggest that a one standard deviation improvement in governance would lead to a two- 
to three-fold difference in income levels in the long run.  A one standard deviation 
change in governance would correspond to, for example the difference between Kenya 
                                                  
28 It is of course possible that halo effects are associated with countries’ recent growth 
performance, rather than with income levels.  We can use the analysis of this section to consider 
this case as well.  The main insight is that since the correlation between recent growth and 
governance is typically fairly modest, growth-related halo effects would not need to be as large in 
order to impart a proportionately larger bias to this correlation. 
29 See for example Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000), Kaufmann 
and Kraay (2002), Alcala and Ciccone (2004), Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), and 
Rigobon and Rodrik (2004).  38
and Turkey on our 2004 Rule of Law indicator.  This means that the simple OLS 
relationship will exaggerate the positive effects of income on governance because it also 
reflects the strong effect in the opposite direction, from governance to incomes. In order 
to compare governance in Sub-Saharan Africa to what might be expected given income 
levels, we need to first isolate these two directions of causation, so to be able to focus in 
particular on the causal effect of income on governance.   
 
  The red and green lines in Figure 6 show two alternative estimates of the causal 
effect of income on governance.  The (slightly) upward-sloping one, in red, comes from 
Rigobon and Rodrik (2004).  They study the causal relationships between per capita 
income, democracy, rule of law, openness to international trade, and geography, using 
identification through heteroskedasticity to isolate the causal effects.
30  As expected, this 
red line is substantially flatter than the OLS regression line, consistent with the intuition 
that the latter relationship overstated the true causal effect of incomes on governance.  
This flattening has important consequences for our conclusions about the quality of 
governance in Africa controlling for income levels.  Once we isolate this much weaker 
effect of income on governance, we find that only 7 out of 46 countries in the region fall 
above the regression line:  Ghana, Lesotho, Cape Verde, Namibia, South Africa, 
Botswana, and Mauritius.  In contrast, the vast majority of countries in Africa have 
governance that is worse than their income levels would predict.    
 
 The weakly downward-sloping green line presents another estimate of the effect 
of income on governance, coming from Kaufmann and Kraay (2002).  In this paper we 
used a different approach to identification and found a zero or even negative impact of 
income on governance.  While this finding may be somewhat extreme, it leads to the 
same conclusions regarding the quality of governance in Africa – now only 6 out of 46 
countries in the region fall above the regression line, indicating governance levels better 
than what per capita incomes would predict.   
                                                  
30 We use their specification excluding democracy, which implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in log per capita GDP improves rule of law by 0.14 standard deviations.  They use a 
different measure of rule of law for the mid-1990s taken from Knack and Keefer (1995).  
However, its correlation with our rule of law indicator is above 0.8, so we can reasonably use the 
estimated coefficient from this paper with our governance indicator, suitably standardized.  Note 
also that in the system of equations estimated by Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) the conditional 
expectation of governance given per capita income also reflects the indirect effects of income on 
openness, which in turn affects the rule of law.  However, these estimated indirect effects are so 
small that our conclusions are essentially unaffected by ignoring them.  39
 
Overall this evidence suggests that it would be inappropriate to discount the 
governance performance of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa based on their low income 
levels.  The reason is simple.  The only way to justify such a discount is to argue that 
higher incomes exert a positive causal effect on governance.  But available evidence 
suggests that the causal impact of incomes on governance is small.  Rather, the 
observed correlation between governance and per capita incomes primarily reflects 
causation in the other direction:  better governance raises per capita incomes.   
  40
6.  Conclusions 
 
There is by now broad consensus among academics and policymakers alike that 
good governance matters for economic development.  There is also growing awareness 
in the aid community that good governance matters for the effectiveness of development 
assistance.  In light of this it is important to be able to measure levels and changes over 
time in governance across countries.  This paper represents the latest installment of our 
aggregate governance indicators which seek to provide such information.  Relative to 
previous years, these indicators reflect a significant expansion of our underlying data set 
of several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn 
from 37 separate data sources. 
 
In our work we have emphasized the difficulty of measuring governance.  We 
have argued that one of the strengths of our composite governance indicators is that 
they can be more informative than individual data sources: on average the aggregation 
reduces the margin of error by about one-half.  Further, given the increasing number of 
separate data sources now at our disposal to construct these aggregate indicators, we 
find that the margins of error of the latest period under measure are smaller than in 
earlier periods.  However, these margins of error, even in our most recent aggregate 
indicators, still remain substantial, and thus all our previous cautionary suggestions 
regarding interpretation continue to apply.    
 
At the same time, we have emphasized that these margins of error are not 
unique to perceptions-based measures of governance, but are an important feature of all 
efforts to measure governance.  In fact, in previous work we have documented that 
objective measures also have substantial margins of error.  Moreover, we believe that 
the type of perceptions data on which we rely provides insights into governance that are 
difficult to obtain from more objective or quantifiable measures.  For example, we show 
that firms’ perceptions of the difficulty of starting a new business, or of their tax burdens, 
do not depend solely on the relevant legal framework governing business entry and 
taxation.  Rather, firms’ views on these issues are also importantly influenced by the 
degree of corruption in their country (particularly so in developing countries), suggesting 
that not only do formal rules matter, but also the institutional environment in which these 
rules are applied and enforced.  Thus, wherever objective data on governance or  41
investment climate are collected (such as de jure data of the numbers of steps required 
by the regulations to start a business), a comprehensive analysis of governance and 
institutional change ought to be complemented by data from the reports of the economic 
agents on the ground, such as firms or users of services, which inevitably will contain an 
element of subjectivity. 
 
  Policymakers are often particularly interested in trends in institutional quality:  is 
governance improving or worsening over time in a particular country?  As we have 
emphasized in our work, the presence of measurement error in all types of governance 
indicators, including our own, makes assessing trends in governance a challenging 
undertaking.  In this paper we developed a formal statistical methodology, as well as a 
simple rule of thumb, for identifying changes in governance that are likely to be 
statistically and practically significant.  Over the eight-year period from 1996-2004 
spanned by our governance indicators, we find that in about  5 to 7 percent of countries  
we can be confident (at the 90 percent significance level) that governance has changed 
substantially.  And at a lower 75 percent significance level, roughly 20 percent of all 
observed changes stand out as significant.  Importantly, we show that there is a great 
deal of agreement among our many data sources about the direction of change in 
governance in these countries.  Overall this reminds us that while often institutional 
quality changes takes place haltingly, gradually, or not at all, there are also countries 
where one can point to sharp improvements or deteriorations even over a fairly short 
eight-year period.  Significant and rapid institutional change, while not the norm, is 
feasible and does take place in practice.  
 
  Finally, we have discussed two important issues that arise in interpreting the 
strong positive correlation between governance and income levels.  Some observers 
have argued that these positive correlations are substantially due to “halo effects” – 
perceptions of governance in rich countries are good simply because the countries are 
rich.  We have argued that such halo effects would need to be implausibly large to 
account for cross-country correlations between governance and incomes.   
 
We have also considered the frequently-heard argument that poor levels of 
governance should be significantly discounted where the country is poor.  Put differently, 
to what extent does it make sense to ask whether a country is well or poorly governed  42
given its income level?   This issue is often raised in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where too many countries are both very poor, and very poorly governed.  We make the 
simple observation that in order to answer this question, it is necessary to isolate the 
causal impact of income levels on governance.  Simply relying on the observed 
correlation is inappropriate, as much of this reflects strong causal effects running from 
governance to per capita incomes.   While identifying the effects of income on 
governance is difficult, the few available estimates suggest that this feedback effect is 
minimal.  As a result, there is little basis on which to argue that the poor governance 
performance many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa should be discounted simply based 
on low income levels.  
 
In conclusion, it is important to keep some perspective on this contribution.  
While these aggregate governance indicators have been useful in providing a general 
snapshot of the countries of the world for various broad components of governance, now 
for 8 years, and while the margins of error have declined over time, they remain a rather 
blunt instrument for specific policy advice at the country level.  As we have argued in the 
past, these aggregate indicators need to be complemented with in-depth in-country 
governance diagnostics, based on micro-surveys of households, firms and public 
officials within the country.  The lessons being drawn from these combined aggregate 
and micro-data sets do point to the importance of moving concretely to the next stage of 
governance reforms, in Africa and elsewhere.  These, among others, are to stress 
reforms in transparency (such as natural resource revenue transparency mechanisms, 
disclosure of assets of politicians, voting records of parliamentarians, political campaign 
contributions, and fiscal accounts), in altering incentives in institutions so to increasingly 
focus on prevention and deterrence (rather than overly relying on prosecutions), and in 
working more closely with other key actors outside the public sector as well, such as the 
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Source Publication Code Type 1/ Coverage 2/ sentative 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
African Development Bank* Country Policy & Institutional Assessments ADB P 50 x x x
Afrobarometer Afrobarometer Survey AFR S 12 x x
Asian Development Bank* Country Policy & Institutional Assessments ASD P 26 x x x
Bertelsmann Foundation* Bertelsmann Transformation Index BTI P 116 x
Brown University's Center for Public Policy* Global E-Governance EGV P 192 x x x
Business Environment Risk Intelligence Business Risk Service BRI P 50 x x x x x
Business Environment Risk Intelligence Qualitative Risk Measure QLM P 115 x x x x x x
Columbia University State Capacity Project CDU P 98 x x x x
Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Service EIU P 115 x x x x x x
European Bank for Reconstruction & Development Transition Report EBR P 26 x x x x x
Freedom House* Countries at the Crossroads CCR P 30 x
Freedom House Nations in Transition FHT P 27 x x x x x
Freedom House Freedom in the World FRH P 192 x x x x x x
Furnar* Index of Budget Transparency LAI S 10 x x
Gallup International Gallup Millennium Survey GMS S 60 x
Gallup International 50th Anniversary Survey GLP S 44 x
Gallup International Voice of the People Survey GAL S 62 x x
Global Insight's DRI McGraw-Hill Country Risk Review DRI P 111 x x x x x x
Heritage Foundation/Wallstreet Journal Economic Freedom Index HER P 161 x x x x x x
IJET Travel Intelligence* Country Security Risk Assessment IJT P 167 x x
 
1/ P=Poll, S=Survey
2/ Countries included in most recently available version of source


















Source Publication Code Type 1/ Coverage 2/ sentative 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Institute for Management and Development World Competitiveness Yearbook WCY S 49 xxxxx
International Research & Exchanges Board* Media Sustainability Index MSI P 18 x x
Latinobarometro Latinobarometro Surveys LBO S 17 xxxxx
Merchant International Group* Gray Area Dynamics MIG P 155 x x x
Political & Economic Risk Consultancy* Corruption Survey PRC S 14 x x x x
P o l i t i c a l  R i s k  S e r v i c e s I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o u n t r y  R i s k  G u i d e P R S P 1 4 0 x xxxxx
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Opacity Index PWC S 35 x
Reporters Without Borders Reporters Without Borders RSF P 138 x x x
State Department / Amnesty International Human Rights Dataset HUM / PTS P 192 x xxxxx
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa* Africa Governance Indicators AGI P 23 x x x
USAID / Vanderbilt University* Democracy Surveys in Central America USD S 8 x
World Bank Business Enterprise Environment Survey BPS S 27 x x x
World Bank World Business Environment Survey WBS S 80 x x x
W o r l d  B a n k C o u n t r y  P o l i c y  &  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e s s m e n t sP I A P 1 3 6 xxxxx
World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report GCS S 104 x xxxxx
World Economic Forum Africa Competitiveness Report GCSA S 23 x
World Markets Research Center World Markets Online WMO P 202 x x x
1/ P=Poll, S=Survey
2/ Countries included in most recently available version of source
* indicates new source added in 2004 53
 























1996 192 165 180 182 167 151 173
1998 192 166 184 185 186 184 183
2000 192 166 187 188 188 187 185
2002 199 186 202 197 197 197 196
2004 207 207 209 204 208 204 207
Median Number of Sources Per Country
1996 4 4 4 4 6 4 4
1998 4 4 4 4 7 5 5
2000 5 6 6 5 8 7 6
2002 7 7 8 7 10 8 8
2004 8 8 9 8 11 8 9
Proportion of Countries with Only One Data Source
1996 0.15 0.13 0.21 0.15 0.07 0.18 0.15
1998 0.14 0.10 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.14
2000 0.14 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08
2002 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
2004 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
Average Standard Error
1996 0.26 0.36 0.29 0.34 0.26 0.29 0.30
1998 0.25 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.25 0.25 0.28
2000 0.25 0.32 0.25 0.32 0.22 0.24 0.27
2002 0.21 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.22 54
 




Control of Corruption WMO DRI GCS
2004 2000 1996 2004 2004 2004
Probability of Being
Above the Median Is:
Number of Countries
B e l o w  1 0 % 1 71 51 61 0 5 3
B e l o w  2 5 % 2 42 41 91 71 1 6
Between 25% and 75% 20 20 18 38 11 12
A b o v e  7 5 % 2 62 51 51 51 21 2
Above 90% 23 22 11 6 7 8
Total Number of Countries 70 69 52 70 34 30
Proportion of Countries
Below 10% 0.24 0.22 0.31 0.14 0.15 0.10
Below 25% 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.24 0.32 0.20
Between 25% and 75% 0.29 0.29 0.35 0.54 0.32 0.40
Above 75% 0.37 0.36 0.29 0.21 0.35 0.40
Above 90% 0.33 0.32 0.21 0.09 0.21 0.27








Governance Score Sources available in both periods
Sources 
Added Weights
















BIH BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA -0.14 -1.20 1.07 2 0 0 1.00 8 -0.19 -0.11 0.27 0.74
CAF CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC -1.20 -0.17 -1.03 2 0 0 1.00 3 -1.08 -1.24 0.67 0.36
HRV CROATIA 0.46 -0.50 0.96 4 0 0 1.00 7 0.34 0.72 0.74 0.27
ERI ERITREA -1.96 -1.10 -0.86 1 1 0 1.00 4 -1.75 -2.03 0.62 0.41
GMB GAMBIA -0.59 -1.34 0.75 3 0 0 1.00 5 -0.46 -0.74 0.65 0.38
GHA GHANA 0.39 -0.35 0.74 4 0 0 1.00 8 0.38 0.36 0.61 0.41
HTI HAITI -1.50 -0.46 -1.03 3 0 0 1.00 5 -1.66 -1.18 0.53 0.49
IDN INDONESIA -0.44 -1.15 0.71 4 0 1 0.80 7 -0.33 -0.53 0.58 0.44
ISR ISRAEL 0.46 1.07 -0.62 4 0 1 0.80 5 0.45 0.38 0.78 0.24
CIV IVORY COAST -1.46 -0.19 -1.27 4 0 0 1.00 4 -1.34 -1.54 0.71 0.32
KGZ KYRGYZ REPUBLIC -1.06 -0.48 -0.58 3 0 0 1.00 6 -1.03 -1.02 0.66 0.35
MEX MEXICO 0.36 -0.23 0.59 5 0 1 0.83 8 0.42 0.21 0.64 0.38
NPL NEPAL -1.00 0.14 -1.13 2 0 0 1.00 6 -0.87 -1.02 0.44 0.58
NGA NIGERIA -0.65 -1.49 0.84 4 0 0 1.00 9 -0.71 -0.54 0.52 0.50
PER PERU -0.04 -0.73 0.69 3 0 2 0.60 7 0.07 -0.23 0.65 0.37
SLE SIERRA LEONE -0.49 -1.37 0.88 2 0 1 0.67 5 -0.29 -0.67 0.53 0.49
SVK SLOVAK REPUBLIC 1.10 0.37 0.72 5 0 0 1.00 5 1.06 1.04 0.86 0.16
YUG SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 0.12 -1.38 1.50 4 0 0 1.00 7 -0.06 0.22 0.36 0.65
ZWE ZIMBABWE -1.48 -0.30 -1.18 4 0 0 1.00 6 -1.60 -1.21 0.55 0.47
Political Stability
ALB ALBANIA -0.97 0.20 -1.17 2 0 1 0.67 3 -0.60 -1.19 0.59 0.48
DZA ALGERIA -1.42 -2.78 1.36 3 0 1 0.75 5 -1.18 -1.46 0.58 0.46
AGO ANGOLA -0.95 -2.17 1.22 4 0 0 1.00 4 -0.73 -1.07 0.63 0.42
AZE AZERBAIJAN -1.52 -0.40 -1.12 2 0 1 0.67 5 -1.46 -1.32 0.53 0.52
BEN BENIN -0.37 1.20 -1.56 1 0 0 1.00 4 0.23 -0.52 0.28 0.80
CAF CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC -1.43 -0.01 -1.42 1 0 0 1.00 3 -1.13 -1.30 0.33 0.76
HTI HAITI -1.87 -0.21 -1.66 2 0 0 1.00 4 -1.06 -1.98 0.36 0.71
HKG HONG KONG 1.30 0.30 1.00 3 0 1 0.75 5 0.80 1.60 0.54 0.51
IDN INDONESIA -1.38 -0.45 -0.93 6 0 0 1.00 6 -1.33 -1.20 0.60 0.44
CIV IVORY COAST -2.28 0.32 -2.60 4 0 0 1.00 4 -2.11 -2.04 0.59 0.45
KGZ KYRGYZ REPUBLIC -0.91 0.76 -1.68 2 0 0 1.00 4 -0.77 -0.86 0.45 0.61
LAO LAOS -0.76 1.20 -1.95 1 0 0 1.00 3 -0.99 -0.51 0.33 0.76
LBY LIBYA -0.02 -1.59 1.57 3 0 1 0.75 2 -0.13 0.26 0.75 0.30
MKD MACEDONIA -1.04 0.21 -1.25 1 1 0 1.00 6 -0.75 -1.06 0.39 0.66
NPL NEPAL -1.74 -0.35 -1.39 1 0 0 1.00 5 -1.40 -1.61 0.21 0.85
PHL PHILIPPINES -1.01 -0.12 -0.90 4 0 2 0.67 6 -0.80 -1.13 0.60 0.44
SLE SIERRA LEONE -0.61 -2.25 1.64 2 0 0 1.00 3 -0.10 -0.81 0.41 0.67
TJK TAJIKISTAN -1.19 -2.67 1.48 2 0 0 1.00 4 -0.91 -1.19 0.45 0.61
TKM TURKMENISTAN -0.92 0.36 -1.29 2 0 0 1.00 3 -1.22 -0.47 0.51 0.56
UZB UZBEKISTAN -1.37 0.07 -1.43 3 0 0 1.00 4 -1.74 -0.67 0.56 0.48
ZWE ZIMBABWE -1.86 -0.11 -1.74 4 0 1 0.80 3 -1.51 -2.00 0.66 0.39
Government Effectiveness
ARG ARGENTINA -0.33 0.45 -0.78 5 1 1 0.83 6 -0.30 -0.36 0.66 0.37
CIV IVORY COAST -1.30 -0.11 -1.19 4 0 0 1.00 6 -1.21 -1.24 0.51 0.52
LVA LATVIA 0.60 0.04 0.56 3 0 1 0.75 7 0.63 0.40 0.63 0.39
LTU LITHUANIA 0.70 0.06 0.64 3 1 0 1.00 8 0.65 0.63 0.59 0.43
SLE SIERRA LEONE -1.32 -0.24 -1.07 2 0 0 1.00 5 -0.83 -1.38 0.30 0.74
TZA TANZANIA -0.37 -1.18 0.81 4 0 0 1.00 9 -0.36 -0.37 0.35 0.67








Governance Score Sources available in both periods
Sources 
Added Weights
















ARG ARGENTINA -0.81 0.82 -1.63 7 0 0 1.00 3 -0.87 -0.44 0.79 0.25
BOL BOLIVIA 0.05 0.82 -0.77 3 0 2 0.60 4 0.25 -0.53 0.72 0.32
BIH BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA -0.66 -2.09 1.43 1 0 0 1.00 8 -0.72 -0.60 0.24 0.80
CUB CUBA -1.81 -0.77 -1.04 3 0 1 0.75 3 -1.89 -1.11 0.73 0.31
ISL ICELAND 1.82 0.53 1.29 3 0 0 1.00 3 1.39 1.70 0.50 0.57
IDN INDONESIA -0.42 0.27 -0.69 3 0 4 0.43 4 -0.38 -0.49 0.77 0.26
LTU LITHUANIA 1.16 0.38 0.79 4 0 1 0.80 6 0.99 1.07 0.67 0.37
MMR MYANMAR -2.34 -1.12 -1.23 3 0 1 0.75 3 -2.33 -1.68 0.73 0.31
PRY PARAGUAY -0.60 0.58 -1.18 3 0 1 0.75 4 -0.59 -0.56 0.70 0.34
SVK SLOVAK REPUBLIC 1.15 0.27 0.88 6 0 1 0.86 5 1.03 0.97 0.75 0.28
VEN VENEZUELA -1.24 -0.08 -1.16 6 0 1 0.86 3 -1.29 -0.73 0.79 0.25
ZMB ZAMBIA -0.49 0.27 -0.76 2 0 3 0.40 6 -0.58 -0.33 0.62 0.41
ZWE ZIMBABWE -2.15 -0.87 -1.28 4 0 2 0.67 5 -2.21 -1.57 0.67 0.36
Rule of Law
ARG ARGENTINA -0.71 0.28 -0.99 10 0 0 1.00 5 -0.71 -0.63 0.71 0.30
BRB BARBADOS 1.21 -0.28 1.49 1 0 0 1.00 3 1.39 0.93 0.40 0.65
HRV CROATIA 0.07 -0.53 0.60 4 1 1 0.80 7 -0.04 0.21 0.65 0.37
EST ESTONIA 0.91 0.35 0.56 4 1 1 0.80 9 0.80 0.94 0.59 0.43
IDN INDONESIA -0.91 -0.36 -0.55 6 2 1 0.86 7 -0.79 -1.08 0.68 0.33
CIV IVORY COAST -1.42 -0.69 -0.74 5 0 0 1.00 6 -1.29 -1.45 0.57 0.45
LTU LITHUANIA 0.60 -0.15 0.75 5 1 0 1.00 8 0.50 0.68 0.63 0.39
MLT MALTA 1.23 0.04 1.18 1 0 1 0.50 4 1.01 1.20 0.37 0.67
PRY PARAGUAY -1.09 -0.50 -0.59 4 2 0 1.00 6 -0.96 -1.16 0.54 0.47
PHL PHILIPPINES -0.62 -0.11 -0.50 6 2 1 0.86 5 -0.56 -0.70 0.71 0.31
SAU SAUDI ARABIA 0.20 0.75 -0.56 3 2 2 0.60 4 0.36 -0.22 0.70 0.31
SWZ SWAZILAND -0.95 0.40 -1.34 2 0 0 1.00 6 -0.42 -1.06 0.25 0.77
THA THAILAND -0.05 0.49 -0.54 6 1 2 0.75 5 -0.10 0.02 0.71 0.31
ZWE ZIMBABWE -1.53 -0.24 -1.29 7 0 0 1.00 7 -1.40 -1.58 0.62 0.40
Control of Corruption
BHR BAHRAIN 0.76 0.08 0.68 2 0 2 0.50 4 0.57 0.93 0.67 0.36
BGR BULGARIA -0.04 -0.67 0.63 3 0 1 0.75 8 -0.11 -0.02 0.37 0.65
CHN CHINA -0.51 -0.01 -0.49 4 1 2 0.67 5 -0.66 -0.31 0.56 0.46
CYP CYPRUS 0.80 1.58 -0.77 3 0 1 0.75 3 0.61 0.96 0.66 0.36
EST ESTONIA 0.82 0.05 0.76 3 0 0 1.00 10 0.58 0.83 0.30 0.72
ISL ICELAND 2.43 1.77 0.66 1 1 2 0.33 3 2.22 2.33 0.72 0.30
ISR ISRAEL 0.79 1.48 -0.69 4 0 2 0.67 4 0.81 0.48 0.75 0.27
CIV IVORY COAST -1.01 0.41 -1.41 3 0 0 1.00 5 -0.88 -1.02 0.44 0.58
LVA LATVIA 0.23 -0.56 0.79 3 0 0 1.00 8 0.24 0.18 0.35 0.67
MDA MOLDOVA -0.86 -0.21 -0.66 2 0 1 0.67 7 -0.90 -0.80 0.38 0.64
ESP SPAIN 1.45 0.77 0.68 5 2 0 1.00 4 1.42 1.16 0.75 0.27
ARE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 1.23 0.19 1.04 4 0 0 1.00 3 1.15 1.10 0.67 0.36










Agree No Change Disagree
Agree / (Agree + 
Disagree)
Sample
Voice and Accountability 192 1.50 0.52 0.80 0.65
Political Stability 165 1.58 0.22 0.69 0.70
Government Effectiveness 180 1.51 0.51 0.70 0.68
Regulatory Quality 182 1.74 0.13 1.11 0.61
Rule of Law 167 1.62 1.34 1.13 0.59
Control of Corruption 151 1.12 0.86 0.67 0.63
Average 173 1.51 0.60 0.85 0.64
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES (90%)
Agree No Change Disagree
Agree / (Agree + 
Disagree)
Sample
Voice and Accountability 19 3.32 0.05 0.32 0.93
Political Stability 21 2.52 0.05 0.38 0.91
Government Effectiveness 17 3.57 0.29 0.43 0.91
Regulatory Quality 13 3.69 0.00 1.31 0.76
Rule of Law 14 4.57 0.86 0.64 0.87
Control of Corruption 13 3.15 0.31 0.92 0.78
Average 16 3.47 0.26 0.67 0.86 58
 
 




[Quasi-Balanced Sample]* ** *** †
   World Average    Std. Dev. Across Countries
# of 





EIU 115 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.28 1.5
PRS * 140 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.7
GCS ** 88 .. .. .. 0.49 0.51 .. .. .. 0.14 0.14 ….
FRH (PR+CL) 190 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.7
FRH (Press Freedom) 188 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 -0.2
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.55 0.53 .. .. .. 0.26 0.22 …
Political Stability
EIU 115 0.54 0.51 0.56 0.54 0.56 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.7
PRS * 140 0.78 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.13 -1.5
GCS ** 88 0.73 0.74 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.13 -2.5   [-2.4]†
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.67 0.56 .. .. .. 0.24 0.20 …
Government  Effectiveness
EIU 115 0.39 0.45 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.30 -0.2
PRS * 140 0.63 0.66 0.57 0.64 0.62 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.15 -0.4
GCS ** 82 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.23 1.9   [2.8]†
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.56 0.55 .. .. .. 0.23 0.22 …
Regulatory Quality
EIU 115 0.42 .. .. 0.51 0.55 0.25 .. .. 0.25 0.23 4.3
GCS ** 82 0.43 0.44 0.38 0.31 0.35 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.13 -3.4  [-3.0]†
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.58 0.61 .. .. .. 0.25 0.17 …
HERITAGE *** 155 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.0
Rule of Law
EIU 115 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.26 1.4
PRS * 140 0.72 0.62 0.65 0.62 0.63 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.22 -3.4
GCS ** 82 0.67 0.63 0.57 0.51 0.51 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.22 -4.6   [-2.9]†
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.58 0.57 .. .. .. 0.23 0.20 …
HERITAGE *** 155 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.28 -1.8
QLM 115 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.1
Control of Corruption
EIU 115 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.2
PRS * 140 0.59 0.51 0.47 0.41 0.42 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 -7.2
GCS ** 82 .. 0.66 0.69 0.64 0.66 .. 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.0   [-0.1]†
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.52 0.54 .. .. .. 0.27 0.20 …
QLM 115 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 -0.2
Note that all variables are scaled to run from 0 to 1
*  PRS Country coverage in 1996: 129 countries, all other periods 140.
** GCS Country coverage in 1996: 58; in 1998: 59; in 2000: 75; and in 2002 and in 2004: 82. 
*** Heritage Country coverage in 1996: 137; all other periods 155.
















1996-2004 Static Dynamic Governance
Average for 
Source Errors
VA 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.27 0.14 0.93 0.39
PV 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.44 0.30 0.78 0.39
GE 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.27 0.11 0.92 0.35
RQ 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.36 0.21 0.86 0.36
RL 0.99 0.99 0.88 0.23 0.12 0.94 0.53
CC 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.33 0.16 0.89 0.50
Average 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.32 0.17 0.89 0.42  
 
Consequences of Persistence for Inference 
 
Mean t-Statistics Number Significant at 90% Rule of Thumb
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Number 
Significant
Also Significant in 
Dynamic Model
VA 0.85 0.57 26 13 12 12
PV 0.91 0.78 21 18 14 14
GE 0.69 0.41 12 1 1 1
RQ 0.86 0.63 25 14 11 9
RL 0.73 0.55 16 7 7 5
CC 0.90 0.58 26 7 10 7








Dependent Variable is GCS '04:  "Easy to Start a Business?"
12345
All Countries
# of Days to start business (DB '04) -1.18 -0.43 -0.47 -0.60 -0.59
5.46*** 1.87* 1.96* 4.33*** 4.19***
Corporate Tax Rate -0.01 0.01
1.06 0.69
Control of Corruption (2002) 0.47 0.45 0.18 0.18
6.14*** 5.84*** 2.80*** 2.81***
Administrative Regulations (GCS ‘04) 0.75 0.77
9.86*** 9.05***
Observations (# of countries) 81 81 81 81 81
Adjusted R-squared 0.23 0.44 0.44 0.71 0.71
Developing Countries
# of Days to start business (DB '04) -0.49 -0.32 -0.29 -0.49 -0.47
1.44 0.95 0.86 2.42** 2.25**
Corporate Tax Rate 0.01 0.01
0.66 0.73
Control of Corruption (2002) 0.50 0.53 0.19 0.22
3.30*** 3.08*** 1.48 1.67
Administrative Regulations (GCS ‘04) 0.83 0.82
8.76*** 8.73***
Observations (# of countries) 56 56 56 56 56
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 0.19 0.18 0.57 0.57
OECD + Newly-Industrialized Countries
# of Days to start business (DB '04) -0.97 -0.53 -0.57 -0.73 -0.74
3.29*** 1.65 1.88* 3.41*** 3.33***
Corporate Tax Rate -0.04 0.00
1.92* 0.09
Control of Corruption (2002) 0.75 0.62 0.29 0.29
2.85*** 2.38** 1.28 1.25
Administrative Regulations (GCS ‘04) 0.64 0.65
4.44*** 3.51***
Observations (# of countries) 25 25 25 25 25
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.36 0.46 0.69 0.67
Note:  DB refers to "Doing Business" study, GCS refers to Global Competitiveness Survey   61
 
 





Dependent Variable is GCS '04:  "How Heavy Is Overall Tax Burden?"
12345
All Countries
# of Days to start business (DB '04) -0.96 -0.27
0.46 0.15
Corporate Tax Rate 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.18 0.18
2.37** 2.29** 2.22** 1.58 1.55
Control of Corruption (2002) -0.77 -0.96 0.58 0.52
1.27 1.19 0.91 0.62
Administrative Regulations (GCS ‘04) -4.29 -4.28
3.91*** 3.91***
Observations (# of countries) 81 81 81 81 81
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.24 0.23
Developing Countries
# of Days to start business (DB '04) -2.06 -1.46
0.68 0.54
Corporate Tax Rate 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
0.71 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.11
Control of Corruption (2002) -2.66 -2.80 -1.59 -1.71
1.78* 1.88* 1.07 1.16
Administrative Regulations (GCS ‘04) -2.93 -2.87
1.62 1.60
Observations (# of countries) 56 56 56 56 56
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.08
OECD + Newly-Industrialized Countries
# of Days to start business (DB '04) 0.96 2.37
0.35 0.93
Corporate Tax Rate 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.33 0.32
4.59*** 4.43*** 4.52*** 3.56*** 3.90***
Control of Corruption (2002) 0.47 0.78 2.63 3.49
0.23 0.32 1.70 1.94*
Administrative Regulations (GCS ‘04) -5.15 -5.38
4.54*** 4.89***
Observations (# of countries) 25 25 25 25 25
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.65 0.65
Note:  DB refers to "Doing Business" study, GCS refers to Global Competitiveness Survey   61
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1 This document presents the Appendices to our research paper “Governance Matters IV:  
Updated Governance Indicators 1996-2004”.  The paper, as well as a synthesis, can be 




















































TABLE A1.  African Development Bank (ADB) 
 
A1: African Development Bank (ADB)
http://www.afdb.org/
The African Development Bank (ADB) is a major development bank in Africa. Established in 1963 in order to
promote economic and social development, the Bank has grown into a $33 billion, multinational development
bank, with 52 African countries and 24 other shareholders.  
The African Development Bank develops its own "Country Policy and Institutional Assessment" for its own Client
sample. Similarly to the World Bank's CPIA, the ADB Indicators annually assess the quality of African
Development Bank borrowers’ policy and institutional performance in areas relevant to economic growth and
poverty reduction. 




2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Policies to improve efficiency of public sector XXX. .. .
Budget Management XXX. .. .
Efficiency of Public Expenditures XXX. .. .
Management of public debt XXX. .. .
Regulatory Quality
Trade policy XXX. .. .
Competitive environment XXX. .. .
Labor Market Policies XXX. .. .
Rule of Law
Property rights XXX. .. .
Control of Corruption
Anti-corruption policies XXX. .. .
Transparency / corruption XXX. .. .
























































The Afrobarometer is a joint enterprise of Michigan State University (MSU), the Institute for Democracy in South
Africa (IDASA) and the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD, Ghana). The Afrobarometer Series,
launched in October 1999, reports the results of national sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens in selected
African countries towards democracy, markets and other aspects of development. The objective of the
Afrobarometer is to collect, analyze and disseminate cross-national, time-series attitudinal data for up to a dozen
new democracies on the African continent.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from the 2002 
and 2004 Reports.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
How much do you trust the parliament? X. .. .. .. .
Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
your country? X X .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
What proportion of the country's problems do you think the 
government can solve? X. .. .. .. .
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family 
feared crime in your own home? X. .. .. .. .
Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family 
had something stolen from your house? X. .. .. .. .
Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family 
been physically attacked? X. .. .. .. .
How much do you trust the courts of law? X. .. .. .. .
How much do you trust the police? X X .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Corruption:  How common is corruption among public officials? .. X .. .. ..
How well would you say the current government is handling the 
fight of corruption in the government? X. .. .. .. .
How many elected leaders (parliamentarians or local councilors) 
do you think are involved in corruption? X. .. .. .. .
How many judges and magistrates do you think are involved in  X. .. .. .. .
How many government officials do you think are involved in 
corruption? X. .. .. .. .
How many border officials do you think are involved in corruption? X. .. .. .. .





















































TABLE A3.  Asian Development Bank (ASD) 
 
A3: Asian Development Bank (ASD)
http://www.adb.org/
The Asian Development Bank is a multilateral development finance institution dedicated to reducing poverty in
Asia and the Pacific. Established in 1966, the ADB - headquartered in Manila and with 26 offices worldwide - is
currently owned by 63 members, mostly from the region.
The Asian Development Bank develops its own "Country Policy and Institutional Assessment" for its own Client
sample. Similarly to the World Bank's CPIA, the ASD Indicators annually assess the quality of Asian
Development Bank borrowers’ policy and institutional performance in areas relevant to economic growth and
poverty reduction. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 2000, 
2002 and 2004.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Competence of civil service XXX. .. .
Budget Management XXX. .. .
Efficiency of Public Expenditures XXX. .. .
Management of public debt XXX. .. .
Regulatory Quality
Trade policy XXX. .. .
Competitive environment XXX. .. .
Factor and products markets X X X .. ..
Rule of Law
Property rights XXX. .. .
Control of Corruption
Anticorruption and Accounting Institutions XXX. .. .






















































TABLE A4:  Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 
A4: Bertelsmann Tranformation Index (BTI)
http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/16.0.html?&L=1
Founded  by Reinhard Mohn in 1977 and headquartered in Berlin, the Bertelsmann Foundation is a non-profit 
organization dedicated to identifying social problems and challenges early on in order to develop and implement 
model solutions. 
Starting in 2004, the Foundation began publishing the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), a global 
ranking that analyzes and evaluates development and transformation processes in 116 countries. The 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index provides the international public and political actors with a comprehensive 
view of the status of democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of political management in each of 
these countries.
The goal of a consolidated market-based democracy constitutes the BTI’s normative framework. The 
BTI analyzes the status of both democratization and market liberalization as it evaluates actors’ performance in 
managing these changes. The quantitative data collected for the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003 is 
outlined in two parallel indices: the Status Index and the Management Index. The Status Index (SI)  shows the 
development achieved by 116 states on their way toward democracy and a market economy. States with 
functioning democratic and market-based structures receive the highest scores. The Management Index (MI) 
reveals the extent to which governments and political actors have been consistent and determined in their pursuit 
of a market-based democracy. Those states showing progress in the last five years and in which transformation 
has resulted from astute management receive the highest scores. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. We use data from 2004,
drawing 5 variables from the Management Index and 6 variables from the Status Index.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Political Participation (SI) X. .. .. .. .
Institutional Stability (SI) X. .. .. .. .
Political and Social Integration (SI) X. .. .. .. .
 
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Consensus Building (MI) X. .. .. .. .
Governance Capability (MI) X. .. .. .. .
Effective Use of Resources (MI) X. .. .. .. .
Reliable Pursuit of Goals (MI) X. .. .. .. .
Regulatory Quality
Price Stability (SI) X. .. .. .. .
Competition (SI) X. .. .. .. .
 
Rule of Law
Rule of Law (SI) X. .. .. .. .
Private Property (SI) X. .. .. .. .
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. ..





















































TABLE A5.  Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)  
 
A5: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps2002/
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) was developed jointly by the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  In its first round conducted in 1999-2000, it surveyed over 4,000 firms 
in 22 transition countries  that examined a wide range of interactions between firms and the state. In its second round 
conducted in 2002, the survey covered over  2,100 firms in 27 countries.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 2002/3 (for both 
2002 and 2004) and 1999/2000 surveys.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
How problematic are telecommunications for the growth of your business  X X .. .. ..
How problematic is electricity for the growth of your business. X X .. .. ..
How problematic is transportation for the growth of your business. X X .. .. ..
 
Regulatory Quality
Information on the laws and regulations is easy to obtain X X .. .. ..
Interpretations of the laws and regulations are consistent and predictable X X .. .. ..
Unpredictability of changes of regulations X X .. .. ..
How problematic are labor regulations for the growth of your business. X X .. .. ..
How problematic are tax regulations for the growth of your business. X X .. .. ..
How problematic are custom and trade regulations for the growth of your business. X X .. .. ..
Rule of Law
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: Fair X X .. .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: affordable X X .. .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: enforceable X X .. .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: Honesty X X .. .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: Quickness X X .. .. ..
Are property rights adequately protected X X .. .. ..
How problematic is organized crime for the growth of your business. X X .. .. ..
How problematic is judiciary for the growth of your business. X X .. .. ..
How problematic is street crime for the growth of your business. X X .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
How common is for firms to have to pay irregular additional payments to get things done X X .. .. ..
Percentage of total annual sales do firms pay in unofficial payments to public officials X X .. .. ..
How often do firms make extra payments to influence the content of new legislation X X .. .. ..
Extent to which firms' payments to public officials impose costs on other firms X X X .. ..
How problematic is corruption for the growth of your business. X X .. .. ..





















































TABLE A6:  Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BRI, QLM) 
 
A6: Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BRI)
http://www.beri.com
BERI S.A. is a private source of analysis and forecasts of the business environment in developed and developing
countries. The firm was founded in 1966 and is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.  
BERI has two services that include variables of interest for the purpose of this paper: The Business Risk Service,
and the FORELEND or Lender Risk Rating. Both services are supervised by Dr. F.T. Haner, founder and senior
editor. A number of analysts review various data sources and produce initial draft reports, relying on an
international network of sources for intelligence in the field. BERI convenes two permanent panels of about 105
experts from all over the world. These panels provide country ratings and qualitative observations on the basis of
these initial reports. One panel assesses political conditions, and the other offers perspectives on the business
operating environment. These ratings are constructed using the Delphi method, in which panelists are also
supplied with the ratings they produced in previous assessments as well as the panel average score for each
measure.
BERI monitors 50 countries three times per year, assessing 57 criteria separated into three indices. The Political
Risk Index (PRI) focuses on sociopolitical conditions in a country. Diplomats and political scientists rate the
present condition of eight causes and two symptoms of political risk, using a scale from 7 (no problem) to 0
(prohibitive problem). The Operation Risk Index (ORI) identifies major bottlenecks for business development,
rating 15 criteria on a scale of 0 (unacceptable conditions) to 4 (superior conditions). The R factor assesses a
country’s willingness to allow foreign companies to convert and repatriate profits and to import components,
equipment and raw materials. It is composed of 4 sub-indices, one of which assesses the quality of legal
framework in terms of statutory laws and actual practice.  
BERI also produced a different set of indicators, the Quantitative Risk Measure in Foreign Lending (QLM),
measurings the qualitative risk factors in credit exposure in 115 countries using a scale from 0 (high risk) to 100
(low risk). In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. We use BERI's


























































2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
 
Political Stability
Political Risk Index: External Causes of Political Risk: Dependence 
on/Importance to a Hostile Major Power XXXXX
Political Risk Index: External Causes of Political Risk: Negative Influences of 
Regional Political Forces XXXXX
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Social Conditions: Wealth 
Distribution, Population XXXXX
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Fractionalization of political 
spectrum and the power of these factions. XXXXX
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Fractionalization by 
language, ethnic and/or religious groups and the power of these factions. XXXXX
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Restrictive (coercive) 
measures required to retain power. XXXXX
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Organization and strength 
of forces for a radical government. XXXXX
Political Risk Index: Symptoms of Political Risk: Societal conflict involving 
demonstrations, strikes, and street violence.
XXXXX
Political Risk Index: Symptoms of Political Risk: Instability as perceived by non-
constitutional changes, assassinations, and guerilla wars.
XXXXX
Government Effectiveness
Operation Risk Index: Bureaucratic delays XXXXX
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
 
Rule of Law
Operation Risk Index: Enforceability of contracts XXXXX
Direct Financial Fraud, Money Laundering and Organized Crime (QLM) * XXXXX
Control of Corruption
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Mentality, including 
xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism, willingness to compromise.
XXXXX
I n d i r e c t  D i v e r s i o n  o f  F u n d s  ( Q L M )  * XXXXX
* country coverage:  115 countries




















































TABLE A7:  Columbia University (CUD) 
 
A7: State Capacity Survey (CUD)
http://www.columbia.edu
The State Capcity Survey was developed in 1999 under the direction of Marc Levy of the CIESIN at Columbia
University, resulting in a set of 31 multiple-choice questions and three open-ended questions. The survey asks
questions in five broad categories: political context, state legitimacy, human resources and organizations,
institutions, and overall capacity. Data were obtained on 108 and 97 countries from assessments completed by
164 experts during 2000 and 2002, respectively.
In the table below we list the questions included in each of the governance indicators. We use data from the 2000 
and 2002/3 (applied to both 2002 and 2004) surveys.
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
To what extent does the state and/or its allied groups engage in repression of its citizens? X X X .. ..
In carrying out internal security tasks, to what extent does the state rely on tactics commonly 
considered illegitimate in the international community? X X X .. ..
Political Stability
Assess the degree to which the decline or collapse of central political authority posed a threat to 
political stability in this country. X X X .. ..
Assess the degree to which political protest posed a threat to political stability in this country. X X X .. ..
Assess the degree to which ethno-cultural and/or religious conflict posed a threat to political 
stability in this country.
X X X .. ..
Assess the degree to which external military intervention posed a threat to political stability in this 
country. X X X .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Rate the administrative and technical skills of the country’s civil service (occupying middle and 
higher management roles). X X X .. ..
Rate the efficiency of the country’s national bureaucracies overall. X X X .. ..
Rate the efficiency of the country’s local-level government bureaucracies overall. X X X .. ..
Rate the effectiveness of coordination between the central government and local-level government 
organizations. X X X .. ..
Rate the state’s ability to formulate and implement national policy initiatives.
Rate the state’s effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue. X X X .. ..
Does the central government produce a national budget in a timely manner? X X X .. ..
Do local governments produce budgets in a timely manner? X X X .. ..
Rate the state’s ability to monitor socioeconomic trends, activities, and conditions within its borders X X X .. ..
Rate the state’s ability to create, deliver, and maintain vital national infrastructure. X X X .. ..
Rate the state’s ability to respond effectively to domestic economic problems. X X X .. ..
Rate the state’s ability to respond effectively to natural disasters. X X X .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
For the most part, is the state seen as legitimately representing its citizens? X X X .. ..
Rate the state’s adherence to the rule of law, considering the country as a whole. X X X .. ..
Control of Corruption
Rate the severity of corruption within the state X X X .. ..
To what extent do the country's primary political decision makers engage in patterns of nepotism, 
cronyism and patronage? X X X .. ..
To what extent do the country's civil service (occupying middle and higher management roles) 
engage in patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage? X X X .. ..
To what extent do patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage undermine the state's ability to 
exercise the basic functions of government effectively? X X X .. ..
To what extent do patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage distort broad patterns of economic 
development? X X X .. ..






















































TABLE A8:  Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
 
A8: Country Policy & Institutional Assessment (CPIA)
http://www.worldbank.org
The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) annually assesses the quality of World Bank borrowers’
policy and institutional performance in areas relevant to economic growth and poverty reduction. Country
assessments began in the World Bank in the late 1970s to help guide the allocation of lending resources. The
methodology has evolved over time, reflecting lessons learned and mirroring the evolution of the development
paradigm. While in earlier years assessments focused mainly on macroeconomic policies, they now include other
factors relevant to poverty reduction, such as social inclusion, equity and governance.  
The CPIA consists of equally weighted criteria representing the policy dimensions of an effective poverty
reduction and growth strategy. The criteria are grouped in four clusters. Cluster A, Economic Management,
covers economic policies. Cluster B, Structural Policies, covers a broad range of structural policies: trade policies,
financial depth, market competition, and environmental sustainability. Cluster C, Policies for Social Inclusion and
Equity, focuses on social equity and broad-based growth, and aims to capture the extent to which a country's
policies and institutions ensure that the benefits of growth are widespread, contribute to the accumulation of social 
capital, and direct public programs to poor people and reduce their vulnerability to various kinds of shocks.
Cluster D, Public Sector Management and Institutions, aims to capture key aspects of good governance, a vital 
For each of the criteria, countries are assessed on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high). The ratings are prepared by the
World Bank's country economists and focus on the quality of the country's current policies and institutions, which
are the main determinants of the present prospects for aid effectiveness. The rating assigned for each criterion
reflects a variety of indicators, observations, and judgments: ratings are based on country knowledge obtained
from country dialogue and the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) process, the available body of economic and
sector work (ESW), project preparation and supervision, and project and CAS monitoring and evaluation. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. We use data for 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002 and 2003. 2004 data was used for 17 benchmark countries.  
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Management of external debt X X X X X
Management of development programs X X X X ..
Quality public Administration / Public expenditure management X X X X X
Budget Management XXXXX
Efficiency of Public Expenditures XXXXX
Regulatory Quality
Competitive environment X X X X X
Factor and products markets X X X X X
Trade policy X X X X X
 
Rule of Law
Property rights X X X X ..
Control of Corruption
Transparency, accountability and corruption in public sector X X X X ..





















































TABLE A9: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
 
A9: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
http://www.eiu.com
The Economist Intelligence Unit is a for-profit organization producing analysis and forecasts of the political,
economic and business environment in more than 180 countries. The EIU was founded in 1949 and is based in
London. In 1997, the EIU launched two quarterly publications which contain some governance measures: The
Country Risk Service, and the Country Forecasts. The assessments in these publications are based on regular
contributions from a global network of more than 500 information-gatherers. A panel of regional experts checks
the accuracy, consistency and impartiality of these assessments. Our databases utilize data about the individual
subcomponents of these country risk ratings, that were made available to us by EIU.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  In this paper, we use data 
from January 1997, 1998, 2000 November 2002 and November 2004.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Orderly transfers XXXXX
Vested interests X X .. .. X
Accountablity of Public Officials X X .. .. X
Human Rights X X .. .. X
Freedom of association X X .. .. X
Political Stability
Armed conflict XXXXX
Violent demonstrations X X .. .. X
Social Unrest XXXXX
International tensions / terrorist threat XXXXX
Government Effectiveness
Quality of bureaucracy / institutional effectiveness XXXXX
Excessive bureacucracy / red tape XXXXX
Government policy (pro business stance) .. .. X X ..
Regulatory Quality
Unfair competitive practices X X .. .. X
Price controls X X .. .. X
Discriminatory tariffs X X .. .. X
Excessive protections X X .. .. X




Fairness of judicial process XXXXX
Enforceability of contracts X X .. .. X
Speediness of judicial process X X .. .. X
Confiscation/expropriation X X .. .. X
Intellectual property rights protection X X .. .. X
Private property protection X X .. .. X
Control of Corruption
Corruption among public officials XXXXX
Country coverage 120 115 115 115 115





















































TABLE A10: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBR) 
 
A10: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBR)
http://www.ebrd.org
The EBRD is an international organization which supports the transition towards open market-oriented economies
and promotes private and entrepreneurial initiative in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  The EBRD is based in London.  
The EBRD publishes an annual Transition Report, which includes a number of governance variables in its
Transition Indicators and Survey of Legal Reforms. The Transition Report presents eight “Transition Indicators”
representing "cumulative progress in the movement from a centrally planned economy to a market economy” for
26 transition economies. The subjective indicators are based on a checklist of various objective measures and
reflect the views of EBRD staff. 
Beginning in 1996, the EBRD has conducted in 26 countries a survey of local public officials, private firms,
academics, lawyers, and other experts, in order to assess the progress made in financial legal reform in transition
economies. The survey considered two areas of financial legal reform: banking and securities activities. For each
area, two indices describing the extensiveness and effectiveness of the financial legal framework were
developed, for a total of four ratings. The “extensiveness” ratings measure how closely legal rules affecting
investment follow international standards. “Effectiveness” reflects how clear, accessible and adequately-
supported the legal rules are. Both are intended to provide a measure of how conducive the laws of these
countries are to fostering investment.  Both indices however were discontinued in 2003. 
In this paper we use data from the 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 Transition Reports.  In the table below we 
list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Price liberalisation  XXXXX
Trade & foreign exchange system  XXXXX
Competition policy  XXXXX
Commercial Law Extensiveness .. X X X ..
Commercial Law Effectiveness .. X X X ..
Financial Regulations: extensiveness .. X X X ..
Financial regulations: effectiveness .. X X X ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. ..





















































TABLE A11:  Freedom House (FRH, FHT, CCR) 
 
A11: Freedom House (FRH, FNT, CCR)
http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
Freedom House is a non-governmental organization which promotes democratic values around the world.
Freedom House was established in 1941 and is headquartered in New York City.   
We rely on data from three Freedom House publications. "Freedom in the World was launched in 1955", and
became an annual publication in 1978, coverinbg 192 countries and/or related and disputed territories. "Nations
in Transit" was launched in 1995 and covers 28 post-communist countries. Finally, "Countries at the CrossRoads"
was launched in 2004 and covers 30 developing countries.
Freedom House develops its assessments using a team of academic advisors, in-house experts, published
resources, and local correspondents including human rights activists, journalists, editors and political figures.
Freedom House staff also conduct regular fact-finding missions to countries being assessed. An academic
advisory board provides input to the project in general.
Freedom in the World (FRH). This publication evaluates political rights and civil liberties around the world.
Freedom House defines political rights as those freedoms that enable people to participate freely in the political
process, and civil liberties as the freedom to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the
state. For all countries, the subjective assessments are based on checklists of rights and freedoms. A Freedom
House team assigns a rating to each item on the checklist and produces an initial assessment for each country.
The team then assess whether the checklists might have missed an important factor for a particular country. The
scores are then reviewed to ensure quality and consistency across countries, and a final rating is produced. 
Freedom House Nations in Transit (FNT). This publication evaluates the progress in democratic and
economic reform in post-communist countries. Country surveys are written by Freedom House staff or
consultants and are reviewed by academics and senior Freedom House staff. Each report is divided into nine
sections, ranging from the political process to progress in price liberalization. For each section, a preliminary
rating is based on a checklist of issues. The academic oversight board establishes the final ratings by
consensus following extensive discussions and debate, which are reviewed by the Freedom House rating
committee. 
Countries at the Crossroads (CCR). This publication is a first-of-its-kind survey of democratic governance that
evaluates performance in 30 key countries that are at a crossroads in determining their political future. The
Countries at the Crossroads survey offers scholars, analysts, and officials a unique comparative tool for
assessing government performance in the areas of civil liberties, rule of law, anticorruption and transparency, and 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.   In this paper we use data 
from the 1995-1996, 1997-98, 2000-2001, 2002-2003 and 2004-2005 editions of Freedom in the World, the 2004 






















































2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Political Rights  XXXXX
Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through 
free and fair elections?
Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
Are there fair electoral laws?
Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?
Do the people have the right to freely organize in different political parties or other 
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and 
fall of these competing parties or groupings?
Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic 
possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, 
religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies or any other powerful groups? 
Do cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups have reasonable self-
determination, self-government, autonomy or participation through informal consensus 
in the decision-making process? 
Civil Liberties  XXXXX
Are there free and independent media, literature and other cultural expressions? 
Is there open public discussion and free private discussion?
Is there freedom of assembly and demonstration?
Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization?
Are citizens equal under the law, with access to an independent, nondiscriminatory 
judiciary, and are they respected by the security forces?
Is there protection from political terror, and from unjustified imprisonment, exile or 
torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system, and freedom from war or 
insurgency situations?
Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there 
effective collective bargaining?
Are there free professional and other private organizations?
Are there free businesses or cooperatives?
Are there free religious institutions and free private and public religious expressions?
Are there personal social freedoms, which include such aspects as gender equality, 
property rights, freedom of movement, choice of residence, and choice of marriage and 
size of family?
Is there equality of opportunity, which includes freedom from exploitation by or 
dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats or any other type of 
denigrating obstacle to a share of legitimate economic gains?
Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption
Table A11: Freedom in the World (193 developed and developing countries) / Nations in Transit (27 transition 























































2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Freedom of the Press XXXXX
Laws and Practice:  Assess whether or not dissent is allowed, if private media are 
permitted alongside governmental broadcasting, if independent media, in practice, are 
permitted to express diverse views
Political Influence over Media Content: This category reflects political pressure on the 
content of both privately owned and government media, and takes into account the day-
to-day conditions in which journalists work, threats from organized crime, or from 
religious extremists, for example, often generate self-censorship and so negatively 
affect the media environment
Economic influence over Media Content: Influence may come from the government or 
from private entrepreneurs.  This reflects competitive pressures in the private sector 
that distort reportage as well as economic favoritism or reprisals by government for 
unwanted press coverage
Actual Incident of Violations of Press Freedom: Murders, arrests, suspension and other 
violations create a sense of fear which may discourage objective reporting
Nations in Transit
Political Process: Deals with elections, referenda, party configuration, conditions for 
political competition, and popular participation in elections. XXXXX
Civil Society: Highlights the degree to which volunteerism, trade unionism, and 
professional associations exist, and whether civic organizations are influential XXXXX
Independent Media: Press freedom, public access to a variety of information sources, 
and  independence of those sources from undue government or other influences.
XXXXX
Countries at the Crossroads
Civil Liberties X. .. .. .. .
Accountability and public voice X. .. .. .. .
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Nations in Transit: Government and Administration: Government decentralization, 
independent and responsibilities or local and regional governments, and legislative and 
executive transparency are discussed.
XXXXX
Regulatory Quality
N/A .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Nations in Transit: Considers judicial and constitutional matters as well as the legal and 
de facto status of ethnic minorities. XXXXX
Countries at the Crossroads: Rule of Law X. .. .. .. .
Control of Corruption
Nations in Transit: corruption XXXX. .
Countries at the Crossroads: Anti-Corruption and Transparency X. .. .. .. .
Table A11: Freedom in the World (193 developed and developing countries) / Nations in Transit (27 transition 





















































TABLE A12:  Furnar's Index of Budget Transparency (LAI) 
 
A12: Furnar's Index of Budget Transparency
http://www.internationalbudget.org/themes/BudTrans/LA03.htm
The Index of Budget Transparency is coordinated by Fundar, a Mexican NGO, and leading NGOs in each country. 4 expert 
panels (Legislators, Media, Academic experts, NGOs) are asked to evaluate different aspects of the budget process in their 
countries such as access to budget information, citizen’s participation and credibility of institutions.
Each country receive an overall transparency rating from 1 to 100, with 100 being highly transparent. The overall rating is 
based on the percentage of positive answers to questions within the following categories:
1. Citizen participation
2. Role and participation of the legislature
3. Information on macroeconomic criteria
4. Budget allocation 
5. Changes in the budget
6. Budget oversight
7.Capacities of external control body
8. Credibility of the internal comptroller 
9. Accountability
10.  Supervision of federal officials
11. Information on federal debt
12. Quality of information and statistics
13. Responsibilities among governmental levels
14. Timelines of information
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper we use data 
from the 2001 and 2003 Reports.  
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Budget Transparency Index X X .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. ..

























































Gallup International was founded in May 1947, is registered in Zurich, Switzerland, and has 55 members around 
the world governed by the same Code of Statutes to ensure technical competence and quality standards.  
The Gallup International Millennium Survey polled 57,000 adults in 60 different countries of the world between 
August and October, 1999. The survey covered a wide range of topics of an ethical, political and religious nature, 
focusing specifically on issues related to democracy, the United Nations, human rights, women's rights, 
environment, religion, crime and basic values.  This source asks several questions which also appeared in the 
Gallup 50th Anniversary Survey which we use for 1998.
In 2002, Gallup International initiated a worldwide survey (on an annual basis) called The Voice of the People. 
The survey interviews citizens all around the world and helps understand the opinion of today's world population 
on issues like the environment, terrorism, global issues, governance and democracy.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use data 
from the 2002 and 2004 Voice of the People Reports, the 2000 Gallup Millenium Survey and the 1997 50th 
Anniversary Survey.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Trust in National Government .. X .. .. ..
Trust in the Parliament .. X .. .. ..
Percent who believe the country is governed by the will of the people .. .. X .. ..
Percent who belive elections are free and fair .. .. X .. ..
Percent who believe the government is accountable .. .. X .. ..
Freedom of speech .. .. X .. ..
Fairness of elections X. .. .. .. .
Human Rights X. .. .. .. .
 
Political Stability
Terrorism / crime X. .. .. .. .
Government Effectiveness
Percent who believe the government is efficient .. .. X .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Trust in the Legal System .. X .. .. ..
Concern with level of crime .. .. X .. ..
Control of Corruption
Percent who believe the government is corrupt .. .. X .. ..
Frequency of corruption X. .. .X. .
Frequency of household bribery X. .. .. .. .
Extent of grand corruption X. .. .. .. .
Extent of petty corruption X. .. .. .. .
Country coverage: 62 46 60 44
























































The Global E-Governance Index is compiled by the Brown University's Center for Public Policy. Official websites 
are evaluated for the presence of various features dealing with information availability, service delivery, and public 
access. Features assessed included the name of the nation, region of the world, and having the following 
features: online publications, online database, audio clips, video clips, non-native languages or foreign language 
translation, commercial advertising, premium fees, user payments, disability access, privacy policy, security 
features, presence of online services, number of different services, digital signatures, credit card payments, email 
address, comment form, automatic email updates, website personalization, personal digital assistant (PDA) 
access, and an English version of the website.
 
Range for the E-Government index- 0 (bad)-100 (good) based on availability of publications and databases (72 
points) and number of online services (28 points).
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use data 
from the 2002 and 2004 Reports.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Global E-governance Index X X .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. ..






















































TABLE A15:  Global Insight's DRI/McGraw-Hill (DRI) 
 
A15: Global Insight's DRI/McGraw-Hill
http://www.globalinsight.com
DRI is an economic consulting and information company which provides data, analysis, forecasts and expert
advice to strategic planners, business and financial analysts, and policy makers. It was founded in 1973 and is
based in the United States. 
In 1996, DRI launched the Country Risk Review (CRR), a quarterly publication providing country risk
assessments to international investors. A first draft of the risk ratings in this publication are produced by country
analysts, who then submit their preliminary assessment to regional review committees charged with analyzing and
challenging these assessment. The global risk service committee evaluates the reviewed assessments to ensure
quality and cross-country consistency.  The country analysts then produce the final country risk review.
The CRR assesses the relationship between country risk and its effects on the profitability of investments. For
each country, DRI identifies a number of “potential sources of risk”, specifies measurable “risk events”, measures
how probable those risk events are, and assesses the severity of impact that each outcome would have. Based
on these considerations, DRI produces a risk score for each country.
The CRR identifies a total of 33 “immediate risk events” and 18 “secondary risk events” for 117 developed and
developing countries. Immediate risk events are classified into policy risks (tax, and non-tax), and outcome risks
(price, and non-price). Secondary risk events are classified into domestic political risks, external political risks,
and economic risks.  These risk events are described in below.
For each risk event, DRI produces a short run and a long run risk rating. These ratings provide subjective
estimates of the likelihood that a particular risk event will occur within one and five years respectively. DRI follows
a methodology to ensure that the five year forecasts are consistent with the short-term forecasts. Although these
indicators nominally measure the likelihood of future changes in governance concepts, in practice the long-run
ratings provide good measures of the current levels of governance.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. Variable definitions consist 
of risk events. The actual ratings provide an estimated probability of these events happening.  In this paper, we 
use data for the fourth quarters of 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004.  
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
Domestic Political Risks: Military Coup Risk: A military coup d’etat (or a series of such events) 
that reduces the GDP growth rate by 2% during any 12-month period. XXXXX
Domestic Political Risks: Major Insurgency/Rebellion: An increase in scope or intensity of one 
or more insurgencies/rebellions that reduces the GDP growth rate by 3% during any 12-month 
period.
XXXXX
Domestic Political Risks: Political Terrorism: An increase in scope or intensity of terrorism that 
reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period. XXXXX
Domestic Political Risks: Political Assassination: A political assassination (or a series of such 
events) that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period. XXXXX
Domestic Political Risks: Civil War: An increase in scope or intensity of one or more civil wars 
that reduces the GDP growth rate by 4% during any 12-month period.
XXXXX
Domestic Political Risks: Major Urban Riot: An increase in scope, intensity, or frequency of 
rioting that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period. XXXXX





















































2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Government Effectiveness
Domestic Political Risk: Government Instability: An increase in government personnel turnover 
rate at senior levels that reduces the GDP growth rate by 2% during any 12-month period. XXXXX
Domestic Political Risk: Government Ineffectiveness: A decline in government personnel 
quality at any level that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period. XXXXX
Domestic Political Risk: Institutional Failure: A deterioration of government capacity to cope 
with national problems as a result of institutional rigidity or gridlock that reduces the GDP 
growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
XXXXX
Regulatory Quality
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations -- Exports: A 2% reduction in export volume as a result of a 
worsening in export regulations or restrictions (such as export limits) during any 12-month 
period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment.
XXXXX
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations -- Imports: A 2% reduction in import volume as a result of a 
worsening in import regulations or restrictions (such as import quotas) during any 12-month 
period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment.
XXXXX
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations -- Other Business: An increase in other regulatory burdens, with 
respect to the level at the time of the assessment, that reduces total aggregate investment in 
real LCU terms by 10%
XXXXX
Policies Non-Tax: Ownership of Business by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale 
from "0" to "10" in legal restrictions on ownership of business by non-residents during any 12-
month period.
XXXXX
Policies Non-Tax: Ownership of Equities by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale from 




Outcomes Non-Price: Losses and Costs of Crime: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to 
"10" in crime during any 12-month period. XXXXX
Domestic Political Risk: Kidnapping of Foreigners: An increase in scope, intensity, or frequency 
of kidnapping of foreigners that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month 
period.
XXXXX
Policies Non-Tax: Enforceability of Government Contracts: A 1 point decline on a scale from 
"0" to "10" in the enforceability of contracts during any 12-month period. XXXXX
Policies Non-Tax: Enforceability of Private Contracts: A 1-point decline on a scale from "0" to 
"10" in the legal enforceability of contracts during any 12-month period. XXXXX
Control of Corruption
Risk Event Outcome non-price: Losses and Costs of Corruption: A 1-point increase on a scale 
from "0" to "10" in corruption during any 12-month period. XXXXX






















































TABLE A16:  Heritage Foundation / Wall Street Journal  (HER) 
 
A16: Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal
http://www.heritage.org
The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institute whose mission is to formulate and promote
conservative public policies.  The Heritage Foundation was established in 1973.
In 1995 the Heritage Foundation, in partnership with the Wall street Journal, launched its annual Index of
Economic Freedom. This index covers 161 countries and measures economic freedoms and prospects for
growth in the global economy. The index is designed for cross country research and is intended to assist
international investors and aid donors in the allocation of their resources. This index is based on a detailed
assessment of 10 different factors, including foreign investment codes, taxes, tariffs, banking regulations,
monetary policy, and the black market. For some of these, assessments are mechanically based on objective
data, while others are generated as subjective ratings based on a pre-specified checklist.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use 
Heritage data for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness












NA .. .. .. .. ..






















































TABLE A17:  IJET's Country Security Risk Ratings (IJT) 
 
A17: IJET's Country Security Risk Ratings
https://worldcue.ijet.com/tic/login.jsp
iJET is a privately held company founded in October 1999 and is based in Annapolis, MD.  iJET monitors the 
world around-the-clock and alerts travelers, expatriates and decision-makers to events and situations in real-time 
to help them avoid or minimize risk and travel disruptions abroad. iJET's professional services offer in-depth 
analysis of changing risks around the world, and allows organizations to monitor, locate and communicate with 
traveling employees and expatriates.
In our paper, we use the iJET's security risk ratings for 167 countries worldwide in 2004.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
 
Political Stability
Security Risk Rating X. .. .. .. .
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. ..





















































TABLE A18:  Institute for Management Development (WCY) 
 
A18: Institute for Management Development (WCY)
http://www.imd.ch.  
The Institute for Management Development is an research and educational organization based in Lausanne,
Switzerland. It has published the World Competitiveness Yearbook since 1987. Until 1996, this was a joint
effort with the World Economic Forum. The World Competitiveness Yearbook analyzes the competitive
environment in 47 countries. It is based on both objective data and surveys of perceptions. The survey
questions over 4,000 local and foreign enterprises operating in the countries under analysis. Mean scores on
the survey questions are reported in the yearbook for all countries. In the table below we list the questions
included in the governance database.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from the 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 editions of the World Competitiveness Yearbook.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Transparency of Government policy XXXXX
Political Stability
The risk of political instability is very high X X X .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Government economic policies do not adapt quickly to changes in the economy X X X .. X
The public service is not independent from political interference XXXXX
G o v e r n m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  n o t  e f f e c t i v e l y  i m p l e m e n t e d XXXX. .
Bureaucracy hinders business activity XXXXX
The distribution infrastructure of goods and services is generally inefficient X X X .. X
Political System is not adapted to todays' economic challenges .. .. X .. X
Policy direction is not consistent X .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
The exchange rate policy of your country hinders the competitiveness of firms X X .. .. ..
Protectionism in the country negatively affects the conduct of business XXXX. .
C o m p e t i t i o n  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  y o u r  c o u n t r y  d o e s  n o t  p r e v e n t  u n f a i r  c o m p e t i t i o n XXXXX
P r i c e  c o n t r o l s  a f f e c t  p r i c i n g  o f  p r o d u c t s  i n  m o s t  i n d u s t r i e s XXXXX
Legal regulation of financial institutions is inadequate for financial stability XXXXX
Foreign financial institutions do not have access to the domestic market .. X .. .. X
Access to capital markets (foreign and domestic) is easily available X X .. .. ..
Ease of doing business is not a competitive advantage for your country X X .. .. ..
Financial institutions' transparency is not widely developed in your country X X .. .. ..
Customs' authorities do not facilitate the efficient transit of goods XXXX. .
The legal framework is detrimental to your country's competitiveness XXXX. .
F o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  a r e  f r e e  t o  a c q u i r e  c o n t r o l  i n  d o m e s t i c  c o m p a n i e s XXXX. .
Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders XXXXX
Real personal taxes are non distortionary XXXXX
Real corporate taxes are non distortionary XXXX. .
Banking regulation does not hinder competitiveness X X .. .. ..
Political system as obstacle to development .. .. X X ..
Labor regulations hinder business activities X .. .. .. ..
New Legislation restricts competitiveness X .. .. .. ..
Subsidies impair economic development X .. .. .. ..
Ease to start a business X .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
T a x  e v a s i o n  i s  a  c o m m o n  p r a c t i c e  i n  y o u r  c o u n t r y XXXX. .
J u s t i c e  i s  n o t  f a i r l y  a d m i n i s t e r e d  i n  s o c i e t y XXXXX
Personal security and private property are not adequately protected XXXXX
Parallel economy impairs economic development in your country XXXXX
Insider trading is common in the stock market X X .. .. X
Patent and copyright protection is not adequately enforced in your country XX. .XX
Control of Corruption
Bribing and corruption exist in the economy XXXXX






















































TABLE A19:  International Research & Exchanges Board (MSI)  
 
A19: Media Sustainability Index (MSI)
http://www.irex.org
The International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX) is an international nonprofit organization 
specializing in education, independent media, Internet development, and civil society programs. 
Through training, partnerships, education, research, and grant programs, IREX develops the capacity of 
individuals and institutions to contribute to their societies.
Through the financial assistance of USAID, IREX introduced in 2002 the Media Sustainability Index, a 
valuable tool for media development practitioners, public officials, scholars and others concerned about 
the region’s media. The Media Sustainability Index is the only study that looks at the entire media 
system in each of 20 countries in Southeast Europe and Eurasia. The MSI analyzes issues such as 
freedom of speech, plurality of media available to citizens, professional journalism standards, business 
sustainability of media, and the efficacy of institutions that support independent media. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 




2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Media Sustainability Index X X .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. ..

























































Latinobarometro is a public opinion survey representing the opinions, attitudes, behaviour and values of citizens
of the countries in which it is conducted. The survey began being applied regularly in 8 countries of the region in
1995, and in 17 countries beginning in 1996. Latinobarometro conducts an annual survey, using representative
samples and an identical questionnaire in each country. It asks questions in in the following areas: Economy and
International Trade, Integration and Regional Trading Blocks, -Democracy, Politics and Institutions, Social
Policies, Civic Culture, Social Capital and Social Fraud, The Environment, Current Issues.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from the 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 surveys.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Satisfaction with democracy X X .. X X
Trust in Parliament X .. .. X ..
Political Stability
Country terrorist threat .. X .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Trust in Government X X. .. ...
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Trust in Judiciary XXXXX
Trust in Police X XXXX
Have you been a victim of crime? X .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Frequency of corruption XXXX. .
It is likely to bribe policemen X. .. .. .. .
It is likely to bribe judges X. .. .. .. .
It is likely to bribe public servants X. .. .. .. .





















































TABLE A21:  Merchant International Group (MIG) 
 
A21: Merchant International Group (MIG)
http://www.merchantinternational.com
Established in 1982, the Merchant International Group Limited (“MIG”) is a strategic research and corporate 
intelligence company developed to provide a range of support services (from identification to evaluation of all 
manner of risks, weaknesses and threats) to corporates in non-domestic markets.
MIG developed a framework that identifies ten distinctive categories of Grey Area Dynamics™. Each refers to a 
range of events, activities and trends that impact upon business. Their impact is of varying severity and may be 
positive or negative, though typically, Grey Area Dynamics™ take the form of obstacles to progress in non-
domestic markets. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 2002 and 
2004.  
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
Extremism X X .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Bureaucracy X X .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Unfair Trade X X .. .. ..
Unfair Competition X X .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Legal Safeguards X X .. .. ..
Organized Crime X X .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Corruption X X .. .. ..
Country coverage 155 118 .. .. ..





















































TABLE A22:  Political Economic Risk Consultancy (PRC)  
 
A22. Political Economic Risk Consultancy (PRC)
http://www.asiarisk.com/
Founded in 1976 and headquartered in Hong Kong, the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy specializeds in
strategic information and analysis for companies doing business in the countries in East and Southeast Asia.
PERC has conducted various surveys of expatriate business managers in the East Asia region. The original
results of these surveys were published under the titles “Corruption in Asia in 1999” (from Asian Intelligence Issue
#531 March 23, 1999). Based on the average responses in these surveys, PERC has produced country ratings.
In this paper, we use data from the 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 surveys.  
Corruption in Asia
In this survey, foreign managers working within the East Asia region were questioned about their perception of
corruption, the quality of the legal system, and the professionalism and reliability of the police and judiciary. We
have obtained their data on corruption for 12 countries, based on a total of 427 responses. With respect to
corruption, respondents were asked “To what extent does corruption exist in a way that detracts from the
business environment for foreign companies?”  
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
To what extent does corruption exist in a way that detracts from the 
business environment for foreign companies?
XXXX. .





















































TABLE A23:  Political Risk Services (PRS) 
 
A23: Political Risk Services (PRS)
http://www.prsgroup.com
The PRS group is an affiliate of Investment Business with Knowledge (IBK), a United States-based corporation
providing up-to-date country information for international business. PRS was founded in 1980 and is
headquartered in Syracuse, New York.
Since 1982, PRS has produced the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) which provides assessments of a
political, economic and financial risks in a large number of developed and developing countries. These
assessments are based on the analysis of a worldwide network of experts, and is subject to a peer review
process at subject and regional levels to ensure the coherence and comparability across countries. The ICRG
assesses three major categories of risk: political (with 12 components), financial (5 components) and economic (6
components). We use components of the Political Risk Index, which report subjective assessments of the factors
influencing the business environment in a particular country. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.    In this paper we use data 























































2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Military in Politics  The military are not elected by anyone, so their participation in 
government, either direct or indirect, reduces accountability and therefore represents a 
risk.  The threat of military intervention might lead as well to an anticipated potentially 
inefficient change in policy or even in government.  It also works as an indication that 
the government is unable to function effectively and that the country has an uneasy 
environment for foreign business.
XXXXX
Democratic Accountability.  Quantifies how responsive government is to its people, on 
the basis that the less response there is the more likely is that the government will fall, 
peacefully or violently.  It includes not only if free and fair elections are in place, but 
also how likely is the government to remain in power or remain popular. 
XXXXX
Political Stability
Internal Conflict.  Assess political violence and its influence on governance.  Highest 
scores go to countries with no armed opposition, and where the government does not 
indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect.  Lowest ratings go to civil war torn 
countries.  Intermediate ratings are awarded on the basis of the threats to the 
government and busines. 
XXXXX
External conflict: The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the risk to the 
incumbent government and to inward investment.  It ranges from trade restrictions and 
embargoes, whether imposed by a single country, a group of countries, or the 
international community as a whole, through geopolitical disputes, armed threats, 
exchanges of fire on borders, border incursions, foreign-supported insurgency, and full-
scale warfare.
XXXXX
Ethnic tensions: This component measures the degree of tension within a country 
attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions.  Lower ratings are given to 
countries where racial and nationality tensions are high because opposing groups are 
intolerant and unwilling to compromise.  Higher ratings are given to countries where 
tensions are minimal, even though such differences may still exist.
XXXXX
Government Effectiveness
Government Stability.  Measures the government’s ability to carry out its declared 
programs, and its ability to stay in office.  This will depend on issues as: the type of 
governance, the cohesion of the government and governing party or parties, the 
closeness of the next election, the government command of the legislature, and 
approval of government policies.
XXXXX
Bureaucratic Quality.  Measures institutional strength and quality of the civil service, 
assess how much strength and expertise bureaucrats have and how able they are to 
manage political alternations without drastic interruptions in government services, or 
policy changes.  Good performers have somewhat autonomous bureaucracies, free 
from political pressures, and an established mechanism for recruitment and training. 
XXXXX
Regulatory Quality
Investment Profile.  Includes the risk to operations (scored from 0 to 4, increasing in 
risk); taxation (scored from 0 to 3), repatriation (scored from 0 to 3); repatriation (scored 
from 0 to 3) and labor costs (scored from 0 to 2).  They all look at the government’s 
attitude towards investment.  
XXXXX
Rule of Law
Law and Order.  The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of 
popular observance of the law.
XXXXX
Control of Corruption
Corruption.  Measures corruption within the political system, which distorts the 
economic and financial environment, reduces the efficiency of government and 
business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather 
than ability, and introduces an inherently instability in the political system.  
XXXXX
























































PricewaterhouseCoopers (OPF) is a U.S.-based professional services firm.  It has set up an "Endowment 
for Transparency and Sustainability" aimed at supporting research efforts world-wide that shed light on two 
related topics of global importance: transparency in business and government, and sustainable economic 
development. Using a team of economists, survey professionals, analysts, and distinguished advisors, it has 
constructed an "Opacity Index" measuring the lack of transparency in 35 countries.
Opacity is defined as "the lack of clear, accurate, formal, easily discernible, and widely accepted practices"
in the following areas: corruption in government bureaucracy, laws governing contracts or property rights,
economic policies, accounting standards, and business regulation. The index was constructed based on
responses to a survey of chief financial officers of medium- and large firms, equity analysts, bankers, and
PWC employees resident in each country surveyed. The survey was conducted in 35 industrial and major
developing countries during the second and third quarter of 2000.




2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Economic .. .. X .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Regulation .. .. X .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Corruption .. .. X .. ..






















































TABLE A25:  Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 
 
A25: Reporters Without Borders
http://www.rsf.org
Reporters Without Borders - headquartered in Paris - is an international organization dedicated to the protection 
of reporters and respect of press freedom in the world.  In 2002,  International Reporters Without Borders 
published its first worldwide press freedom index, compiled for 139 countries. The organisation's initiatives are 
being carried out on five continents through its national branches and its offices in Abidjan, Bangkok, Buenos 
Aires, Istanbul, Montreal, Nairobi, New York, Tokyo and Washington. It also works in close co-operation with local 
and regional press freedom organisations and with members of the "Reporters without Borders' Network." 
The index was drawn up by asking journalists, researchers and legal experts worldwide to answer 50 questions 
about the whole range of press freedom violations (such as murders or arrests of journalists, censorship, 
pressure, state monopolies in various fields, punishment of press law offences and regulation of the media). 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 2002 
and 2004.
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Press Freedom Index X X .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. ..





















































TABLE A26:  State Department / Amnesty International (HUM / PTS) 
 
A26: State Department / Amnesty International - Human Rights Database
http://www.humanrightsdata.com
http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney_docs/pts.xls
We gather data from two different studies who have compiled a set of human rights indicators, drawing from the 
State Department's and Amnesty International's Human Rights Reports
The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover global human rights practices in the
previous calendar years. Reports are generated through data gathered by the State Department from all of its
embassies and representations throughout the world.
The Amnesty International’s Annual Reports cover global human rights conditions for the previous calendar years.
Reports are based on information collected through Amnesty activists as well as from other sources such as
media reports
The Cingranelli & Richards Human Rights Database (CIRI - http://www.humanrightsdata.com) contains
standards-based quantitative information on government respect for 13 internationally recognized human rights
for 192 countries. It is designed for use by scholars and students who seek to test theories about the causes and
consequences of human rights violations, as well as policy makers and analysts who seek to estimate the human
rights effects of a wide variety of institutional changes and public policies including democratization, economic aid,
military aid, structural adjustment, and humanitarian intervention.
The Political terror Scale (PTS - http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney_docs/pts.xls) was 
originally codified by Prof. Marc Gibney of the University of North Carolina. The Index captures the reality of 
domestic political terror, capturing issues such as: imprisonments, tortures, rule of law, security, disappearances 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from the 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 Reports  
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Restrictions on domestic and foreign travel XXXXX
Freedom of political participa t i o n XXXXX
I m p r i s o n m e n t s  b e c a u s e  o f   e t h n i c i t y ,  r a c e ,  o r  p o l i t i c a l ,  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s ? XXXXX
Government censorship XXXXX
Political Stability
Frequency of political killings XXXXX
Frequency of disappearances XXXXX
Frequency of tortures XXXXX
P o l i t i c a l  t e r r o r  s c a l e  ( P T S ) XXXXX
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Independence of judiciary XXXXX
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Country coverage 192 159 159 159 159






















































TABLE A27:  United Nations Economic Commissions for Africa (AGI) 
 
A27: Africa Governance Indicators
http://www.uneca.org/
Established in 1958, the Economic Commission for Africa is one of five regional commissions under the
administrative direction of United Nations headquarters. As the regional arm of the UN in Africa, it is mandated to
support the economic and social development of its 53 member States, foster regional integration, and promote
international cooperation for Africa's development. 
The Africa Governance Indicators is the result of a study initiated by the United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa, as part of the first major continent-wide study to measure and monitor progress of governance in Africa, 
published in “Progress towards Good Governance in Africa.”
The objective of the research was to ascertain current public perceptions of the state of governance in the region.
By placing strong emphasis on local and national surveys, and incorporating the views of a wide cross-section of
society, it aimed not only to take a snapshot of the perception of governance in various countries, but also to
highlight key capacity deficits and encourage the sharing of intraregional experience and knowledge on the
challenges to good governance
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 2004.  
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Political representation X. .. .. .. .
Political system X. .. .. .. .
Power distribution X. .. .. .. .
Political party freedom / security X. .. .. .. .
Electoral process Independence / credibility X. .. .. .. .
Institutional effectiveness / accountability X. .. .. .. .
Legislature's effectiveness X. .. .. .. .
Human rights X. .. .. .. .
Media Independence X. .. .. .. .
Satisfaction with democracy X. .. .. .. .
Trust in Government X. .. .. .. .
Trust in Parliament X. .. .. .. .
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Executive's effectiveness X. .. .. .. .
Effectiveness in state structure X. .. .. .. .
Government services efficiency X. .. .. .. .
Decentralization of structures X. .. .. .. .
Economic management X. .. .. .. .
Regulatory Quality
Investment policies attractiveness X. .. .. .. .
Pro-investment tax policies X. .. .. .. .
Tax system efficiency/corruption X. .. .. .. .
Rule of Law
Judiciary's effectiveness X. .. .. .. .
Respect for rule of law X. .. .. .. .
Law enforcement organs X. .. .. .. .
Trust in Judiciary X. .. .. .. .
Trust in Police X. .. .. .. .
Control of Corruption
Civil service transparency / accountability X. .. .. .. .
Corruption control X. .. .. .. .




















































TABLE A28:  USAID / Vanderbilt University (USD) 
 
A28: USAID / Vanderbilt University's Democracy Surveys
http://www.millennium-int.com/newdsd/
The Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) conducted Democracy Surveys in 7 Central American
countries and Mexico, directed by Prof. Mitchell Seligson of Vanderbilt University and with the financial
assistance of USAID. The surveys were commissioned as part of a larger effort to promote and divulge
democracy and prosperity and bolster confidence in democratic institutions in the region.




2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Trust in legislation X. .. .. .. .
Satisfaction with democracy X. .. .. .. .
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Trust in supreme court X. .. .. .. .
Victim of crime X. .. .. .. .
Trust in tribunals X. .. .. .. .
Trust in justice X. .. .. .. .
Trust in police X. .. .. .. .
Control of Corruption
Frequency of corruption X. .. .. .. .




















































TABLE A29:  The World Business Environment Survey (WBS, WDR) 
 
A29. The World Business Environment Survey (WBS)
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/IC-WBESConditions
The World Business Environment Survey (WBS) is a survey conducted by the World Bank in collaboration
with several other institutions. It is designed to provide information on the business environment facing
private enterprises. It was conducted during 1999 and 2000 in 81 countries. The respondents were
managers of firms in at least 100 firms per country. This survey asks several questions similar to those in
the 1997 World Development Report survey that we use in constructing the 1998 version of the indicators.
We therefore treat the WBS as the continuation of this source.
The component of the WBS covering transition economies is referred to as the Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey (BPS), described in Table A2. The questionnaire for this region contains
more detailed questions about corruption issues, including questions on "state capture" referring to the
manipulation of the institutions of the state for private gain on a grand scale. In addition, a new round of
BPS was conducted in 2002.  For these reasons, we treat the BPS as a separate source.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. We use data from























































2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Business have voice to express .. .. X X ..
Business are informed .. .. X X ..
Political Stability
Political instability .. .. X .. ..
Likelihood of uncostitutional .. .. .. X ..
Threat of terrorism .. .. .. X ..
Government Effectiveness
Quality of customs .. .. X X ..
Quality of public works (roads,…) .. .. X X ..
Quality of power company .. .. X .. ..
Quality of Water .. .. X .. ..
Quality of public health .. .. X X ..
Quality of public education .. .. X .. ..
Quality of central government  .. .. X .. ..
Quality of central bank .. .. X .. ..
Efficiency of government in delivering services .. .. X X ..
Likelihood that when a government official acts against the rules, one can go 
to another official or a superior and get correct treatment
.. .. .. X ..
Management time spent with bureaucrats .. .. .. X ..
The efficiency of mail delivery .. .. .. X ..
Predictability of changes in rules and laws .. .. .. X ..
Credibility of government's commitment to policies .. .. .. X ..
Regulatory Quality
Regulations on starting new businesses .. .. X X ..
Price controls .. .. X X ..
Regulations on foreign trade .. .. X X ..
Foreign currency regulations .. .. X X ..
General uncertainty about regulations .. .. X X ..
Rule of Law
Corruption of bankers .. .. X .. ..
Quality of the Police .. .. X .. ..
Organized crime .. .. X .. ..
Street crime .. .. X X ..
Courts--  fair & impartial .. .. X .. ..
Courts-affordable .. .. X .. ..
Courts-consistent/predictable .. .. X X ..
Court's enforceability .. .. X .. ..
Confidence in judicial system today in insuring property rights .. .. X X ..
General constraint—functioning of the judiciary .. .. X .. ..
Obstacles to competition-violation of patents .. .. X .. ..
Quality of courts .. .. X .. ..
Control of Corruption
Frequency of additional payments .. .. X X ..
Dishonest courts .. .. X .. ..
Corruption as obstacle to business .. .. X X ..
Bribery (% of Gross revenues) .. .. X .. ..
Country coverage .. .. 80 74 ..





















































TABLE A30:  World Economic Forum (GCS, GCSA) 
 
A30. World Economic Forum (GCS)
http://www.weforum.org
The World Economic Forum (WEF) is an independent, not-for-profit organization bringing together top leaders
from business, government, academia and the media to address key economic, social and political issues in
partnership.  The WEF was founded in 1971 and is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.  
Since 1996, the WEF has sponsored the Global Competitiveness Report, an annual publication produced in
collaboration with the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID). As background for this report, the
WEF conducts the Global Competitiveness Survey, which measures the perceptions of business executives
about the country in which they operate. The survey asks top managers to rank on a 1 to 7 scale their opinion on
issues in eight broad areas: 1) Openness, 2) Government, 3) Finance, 4) Infrastructure, 5) Technology, 6)
Management, 7) Labor, and 8) Institutions.
In 1998 and 2002 the WEF sponsored separate surveys of countries in Africa and Middle East, respectively. We
incorporated them in the Global Surveys, resulting in an increase of country coverage in 1998 and 2002 of 20 and
8 countries, respectively.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use data 
from the 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 Surveys  Additional questions from the 1998 African Competitiveness 
Report (covering 23 African countries overall) have also been listed (GCSA).
 
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Firms are usually informed clearly and transparently by the Government on changes in policies
affecting their industry X X .. .. ..
Newspapers can publish stories of their choosing without fear of censorship or retaliation X X .. .. ..
When deciding upon policies and contracts, Government officials favor well-connected firms X X .. .. ..
Extent of direct influence of legal contributions to political parties on specific public policy
outcomes X X .. .. ..
Effectiveness of national Parliament/Congress as a law making and oversight institution X X .. .. ..
Political Stability
The threat of terrorism in the country imposes significant costs on business X X .. .. ..
New Governments honor commitments of previous Governments .. .. X X X
Likelihood of dramatic changes in institutions .. .. X X X
The highest power is always peacefully transferred .. .. .. X ..
Government coups or political instability as an obstacle to development (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Tribal conflict as an obstacle for business development (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Government Effectiveness
Competence of public sector personnel XXXXX
Quality of general infrastructure XX. .. .X
Quality of public schools XX. .. .X
Time spent by senior management dealing with government officials XXXXX
Public Service vulnerability to political pressure .. .. X X X
Wasteful government expenditure X. .XX. .
Strength and expertise of the civil service to avoid drastic interruptions in government services in
times of political instability (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Government economic policies are independent of pressure from special interest groups.
.. .. X .. ..





















































2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Regulatory Quality
Administrative regulations are burdensome XXXXX
Tax system is distortionary XXXXX
Import barriers as obstacle to growth XX. .XX
Competition in local market is limited XX. .X. .
It is easy to start company XX. .X. .
Anti monopoly policy is lax and ineffective XX. .XX
Clusters are frequent X X .. .. ..
Environmental regulations hurt competitiveness X X .. .. ..
Cost of tariffs imposed on business XX. .XX
Government subsidies keep uncompetitive industries alive artificially .. X .. .. X
C o m p l e x i t y  o f  T a x  S y s t e m X. .. .. .. .
Domestic banks are protected from foreign competition .. .. .. X ..
Barriers to entry in banking sector are very high .. .. .. X ..
Interest rates are heavily regulated .. .. .. X ..
Private sector participation in infrastructure projects is not permitted .. .. .. X ..
Costs of uncertain rules, laws, or government policies (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Tranfer costs associated with exporting capital as an obstacle to business (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
General uncertainty on costs of regulations as an obstacle to business (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Openness of public sector contracts to foreign investors (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Policies for dividend remittances as obstacles to development (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Dominance of state owned or state controlled enterpriese (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
State interference in private business (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Regulatory discretionality (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Price controls as an obstacle to business develpoment (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Regulations on foreign trade as an obstacle to business develpoment (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Foreign currency regulations as an obstacle to business develpoment (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Rule of Law
Common crime imposes costs on business X X .. .. ..
Organized crime imposes costs on business XXXXX
Money laundering through banks is pervasive X X .. .. ..
Money laundering through non-banks is pervasive X X .. .. ..
Quality of Police XXXXX
Insider trading is pervasive X X .. .. X
The judiciary is independent from political influences of government, citizens, or firms XXXX. .
Legal framework to challenge the legality of government actions is inefficient XXXXX
Intellectual Property protection is weak  XX. .XX
Protection of financial assets is weak XXX. .. .
Illegal donation to parties are frequent X X .. .. ..
Private businesses are morel likely to settle disputes outside courts. .. .. X .. ..
Compliance with court rulings and /or arbitration awards (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Legal system effectiveness at enforcing commercial contracts (GCSA) .. .. .. X ..
Citizens’ willingness to accept legal means to adjudicate disputes rather than depending
on physical force or illegal means (GCSA)
.. .. .. X ..
Percentage of firms which are unofficial or unregistered / Tax evasion X X X X X
Control of Corruption
Public trust in financial honesty of politicians X X .. .. ..
Extent to which legal contributions to political parties are misused by politicians X X .. .. ..
Diversion of public funds due to corruption is common X X .. .. ..
Frequency of bribery in the economy XX. .X. .
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: public utilities, tax payments,
loan applications, awarding of public contracts, influencing laws, policies regulations,
decrees, getting favourable judicial decisions
XXXXX
Percentage Bribes paid as share of revenues X .. .. .. ..
Percentage bribe paid for procurement contracts X .. .. .. ..
Extent to which firms' illegal payments to influence government policies impose costs on
other firms
X X .. .. ..
Extent to which influence of powerful firms with political ties impose costs on other firms
X X .. .. ..
Country Coverage: 104 88 80 74 58





















































TABLE A31:  World Markets Online (WMO) 
 
A31: World Markets Online
http://www.worldmarketsonline.com
World Markets Online (WMO) is an online subscription service from the World Markets Research Center updated 
daily which provides analysis of the conditions and risks for businesses worldwide. Established in 1996, the World 
Markets Research Centre is based in London and employs over 190 permanent staff.
  
World Markets Online has developed a risk rating system to enable its clients to compare and contrast the
investment climate in over 200 countries around the world. For WMO the principal quality their risk measures
endeavor to measure is stability, which they believe businesses need most of all to be able to make secure
investments and plan ahead. In addition to stability, WMO believes that businesses also need the right conditions
in place; governments must ensure the right policies and safeguards to allow businesses to operate effectively. A
country with a high risk rating by WMO is a country where businesses face continual threats to their operations,
either from direct physical intervention, or because of the poor conditions and stability in the country concerned.
The system rates the quality of conditions and level of stability encountered by investors in each country in terms
of political, economic, legal, tax, operational and security environment.
Drawing on a worldwide network of information gatherers and analysts, World Markets Research Centre
generates a comprehensive range of in-depth country, sector and market services. The process by which the
risks are assessed consists firstly of WMO analysts' own experience of the country’s conditions. Daily stories
highlight countries’ changing conditions and constantly inform the risk rating levels. In addition to the in-house
analysts’ own consensus, World Markets Online also draws upon the expertise and impressions of those working
in the field through a wide network of stringers and informal contacts which allows them to access information
only available locally as well as to case studies of individual investor's experience. Regular meetings of all the
analysts across the regional desks ensure that their ratings are fully comparable globally, and that the factors
used for assessment are consistent.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use the

























































2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Institutional permanence An assessment of how mature and well-established the political 
system is. It is also an assessment of how far political opposition operates within the system 
or attempts to undermine it from outside. A country with high institutional permanence would 
unquestionably survive the death or removal from power of the current leadership. A mature 
political system will conventionally have a clearly established relationship between the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. 
X X .. .. ..
Representativeness How well the population and organised interests can make their voices 
heard in the political system. Provided representation is handled fairly and effectively, it will 
ensure greater stability and better designed policies. 
X X .. .. ..
Political Stability
Civil unrest How widespread political unrest is, and how great a threat it poses to investors. 
Demonstrations in themselves may not be cause for concern, but they will cause major 
disruption if they escalate into severe violence. At the extreme, this factor would amount to 
civil war. 
X X .. .. ..
Terrorism Whether the country suffers from a sustained terrorist threat, and from how many 
sources. The degree of localisation of the threat is assessed, and whether the active groups 
are likely to target or affect businesses. 
X X .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Bureaucracy : An assessment of the quality of the country’s bureaucracy. The better the 
bureaucracy the quicker decisions are made and the more easily foreign investors can go 
about their business.
X X .. .. ..
Policy consistency and forward planning How confident businesses can be of the continuity 
of economic policy stance - whether a change of government will entail major policy 
disruption, and whether the current government has pursued a coherent strategy. This factor 
also looks at the extent to which policy-making is far-sighted, or conversely aimed at short-
term economic advantage. 
X X .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Tax Effectiveness How efficient the country’s tax collection system is. The rules may be clear 
and transparent, but whether they are enforced consistently. This factor looks at the relative 
effectiveness too of corporate and personal, indirect and direct taxation. 
X X .. .. ..
Legislation An assessment of whether the necessary business laws are in place, and 
whether there any outstanding gaps. This includes the extent to which the country's 
legislation is compatible with, and respected by, other countries' legal systems. 
X X .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Judicial Independence An assessment of how far the state and other outside actors can 
influence and distort the legal system. This will determine the level of legal impartiality 
investors can expect. 
X X .. .. ..
Crime How much of a threat businesses face from crime such as kidnapping, extortion, street 
violence, burglary and so on. These problems can cause major inconvenience for foreign 
investors and require them to take expensive security precautions. 
X X .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Corruption : An assessment of the intrusiveness of the country’s bureaucracy. The amount of 
red tape likely to countered is assessed, as is the likelihood of encountering corrupt officials 
and other groups. 
X X .. .. ..
Country coverage 202 186 .. .. ..






















































Appendix B:  Components of Aggregate Governance Indicators, 2004
 Table B1:  Voice and Accountability
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
CUD A7 To what extent does the state and/or its allied groups engage in repression of its citizens?
In carrying out internal security tasks, to what extent does the state rely on tactics commonly considered illegitimate in the 
international community?
EIU A9 Orderly transfers
Vested interests
Accountability of Public Officials
Human Rights
Freedom of association
FRH A11 Civil liberties: Freedom of speech, of assembly and demonstration, of religion, equal opportunity, of excessive
governmental intervention
Political Rights: free and fair elections, representative legislative, free vote, political parties, no dominant group, respect for
minorities
Freedom of the Press
GCS A30 Firms are usually informed clearly and transparently by the Government on changes in policies affecting their industry
Newspapers can publish stories of their choosing without fear of censorship or retaliation
When deciding upon policies and contracts, Government officials favor well-connected firms
Extent of direct influence of legal contributions to political parties on specific public policy outcomes
Effectiveness of national Parliament/Congress as a law making and oversight institution
HUM A26 Travel: domestic and foreign travel restrictions 
Freedom of political participation
Imprisonments: Are there any imprisoned people because of their ethnicity, race, or their political, religious beliefs?
Government censorship
PRS A23 Military in Politics The military are not elected by anyone, so their participation in government, either direct or indirect,
reduces accountability and therefore represents a risk. The threat of military intervention might lead as well to an
anticipated potentially inefficient change in policy or even in government. It also works as an indication that the
government is unable to function effectively and that the country has an uneasy environment for foreign business.
Democratic Accountability. Quantifies how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less response
there is the more likely is that the government will fall, peacefully or violently. It includes not only if free and fair elections
are in place, but also how likely is the government to remain in power. 
RSF A25 Press Freedom Index
WMO A31 Institutional permanence: An assessment of how mature and well-established the political system is. It is also an 
assessment of how far political opposition operates within the system or attempts to undermine it from outside. A country 
with high institutional permanence would unquestionably survive the death or removal from power of the current 
leadership. A mature political system will conventionally have a clearly established relationship between the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of government.
Representativeness: How well the population and organized interests can make their voices heard in the political system. 


























































 Table B1:  Voice and Accountability (cont.)
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Non-representative Sources
AFR A2 How much do you trust the parliament?
Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?
AGI A27 Political representation
Political system
Power distribution
Political party freedom / security








Political and Social Integration
CCR A11 Civil Liberties
Accountability and public voice
FHT A11 Political Process: Deals with elections, referenda, party configuration, conditions for political competition, and popular
participation in elections.
Civil Society: Highlights the degree to which volunteerism, trade unionism, and professional associations exist, and
whether civic organizations are influential
Independent Media: Press freedom, public access to a variety of information sources, and the independence of those
sources from undue government or other influences.
GAL A13   Fairness of elections
Human Rights
LAI A12 Budget Transparency
LOB A20 Satisfaction with democracy
Trust in Parliament
MSI A19 Media Sustainability Index
USD A27 Trust in legislation
Satisfaction with democracy



























































Table B2:  Political Stability
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
CUD A7 Assess the degree to which the decline or collapse of central political authority posed a threat to political stability in this 
country.
Assess the degree to which political protest or rebellion posed a threat to political stability in this country.
Assess the degree to which ethno-cultural and/or religious conflict posed a threat to political stability in this country.
DRI A15 Military Coup Risk: A military coup d’etat (or a series of such events) that reduces the GDP growth rate by 2% during any 
12-month period.
Major Insurgency/Rebellion: An increase in scope or intensity of one or more insurgencies/rebellions that reduces the 
GDP growth rate by 3% during any 12-month period.
Political Terrorism: An increase in scope or intensity of terrorism that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-
month period.
Political Assassination: A political assassination (or a series of such events) that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% 
during any 12-month period.
Civil War: An increase in scope or intensity of one or more civil wars that reduces the GDP growth rate by 4% during any 
12-month period.
Major Urban Riot: An increase in scope, intensity, or frequency of rioting that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during 
any 12-month period.




GCS A30 Country terrorist threat: Does the threat of terrorism in the country impose significant costs on firms?
HUM A26 Frequency of political killings
Frequency of disappearances
Frequency of torture
IJT A17 Security Risk Rating
MIG A21 Extremism. The term “extremism” covers the threat posed by any individuals or organisations who hold a narrow set of 
fanatical beliefs. Extremists are likely to believe that any and all means are justified to eradicate the target of hostility, and 
are not afraid to destroy themselves in the process. This ideological aspect of extremism makes it highly unpredictable, 
and its close association with violence makes it highly dangerous. The extent to which extremism should be judged a 
threat to a particular business in a particular market can be assessed along the following lines: integration issues; religious 
tensions; pressure groups; terrorist activity; xenophobia.
PRS A23 Internal Conflict: Assesses political violence and its influence on governance.  
External conflict: The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the risk to the incumbent government and to 
inward investment.
Ethnic tensions: This component measures the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or 
language divisions.
PTS A26 Political Terror Scale
WMO A31 Civil unrest How widespread political unrest is, and how great a threat it poses to investors. Demonstrations in themselves
may not be cause for concern, but they will cause major disruption if they escalate into severe violence. At the extreme,
this factor would amount to civil war.
Terrorism Whether the country suffers from a sustained terrorist threat, and from how many sources. The degree of
localization of the threat is assessed, and whether the active groups are likely to target or affect businesses. 
Non-representative Sources
BRI A6 Fractionalization of political spectrum and the power of these factions.
Fractionalization by language, ethnic and/or religious groups and the power of these factions.
Restrictive (coercive) measures required to retain power.
Organization and strength of forces for a radical government.
    Societal conflict involving demonstrations, strikes, and street violence.
Instability as perceived by non-constitutional changes, assassinations, and guerrilla wars.
GAL A13 Terrorism/Crime

























































 Table B3:  Government Effectiveness
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
CUD A7
Rate the administrative and technical skills of the country’s civil service (occupying middle and higher management roles).
Rate the efficiency of the country’s national bureaucracies overall.
Rate the efficiency of the country’s local-level government bureaucracies overall.
Rate the effectiveness of coordination between the central government and local-level government organizations.
Rate the state’s ability to formulate and implement national policy initiatives.
Rate the state’s effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue.
Does the central government produce a national budget in a timely manner?
Do local governments produce budgets in a timely manner?
Rate the state’s ability to monitor socioeconomic trends, activities, and conditions within its borders
Rate the state’s ability to create, deliver, and maintain vital national infrastructure.
Rate the state’s ability to respond effectively to domestic economic problems.
Rate the state’s ability to respond effectively to natural disasters.
DRI A15 Government Instability: An increase in government personnel turnover rate at senior levels that reduces the GDP growth 
rate by 2% during any 12-month period.
Government Ineffectiveness: A decline in government personnel quality at any level that reduces the GDP growth rate by 
1% during any 12-month period.
Institutional Failure: A deterioration of government capacity to cope with national problems as a result of institutional 
rigidity that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
EIU A9 Quality of bureaucracy
Excessive bureaucracy / red tape
GCS A30 Public Spending Composition
Quality of general infrastructure
Quality of public schools
Time spent by senior management dealing with government officials
MIG A21 Bureaucracy. The critical feature of bureaucracy is that it raises issues more complicated than “red tape” alone. 
Bureaucracy can be actively and deliberately obstructive to foreign investors – in response to political pressures, vested 
interests and special interest lobbies. Some features that determine the extent that bureaucracy could affect business 
operations are the accountability of public officials; politicisation of bureaucratic departments; regulatory credibility and 
enforceability; size of the public sector and transparency of decision-making.
PRS A23 Government Stability.  Measures the government’s ability to carry out its declared programs, and its ability to stay in office. 
This will depend on issues such as: the type of governance, the cohesion of the government and governing party or 
parties, the closeness of the next election, the government’s command of the legislature, and popular approval of the 
government policies.
Bureaucratic Quality.  Measures institutional strength and quality of the civil service, assess how much strength and 
expertise bureaucrats have and how able they are to manage political alternations without drastic interruptions in 
government services, or policy changes.  Good performers have somewhat autonomous bureaucracies, free from political 
pressures, and an established mechanism for recruitment and training. 
WMO A31 Policy consistency and forward planning: How confident businesses can be of the continuity of economic policy stance -
whether a change of government will entail major policy disruption, and whether the current government has pursued a
coherent strategy. This factor also looks at the extent to which policy-making is far-sighted, or conversely aimed at short-
term economic (and electoral) advantage. 
Bureaucracy : An assessment of the quality of the country’s bureaucracy. The better the bureaucracy the quicker 























































 Table B3:  Government Effectiveness (cont.)
Code Table Concept Measured
Non-representative Sources
ADB A1 Management of public debt
Policies to improve efficiency of public sector
Revenue Mobilization 
Budget Management
AFR A2 What proportion of the country's problems do you think the government can solve?
Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to obtain household services (like piped water, electricity or 
telephone)?
Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to obtain an identity document (such as birth certificate, driver's 
license or passport)?
AGI A27 Executive's effectiveness




ASD A3 Civil service
Revenue Mobilization and Budget Management
Management and Efficiency of Public Expenditures
BPS A5 How problematic are telecommunications for the growth of your business 
How problematic is electricity for the growth of your business.
How problematic is transportation for the growth of your business.
BRI A6   Bureaucratic delays
BTI A4   Consensus Building
Governance Capability
Effective Use of Resources
Reliable Pursuit of Goals
Welfare Regime
CPIA A8 Management of external debt




EGV A14 Global E-government
FHT A11 Government and Administration: Government decentralization, independent and responsibilities or local and regional
governments, and legislative and executive transparency are discussed.
LBO A20 Trust in Government
WCY A18 Government economic policies do not adapt quickly to changes in the economy
The public service is not independent from political interference
Government decisions are not effectively implemented
Bureaucracy hinders business activity
The distribution infrastructure of goods and services is generally inefficient
























































 Table B4:  Regulatory Quality
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
DRI A15 Regulations -- Exports: A 2% reduction in export volume as a result of a worsening in export regulations or restrictions 
(such as export limits) during any 12-month period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment.
Regulations -- Imports: A 2% reduction in import volume as a result of a worsening in import regulations or restrictions 
(such as import quotas) during any 12-month period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment.
Regulations -- Other Business: An increase in other regulatory burdens, with respect to the level at the time of the 
assessment, that reduces total aggregate investment in real LCU terms by 10%
Ownership of Business by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in legal restrictions on ownership 
of business by non-residents during any 12-month period.
Ownership of Equities by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in legal restrictions on ownership 
of equities by non-residents during any 12-month period.




GCS A30 Administrative regulations are burdensome
Tax system is distortionary
Import barriers as obstacle to growth
Competition in local market is limited
It is easy to start company
Anti monopoly policy is lax and ineffective
Clusters are frequent
Environmental regulations hurt competitiveness
Cost of tariffs imposed on business







MIG A21 Unfair Competition. When entering a non-domestic market the corporate may find that established players and 
competitors often resort to unethical and illegal means to create obstructions that will cause the enterprise to under-
perform. The rules of doing business are different in different markets, and so are the routes that companies choose 
towards success. For any company, the most important factor in assessing the risk of unfair competition is how much 
knowledge it has of its local and international competitors. Pertinent issues to consider: competitor behaviour; competitor 
links; information security; political involvement in the sector; transparency. 
Unfair Trade. In some parts of the world, companies and governments’ interests are so closely intertwined that they are 
almost indistinguishable. The principals of those companies, some of whom are government ministers, use their position to 
trade unfairly and put obstacles in the way of foreign business to ensure that they retain the dominant position within the 
market. Occasionally, activities border on the illegal when government legislation is deliberately amended to favour local 
business, and/or enforcement bodies are deliberately obstructive to ensure that the local business succeeds at the 
expense of the foreign investor.
PRS A23 Investment Profile.  Includes the risk to operations (scored from 0 to 4, increasing in risk); taxation (scored from 0 to 3), 
repatriation (scored from 0 to 3); repatriation (scored from 0 to 3) and labor costs (scored from 0 to 2).  They all look at the 
government’s attitude towards investment.  
WMO A31 Tax Effectiveness: How efficient the country’s tax collection system is. The rules may be clear and transparent, but
whether they are enforced consistently. This factor looks at the relative effectiveness too of corporate and personal,
indirect and direct taxation. 
Legislation: An assessment of whether the necessary business laws are in place, and whether there any outstanding























































 Table B4:  Regulatory Quality (cont.)
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Non-representative Sources
ADB A1 Trade policy
Competitive environment
Labor Market Policies
AGI A27 Investment policies attractiveness
Pro-investment tax policies
Tax system efficiency/corruption
ASD A3 Trade Policy and Forex Regime
Factor and Product Markets and Prices
Enabling Environment for Private Sector Development
BPS A5 Information on the laws and regulations is easy to obtain
Interpretations of the laws and regulations are consistent and predictable
Unpredictability of changes of regulations
How problematic are labor regulations for the growth of your business.
  How problematic are tax regulations for the growth of your business.
How problematic are custom and trade regulations for the growth of your business.
BTI A4 Competition
Price Stability
CPIA A8 Competitive environment
Factor and products markets
Trade policy
EBRD A10 Price liberalization 
Trade & foreign exchange system 
Competition policy 
WCY A18 Access to capital markets (foreign and domestic) is easily available
Ease of Doing Business
Banking regulation does not hinder competitiveness
Competition legislation in your country does not prevent unfair competition
Customs' authorities do not facilitate the efficient transit of goods
Financial institutions' transparency is not widely developed in your country
Easy to start company
Foreign investors are free to acquire control in domestic companies
Legal regulation of financial institutions is inadequate for financial stability
Price controls affect pricing of products in most industries
Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders
Real corporate taxes are non distortionary
Real personal taxes are non distortionary
The exchange rate policy of your country hinders the competitiveness of enterprises
The legal framework is detrimental to your country's competitiveness
Protectionism in your country negatively affects the conduct of business in your country
Labor regulations hinder business activities
New Legislation restricts competitiveness





















































 Table B5:  Rule of Law
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
CUD A7 For the most part, is the state seen as legitimately representing its citizens?
Rate the state’s adherence to the rule of law, considering the country as a whole.
DRI A15 Losses and Costs of Crime: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in crime during any 12-month period.
Kidnapping of Foreigners: An increase in scope, intensity, or frequency of kidnapping of foreigners that reduces the GDP 
growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
  Enforceability of Government Contracts: A 1 point decline on a scale from "0" to "10" in the enforceability of contracts 
during any 12-month period.
Enforceability of Private Contracts: A 1-point decline on a scale from "0" to "10" in the legal enforceability of contracts 
during any 12-month period.
EIU A9 Violent crime
Organized crime
Fairness of judicial process
Enforceability of contracts
Speediness of judicial process
Confiscation/expropriation
GCS A30 Common crime imposes costs on business
Organized crime imposes costs on business
Money laundering through banks is pervasive
Money laundering through non-banks is pervasive
Quality of Police
Insider trading is pervasive
The judiciary is independent from political influences of members of government, citizens or firms
Legal framework to challenge the legality of government actions is inefficient
Intellectual Property protection is weak 
Protection of financial assets is weak
Illegal donation to parties are frequent
Percentage of firms which are unofficial or unregistered
HER A16 Black market
Property Rights
HUM A26 Independence of Judiciary
MIG A21
Organised Crime. Crime, especially organised crime, is ultimately about profit. As capitalism and free market economic 
principles have spread around the world, the rule of law has often failed to keep pace. Existing organised crime groups 
simply seized the opportunity to fill that gap, and were swiftly followed by a flood of operators that have been kept to seize 
on the capitalist profit motive while dispensing with scruples. The most dangerous aspect of organised crime for legitimate 
businesses is that it is often indistinguishable, to the naked eye, from legitimate business. The proceeds of organised 
crime are recycled into legitimate companies through investments. 
Legal Safeguards. The performance of an enterprise in terms of the timeframe for returns and the rate of return itself, may 
be hostage to legal obstacles or the absence of sufficient recourse to the law in a non-domestic market. The challenges 
posed by an absence of legal safeguards do not always arise because there simply is not enough of a legislative 
framework by which to interpret situations. Frequently, the problem lies not with the legal framework itself, but with the 
inability for that framework to be used in an impartial and reliable fashion, if indeed it is usable at all. 
PRS A23 Law and Order.  The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the 
Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law (assessed separately).
QLM A6 Direct Financial Fraud, Money Laundering and Organized Crime
WMO A31 Judicial Independence An assessment of how far the state and other outside actors can influence and distort the legal 
system. This will determine the level of legal impartiality investors can expect. 
Crime How much of a threat businesses face from crime such as kidnapping, extortion, street violence, burglary and so 

























































 Table B5:  Rule of Law (cont.)
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Non-representative Sources
ADB A1 Property Rights
AFR A2 Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family feared crime in your own home?
Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family had something stolen from your house?
Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family been physically attacked?
How much do you trust the courts of law?
How much do you trust the police?
Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to obtain help from the police when you need it?
AGI A27 Judiciary's effectiveness
Respect for rule of law
Law enforcement organs
ASD A3 Rule of Law
BPS A5 Fairness of the court system
Affordability of the court system
Enforceability of court decisions
Honesty of courts
Quickness of court decisions
Property right protection
How problematic is organized crime for the growth of your business.
  How problematic is judiciary for the growth of your business.
How problematic is street crime for the growth of your business.
BRI A6 Enforceability of contracts
BTI A4 Rule of Law
Private Property
CCR A11 Rule of Law
CPIA A8 Property rights
FHT A11 Rule of Law: Considers judicial/constitutional matters as well as the legal and de facto status of ethnic minorities.
GAL A13 Trust in the Legal System
LBO A20 Trust in Judiciary
Trust in Police
Victim of crime
USD A28 Trust in Judiciary
Trust in Police
Victim of crime
Trust in supreme court
Trust in tribunals
WCY A18 Tax evasion is a common practice in your country
  Justice is not fairly administered in society
Personal security and private property are not adequately protected
Parallel economy impairs economic development in your country
Insider trading is common in the stock market
























































 Table B6: Control of Corruption
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
CUD A7 Rate the severity of overall corruption within the state
To what extent do the country's primary political decision makers engage in patterns of nepotism, cronyism and 
patronage?
To what extent do the country's civil service engage in patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage?
To what extent do patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage undermine the state's ability to exercise the basic 
functions of government effectively?
To what extent do patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage distort broad patterns of economic development?
DRI A15 Risk Event Outcome non-price: Losses and Costs of Corruption: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in 
corruption during any 12-month period.
EIU A9 Corruption
GCS A30 Public trust in financial honesty of politicians
Diversion of public funds due to corruption is common
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: import/export permits
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: public utilities
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to tax payments
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: loan applications
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: awarding of public contracts
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: influencing laws, regulations, decrees
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: getting favorable judicial decisions
Extent to which powerful firms' political ties impose costs on other firms
Extent to which firms' illegal payments to influence government policies impose costs on other firms
MIG A21 Corruption. There is an immense variety of activities that may be construed as corrupt. Bribery is the most obvious. 
However, what is and is not a bribe is a matter of presentation and perception in much the same way as “corruption” itself. 
Some of the issues that executives should consider include: accounting standards; anti-corruption policy credibility and 
enforceability; cronyism, nepotism and vested interests; cultural differences; judicial independence; transparency of 
decision-making. 
PRS A23 Corruption.  Measures corruption within the political system, which distorts the economic and financial environment, 
reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage 
rather than ability, and introduces an inherently instability in the political system.  
QLM A6 Indirect Diversion of Funds
WMO A31 Corruption: This index assesses the intrusiveness of the country’s bureaucracy. The amount of red tape likely to
countered is assessed, as is the likelihood of encountering corrupt officials and other groups. 
Non-representative Sources
ADB A1 Anti-corruption policies
Transparency / corruption
AFR A2 How well would you say the current government is handling the fight of corruption in the government?
How many elected leaders (parliamentarians or local councilors) do you think are involved in corruption?
How many judges and magistrates do you think are involved in corruption?
How many government officials do you think are involved in corruption?
How many border officials do you think are involved in corruption?
AGI A27 Civil service transparency / accountability
Corruption control
ASD A3 Anti-corruption
BPS A5 How common is for firms to have to pay irregular additional payments to get things done
On average, what percent of total annual sales do firms pay in unofficial payments to public officials
How often do firms make epayments to influence the content of new legislation
Extent to which firms' payments to public officials to affect legislation impose costs on other firms























































 Table B6: Control of Corruption (cont.)
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Non-Representative Sources
BRI A6 Internal Causes of Political Risk: Mentality, including xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism, willingness to
compromise, etc.
CCR A11   Transparency / corruption
CPIA A8   Transparency / corruption
FHT A11 Corruption
GAL A13 Frequency of corruption
Frequency of household bribery
Extent of Grand corruption
Extent of Petty corruption
LBO A20 Have you heard of acts of corruption?
It is likely to bribe policemen
It is likely to bribe judges
It is likely to bribe public servants
PRC A22 Corruption Index
USD A28 Frequency of corruption






















































APPENDIX C: Governance Indicators over Time 
 
TABLE C1: Voice and Accountability
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.35 0.14 9 -1.31 0.23 5 -1.76 0.33 2 -1.68 0.30 2 -1.53 0.35 2
ALBANIA ALB 0.03 0.11 9 -0.10 0.14 6 -0.05 0.16 6 -0.26 0.19 5 -0.35 0.21 4
ALGERIA DZA -0.91 0.15 9 -0.96 0.17 7 -1.31 0.22 5 -1.46 0.23 4 -1.17 0.21 4
A M E R I C A N  S A M O A A S M 0 . 4 4 0 . 5 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ANDORRA ADO 1.23 0.20 3 1.41 0.29 2 1.39 0.38 1 1.44 0.35 1 1.29 0.40 1
ANGOLA AGO -1.02 0.15 8 -1.40 0.17 7 -1.37 0.22 5 -1.28 0.23 4 -1.42 0.21 4
ANGUILLA AIA 0.74 0.52 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG 0.48 0.20 3 0.17 0.29 2 -0.02 0.38 1 0.05 0.35 1 0.19 0.40 1
ARGENTINA ARG 0.49 0.14 13 0.23 0.15 12 0.44 0.21 8 0.29 0.22 6 0.60 0.20 6
ARMENIA ARM -0.66 0.11 9 -0.44 0.14 6 -0.30 0.16 6 -0.31 0.19 5 -0.57 0.23 3
A R U B A A B W 0 . 6 4 0 . 5 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.40 0.16 10 1.50 0.17 9 1.61 0.22 6 1.50 0.23 5 1.73 0.21 5
AUSTRIA AUT 1.25 0.16 9 1.32 0.17 9 1.21 0.22 6 1.27 0.23 6 1.43 0.21 5
AZERBAIJAN AZE -0.97 0.10 11 -0.87 0.12 9 -0.81 0.16 7 -0.95 0.18 6 -1.08 0.18 4
BAHAMAS BHS 1.14 0.19 4 1.18 0.25 3 1.10 0.28 2 1.07 0.29 2 1.11 0.32 2
BAHRAIN BHR -0.73 0.14 9 -0.74 0.18 7 -1.17 0.22 5 -1.22 0.23 4 -0.94 0.21 4
BANGLADESH BGD -0.69 0.15 9 -0.57 0.17 8 -0.34 0.22 6 -0.17 0.23 4 -0.33 0.21 4
BARBADOS BRB 1.17 0.20 3 1.39 0.29 2 1.21 0.38 1 1.44 0.35 1 1.23 0.40 1
BELARUS BLR -1.54 0.11 9 -1.40 0.13 8 -1.21 0.16 6 -0.98 0.19 5 -1.03 0.23 3
BELGIUM BEL 1.35 0.16 8 1.44 0.18 8 1.19 0.22 6 1.32 0.23 5 1.48 0.21 5
BELIZE BLZ 0.91 0.20 3 0.83 0.27 3 0.86 0.33 3 1.01 0.30 2 1.09 0.35 2
BENIN BEN 0.30 0.16 7 0.03 0.23 5 0.44 0.31 3 0.61 0.29 3 0.75 0.35 2
B E R M U D A B M U 0 . 9 9 0 . 5 2 1 1 . 0 7 0 . 4 7 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
BHUTAN BTN -1.18 0.19 4 -1.17 0.25 4 -1.63 0.33 2 -1.56 0.30 2 -1.37 0.35 2
BOLIVIA BOL -0.01 0.15 10 0.01 0.18 9 0.23 0.22 6 0.34 0.22 6 0.10 0.20 5
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.14 0.11 10 -0.29 0.14 8 -0.37 0.18 5 -1.11 0.21 3 -1.20 0.35 2
BOTSWANA BWA 0.73 0.14 11 0.73 0.17 8 0.78 0.22 6 0.77 0.23 4 0.74 0.21 4
BRAZIL BRA 0.34 0.14 13 0.35 0.15 12 0.53 0.22 7 0.59 0.22 7 0.23 0.20 6
BRUNEI BRN -1.11 0.19 4 -0.82 0.22 5 -1.07 0.26 3 -1.14 0.26 3 -0.97 0.30 3
BULGARIA BGR 0.58 0.11 12 0.56 0.12 11 0.51 0.15 8 0.40 0.18 6 0.17 0.17 5
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.38 0.15 7 -0.27 0.22 5 -0.31 0.25 4 -0.24 0.26 3 -0.46 0.30 3
BURUNDI BDI -1.13 0.18 5 -1.16 0.25 4 -1.66 0.31 3 -1.59 0.30 2 -1.28 0.35 2
CAMBODIA KHM -0.89 0.16 6 -0.56 0.25 4 -0.35 0.33 3 -0.87 0.30 2 -0.68 0.35 2
CAMEROON CMR -1.18 0.15 8 -1.10 0.18 7 -0.90 0.22 6 -0.77 0.23 5 -1.05 0.21 4
CANADA CAN 1.38 0.16 10 1.50 0.17 10 1.27 0.21 8 1.30 0.23 6 1.44 0.21 5
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.80 0.19 5 0.41 0.28 3 0.86 0.38 1 0.92 0.35 1 0.90 0.40 1
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S C Y M 0 . 7 6 0 . 5 2 1 1 . 5 1 0 . 4 7 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.20 0.18 5 -0.80 0.25 4 -0.52 0.33 2 0.06 0.30 2 -0.17 0.35 2
CHAD TCD -1.09 0.16 7 -0.95 0.25 4 -0.89 0.33 2 -0.83 0.29 3 -0.76 0.35 2
CHILE CHL 1.09 0.14 12 1.07 0.15 11 0.56 0.21 8 0.65 0.22 6 0.93 0.20 6
CHINA CHN -1.54 0.15 10 -1.38 0.17 9 -1.37 0.22 7 -1.51 0.23 5 -1.29 0.21 5
COLOMBIA COL -0.47 0.14 12 -0.55 0.17 10 -0.53 0.21 8 -0.30 0.22 7 -0.07 0.20 6
COMOROS COM -0.14 0.19 4 -0.51 0.28 3 -0.47 0.38 1 -0.04 0.35 1 -0.11 0.40 1
CONGO COG -0.79 0.17 6 -1.10 0.21 6 -1.56 0.25 4 -1.02 0.25 4 -1.23 0.30 3
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.64 0.15 8 -1.89 0.22 5 -1.91 0.25 4 -1.67 0.26 3 -1.23 0.30 3
COSTA RICA CRI 1.11 0.14 13 1.16 0.17 10 1.31 0.22 6 1.25 0.22 6 1.37 0.20 5
CROATIA HRV 0.46 0.11 11 0.49 0.12 10 0.38 0.16 7 -0.30 0.18 5 -0.50 0.18 4
CUBA CUB -1.88 0.15 8 -1.77 0.17 7 -1.72 0.23 4 -1.68 0.23 4 -1.38 0.21 4
CYPRUS CYP 1.00 0.16 8 0.94 0.18 6 1.22 0.23 4 1.06 0.23 4 1.06 0.21 4
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 1.03 0.11 11 0.90 0.13 9 0.99 0.16 8 1.14 0.18 7 1.06 0.17 6
DENMARK DNK 1.59 0.16 10 1.72 0.17 10 1.51 0.21 7 1.51 0.23 5 1.73 0.21 5
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.85 0.19 4 -0.69 0.28 3 -0.56 0.38 1 -0.73 0.35 1 -0.77 0.40 1
DOMINICA DMA 1.13 0.20 3 1.05 0.29 2 1.21 0.38 1 1.27 0.35 1 1.27 0.40 1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM 0.27 0.15 9 0.19 0.18 7 0.43 0.22 6 -0.05 0.23 4 0.02 0.21 4
ECUADOR ECU -0.19 0.14 11 -0.06 0.18 8 -0.14 0.22 6 0.27 0.22 6 0.06 0.20 5
EGYPT EGY -1.04 0.15 9 -0.88 0.17 8 -0.81 0.22 6 -0.83 0.23 4 -0.74 0.21 4
EL SALVADOR SLV 0.26 0.14 11 0.06 0.18 8 0.24 0.22 6 0.04 0.22 5 -0.22 0.20 5
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.71 0.19 4 -1.44 0.28 3 -1.46 0.38 1 -1.55 0.35 1 -1.47 0.40 1
ERITREA ERI -1.96 0.17 6 -2.05 0.23 5 -1.42 0.31 3 -1.07 0.30 2 -1.10 0.35 2
ESTONIA EST 1.13 0.11 12 1.05 0.13 9 0.89 0.15 9 0.82 0.18 6 0.77 0.18 4
ETHIOPIA ETH -1.11 0.14 10 -1.14 0.21 6 -1.00 0.25 5 -0.69 0.26 3 -0.61 0.30 3
FIJI FJI 0.15 0.18 5 -0.06 0.24 4 0.11 0.31 3 0.10 0.29 3 -0.09 0.35 2
FINLAND FIN 1.50 0.16 9 1.70 0.17 9 1.60 0.21 7 1.51 0.23 5 1.71 0.21 5
FRANCE FRA 1.24 0.16 10 1.29 0.17 9 1.07 0.21 8 1.09 0.23 6 1.50 0.21 5
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.44 0.52 1 0.42 0.47 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.71 0.15 7 -0.42 0.18 6 -0.46 0.22 5 -0.26 0.23 4 -0.54 0.21 4
GAMBIA GMB -0.59 0.16 8 -1.03 0.21 6 -0.98 0.26 3 -1.18 0.26 3 -1.34 0.30 3
GEORGIA GEO -0.34 0.11 11 -0.29 0.14 7 -0.21 0.18 6 -0.37 0.21 4 -0.52 0.23 3
GERMANY DEU 1.38 0.16 10 1.51 0.17 10 1.35 0.21 8 1.36 0.23 6 1.55 0.21 5  
 




















































TABLE C1: Voice and Accountability (cont.)
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
GHANA GHA 0.39 0.14 12 0.01 0.17 8 0.00 0.22 6 -0.53 0.23 5 -0.35 0.21 4
GREECE GRC 0.91 0.16 9 1.05 0.18 8 1.01 0.23 5 0.92 0.23 5 0.98 0.21 5
GRENADA GRD 0.85 0.19 4 0.68 0.29 2 0.99 0.38 1 1.05 0.35 1 1.05 0.40 1
GUAM GUM 0.52 0.52 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GUATEMALA GTM -0.39 0.13 13 -0.48 0.17 10 -0.26 0.22 6 -0.36 0.22 5 -0.64 0.20 5
GUINEA GIN -1.12 0.17 6 -1.19 0.22 5 -1.12 0.26 3 -0.99 0.25 4 -1.13 0.30 3
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -0.62 0.17 6 -0.74 0.21 6 -0.85 0.25 4 -0.34 0.25 4 -0.55 0.30 3
GUYANA GUY 0.62 0.19 4 0.65 0.23 4 0.91 0.25 4 0.98 0.26 3 0.90 0.30 3
HAITI HTI -1.50 0.15 8 -1.11 0.21 7 -0.79 0.25 5 -0.65 0.26 3 -0.46 0.30 3
HONDURAS HND -0.02 0.15 11 -0.15 0.17 8 0.01 0.22 6 0.12 0.22 5 -0.36 0.20 5
HONG KONG HKG 0.21 0.17 8 0.15 0.18 8 -0.45 0.24 5 -0.16 0.25 5 0.62 0.22 4
HUNGARY HUN 1.16 0.11 11 1.17 0.13 10 1.14 0.15 9 1.15 0.18 7 1.06 0.17 6
ICELAND ISL 1.41 0.18 8 1.52 0.21 7 1.44 0.25 5 1.36 0.25 4 1.45 0.29 4
INDIA IND 0.27 0.15 11 0.38 0.17 10 0.45 0.22 7 0.26 0.23 6 0.28 0.21 5
INDONESIA IDN -0.44 0.13 12 -0.49 0.17 10 -0.52 0.22 7 -1.33 0.23 5 -1.15 0.21 5
IRAN IRN -1.36 0.15 8 -1.04 0.17 7 -0.69 0.22 5 -0.90 0.23 4 -1.08 0.21 4
IRAQ IRQ -1.71 0.15 7 -2.12 0.18 6 -2.12 0.22 5 -1.93 0.23 4 -1.74 0.21 4
IRELAND IRL 1.30 0.16 10 1.40 0.17 10 1.42 0.21 7 1.34 0.23 6 1.49 0.21 5
ISRAEL ISR 0.46 0.16 10 0.61 0.17 10 0.94 0.22 6 1.01 0.23 5 1.07 0.21 5
ITALY ITA 1.06 0.16 9 1.11 0.17 9 1.06 0.21 8 1.21 0.23 6 1.10 0.21 5
IVORY COAST CIV -1.46 0.15 8 -1.25 0.17 7 -1.31 0.23 5 -0.65 0.23 5 -0.19 0.21 4
JAMAICA JAM 0.54 0.15 8 0.51 0.18 6 0.70 0.23 4 0.66 0.23 5 0.55 0.21 4
JAPAN JPN 0.98 0.16 10 0.99 0.17 10 0.99 0.21 7 1.05 0.25 4 1.08 0.21 5
JORDAN JOR -0.68 0.14 10 -0.41 0.18 7 -0.19 0.22 5 -0.19 0.23 5 -0.16 0.21 4
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -1.21 0.10 11 -1.14 0.12 9 -0.91 0.15 8 -0.73 0.18 6 -1.00 0.18 4
KENYA KEN -0.34 0.13 13 -0.58 0.17 7 -0.84 0.22 6 -0.77 0.23 5 -0.48 0.21 4
KIRIBATI KIR 0.87 0.20 3 1.09 0.35 1 1.15 0.38 1 1.26 0.35 1 1.17 0.40 1
KOREA, NORTH PRK -2.05 0.15 8 -2.32 0.21 6 -2.02 0.26 3 -1.96 0.26 3 -1.84 0.30 3
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.73 0.15 11 0.63 0.17 10 0.76 0.21 7 0.68 0.23 6 0.71 0.21 5
KUWAIT KWT -0.48 0.16 7 -0.29 0.17 8 -0.22 0.23 4 -0.33 0.23 4 -0.20 0.21 4
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -1.06 0.11 9 -0.90 0.14 7 -0.68 0.18 4 -0.46 0.21 4 -0.48 0.23 3
LAOS LAO -1.55 0.18 5 -1.73 0.25 4 -1.43 0.31 3 -1.26 0.30 2 -1.09 0.35 2
LATVIA LVA 0.96 0.11 10 0.91 0.14 7 0.76 0.16 6 0.72 0.18 6 0.52 0.18 4
LEBANON LBN -0.81 0.15 7 -0.54 0.18 7 -0.37 0.22 5 -0.51 0.23 4 -0.43 0.21 4
LESOTHO LSO 0.28 0.18 6 -0.16 0.26 4 -0.03 0.33 2 -0.01 0.30 2 0.02 0.35 2
LIBERIA LBR -1.24 0.16 7 -1.54 0.21 6 -1.16 0.25 4 -0.90 0.26 3 -1.40 0.30 3
LIBYA LBY -1.79 0.15 7 -1.70 0.18 6 -1.60 0.23 4 -1.58 0.23 4 -1.46 0.21 4
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.27 0.20 3 1.32 0.29 2 1.39 0.38 1 1.44 0.35 1 1.29 0.40 1
LITHUANIA LTU 0.97 0.11 11 0.89 0.13 8 0.95 0.15 8 0.84 0.18 6 0.76 0.18 4
LUXEMBOURG LUX 1.40 0.18 7 1.41 0.23 6 1.33 0.25 5 1.37 0.25 4 1.50 0.29 4
MACAO MAC 0.11 0.52 1 0.42 0.47 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.02 0.11 10 -0.30 0.13 7 -0.03 0.17 5 0.06 0.19 5 -0.06 0.18 4
MADAGASCAR MDG 0.07 0.17 7 -0.05 0.22 5 0.25 0.25 5 0.40 0.25 4 0.26 0.30 3
MALAWI MWI -0.50 0.14 10 -0.56 0.18 7 -0.28 0.22 6 -0.10 0.23 5 -0.43 0.21 4
MALAYSIA MYS -0.36 0.13 12 -0.28 0.17 10 -0.27 0.21 8 -0.25 0.23 6 -0.05 0.21 5
MALDIVES MDV -1.07 0.19 4 -0.74 0.29 2 -0.94 0.38 1 -1.05 0.35 1 -0.98 0.40 1
MALI MLI 0.35 0.15 10 0.18 0.21 7 0.28 0.25 4 0.38 0.25 4 0.30 0.30 3
MALTA MLT 1.26 0.19 5 1.29 0.25 3 1.39 0.28 2 1.36 0.29 2 1.10 0.32 2
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL 1.14 0.21 2 1.23 0.35 1 1.30 0.38 1 1.35 0.35 1 1.23 0.40 1
M A R T I N I Q U E M T Q 0 . 6 8 0 . 5 2 1 0 . 6 4 0 . 4 7 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MAURITANIA MRT -1.16 0.19 4 -0.67 0.25 4 -0.67 0.31 3 -0.91 0.30 2 -0.84 0.35 2
MAURITIUS MUS 0.94 0.16 7 0.80 0.19 6 1.21 0.26 4 0.98 0.26 4 0.87 0.23 3
MEXICO MEX 0.36 0.14 14 0.36 0.15 12 0.09 0.21 8 -0.17 0.22 7 -0.23 0.20 6
MICRONESIA FSM 1.01 0.20 3 0.93 0.35 1 0.97 0.38 1 0.98 0.35 1 1.18 0.40 1
MOLDOVA MDA -0.47 0.11 10 -0.32 0.13 7 -0.01 0.16 7 -0.03 0.18 6 -0.21 0.18 4
MONACO MCO 0.91 0.21 2 0.92 0.35 1 1.11 0.38 1 1.17 0.35 1 1.03 0.40 1
MONGOLIA MNG 0.45 0.16 7 0.44 0.21 6 0.73 0.25 4 0.62 0.19 4 0.38 0.30 3
MOROCCO MAR -0.55 0.14 10 -0.30 0.17 8 -0.44 0.23 4 -0.53 0.23 5 -0.63 0.21 4
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.13 0.15 10 -0.26 0.21 6 -0.28 0.25 4 -0.10 0.25 4 -0.20 0.30 3
MYANMAR MMR -2.19 0.15 8 -2.05 0.17 7 -2.12 0.22 5 -1.92 0.23 4 -1.73 0.21 4
NAMIBIA NAM 0.47 0.14 11 0.33 0.17 9 0.28 0.22 6 0.42 0.23 4 0.52 0.21 4
NAURU NRU 1.08 0.21 2 0.85 0.35 1 0.88 0.38 1 1.02 0.35 1 0.90 0.40 1
NEPAL NPL -1.00 0.14 8 -0.52 0.23 5 -0.12 0.31 3 -0.01 0.30 2 0.14 0.35 2
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.49 0.16 9 1.63 0.17 9 1.53 0.21 7 1.51 0.23 5 1.70 0.21 5
N E T H E R L A N D S  A N T I L L E S A N T 0 . 4 4 0 . 5 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.47 0.16 9 1.60 0.18 7 1.51 0.22 6 1.37 0.23 5 1.66 0.21 5
NICARAGUA NIC 0.06 0.13 13 0.09 0.17 8 -0.08 0.22 6 -0.01 0.22 5 -0.22 0.20 5
NIGER NER -0.12 0.17 6 -0.18 0.22 5 -0.07 0.25 4 -0.99 0.26 3 -0.41 0.30 3




















































TABLE C1: Voice and Accountability (cont.)
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
NORWAY NOR 1.53 0.16 9 1.64 0.17 9 1.50 0.22 6 1.55 0.23 5 1.76 0.21 5
OMAN OMN -0.90 0.16 6 -0.55 0.17 7 -0.68 0.23 4 -0.74 0.23 4 -0.61 0.21 4
PALAU PCI 1.21 0.21 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PAKISTAN PAK -1.31 0.14 10 -1.10 0.18 7 -1.53 0.22 6 -0.62 0.23 4 -0.98 0.21 4
PANAMA PAN 0.54 0.16 10 0.50 0.17 10 0.69 0.22 6 0.52 0.22 5 0.33 0.20 5
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.03 0.15 7 -0.15 0.18 6 0.03 0.22 5 0.20 0.23 4 0.17 0.21 4
PARAGUAY PRY -0.23 0.15 10 -0.53 0.17 9 -0.59 0.22 5 -0.28 0.22 6 -0.39 0.20 5
PERU PER -0.04 0.14 12 0.11 0.15 11 -0.01 0.22 7 -0.79 0.22 6 -0.73 0.20 5
PHILIPPINES PHL 0.02 0.15 11 0.17 0.17 9 0.40 0.21 8 0.46 0.23 5 0.17 0.21 5
POLAND POL 1.13 0.11 12 1.11 0.13 11 1.12 0.15 9 1.01 0.18 7 0.99 0.17 6
PORTUGAL PRT 1.31 0.16 9 1.31 0.17 9 1.35 0.23 6 1.38 0.23 6 1.32 0.21 5
P U E R T O  R I C O P R I1 . 0 2 0 . 2 2 2 0 . 6 4 0 . 4 7 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
QATAR QAT -0.79 0.15 7 -0.52 0.19 5 -0.66 0.24 3 -0.91 0.25 3 -0.83 0.22 3
REUNION REU 1.05 0.52 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ROMANIA ROM 0.36 0.11 13 0.41 0.12 11 0.43 0.15 8 0.24 0.18 5 0.03 0.17 5
RUSSIA RUS -0.81 0.11 13 -0.44 0.12 12 -0.44 0.15 9 -0.26 0.18 7 -0.36 0.17 6
RWANDA RWA -1.09 0.17 6 -1.41 0.23 5 -1.46 0.31 3 -1.50 0.30 2 -1.43 0.35 2
SAMOA SAM 0.69 0.20 3 0.67 0.29 2 0.62 0.38 1 0.60 0.35 1 0.77 0.40 1
SAN MARINO SMR 1.18 0.21 2 1.17 0.35 1 1.39 0.38 1 1.44 0.35 1 1.29 0.40 1
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP 0.55 0.20 3 0.48 0.29 2 0.93 0.38 1 0.75 0.35 1 0.88 0.40 1
SAUDI ARABIA SAU -1.63 0.15 8 -1.40 0.17 8 -1.27 0.22 5 -1.37 0.23 4 -1.22 0.21 4
SENEGAL SEN 0.19 0.14 10 0.15 0.17 7 -0.11 0.22 6 -0.49 0.23 5 -0.17 0.21 4
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO YUG 0.12 0.11 11 -0.23 0.12 8 -0.32 0.16 5 -0.96 0.18 5 -1.38 0.21 4
SEYCHELLES SYC -0.04 0.19 4 0.19 0.28 3 0.11 0.38 1 0.19 0.35 1 0.10 0.40 1
SIERRA LEONE SLE -0.49 0.15 8 -0.57 0.21 6 -1.36 0.25 4 -1.72 0.26 3 -1.37 0.30 3
SINGAPORE SGP -0.13 0.15 10 0.51 0.18 7 -0.05 0.22 7 0.01 0.23 6 0.40 0.21 5
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 1.10 0.11 10 0.92 0.14 8 0.90 0.16 8 0.45 0.18 6 0.37 0.17 5
SLOVENIA SVN 1.12 0.11 11 1.10 0.13 10 0.98 0.16 8 0.92 0.18 5 0.99 0.18 4
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB 0.10 0.20 3 0.37 0.35 1 0.06 0.38 1 1.11 0.35 1 1.07 0.40 1
SOMALIA SOM -1.58 0.16 7 -1.51 0.22 5 -1.37 0.25 4 -1.46 0.26 3 -1.91 0.30 3
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.86 0.14 13 0.73 0.17 11 1.05 0.21 8 0.87 0.23 6 0.68 0.21 5
SPAIN ESP 1.17 0.16 10 1.24 0.17 10 1.10 0.21 8 1.27 0.23 6 1.15 0.21 5
SRI LANKA LKA -0.16 0.14 10 -0.06 0.17 8 -0.37 0.22 5 -0.29 0.23 4 -0.21 0.21 4
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 0.75 0.20 3 0.96 0.35 1 1.01 0.38 1 1.07 0.35 1 1.06 0.40 1
ST. LUCIA LCA 0.97 0.20 3 1.04 0.35 1 1.06 0.38 1 1.12 0.35 1 1.13 0.40 1
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 0.96 0.20 3 0.98 0.35 1 1.03 0.38 1 1.09 0.35 1 1.14 0.40 1
SUDAN SDN -1.81 0.15 8 -1.71 0.17 7 -1.75 0.22 5 -1.71 0.23 4 -1.66 0.21 4
SURINAME SUR 0.60 0.19 4 0.29 0.25 3 0.55 0.28 2 0.19 0.29 2 -0.06 0.32 2
SWAZILAND SWZ -1.45 0.18 5 -1.18 0.25 4 -1.22 0.33 2 -0.92 0.30 2 -1.28 0.35 2
SWEDEN SWE 1.52 0.16 9 1.65 0.17 10 1.56 0.21 8 1.48 0.23 5 1.70 0.21 5
SWITZERLAND CHE 1.49 0.16 9 1.63 0.17 9 1.64 0.21 7 1.55 0.23 6 1.71 0.21 5
SYRIA SYR -1.72 0.15 8 -1.56 0.17 7 -1.64 0.23 4 -1.59 0.23 4 -1.37 0.21 4
TAIWAN TWN 0.95 0.15 11 0.89 0.17 9 0.81 0.21 7 0.71 0.23 5 0.55 0.21 5
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.12 0.11 8 -1.07 0.14 7 -0.93 0.18 4 -1.37 0.21 3 -1.42 0.23 3
TANZANIA TZA -0.35 0.14 11 -0.41 0.17 8 -0.15 0.22 6 -0.40 0.23 5 -0.77 0.21 4
THAILAND THA 0.24 0.15 10 0.20 0.17 9 0.25 0.22 7 0.11 0.23 6 0.01 0.21 5
TIMOR, EAST TMP 0.25 0.17 5 0.19 0.29 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -1.22 0.17 6 -1.20 0.22 5 -1.09 0.26 3 -1.14 0.25 4 -1.07 0.30 3
TONGA TON -0.35 0.19 4 -0.12 0.35 1 -0.09 0.38 1 -0.05 0.35 1 0.00 0.40 1
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.49 0.16 7 0.56 0.18 6 0.61 0.23 5 0.92 0.23 4 0.77 0.21 4
TUNISIA TUN -1.11 0.15 9 -0.83 0.17 8 -0.71 0.23 5 -0.92 0.23 4 -0.53 0.21 4
TURKEY TUR -0.15 0.15 11 -0.47 0.17 10 -0.65 0.21 8 -0.92 0.23 6 -0.41 0.21 5
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.90 0.12 6 -1.85 0.16 5 -1.59 0.18 3 -1.59 0.21 3 -1.69 0.23 3
TUVALU TUV 0.94 0.20 3 1.17 0.35 1 1.39 0.38 1 1.44 0.35 1 1.29 0.40 1
UGANDA UGA -0.64 0.13 13 -0.77 0.17 8 -0.94 0.22 6 -0.61 0.23 5 -0.63 0.21 4
UKRAINE UKR -0.62 0.10 13 -0.64 0.12 10 -0.39 0.16 7 -0.14 0.18 6 -0.39 0.18 4
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE -1.01 0.16 7 -0.47 0.18 6 -0.62 0.23 4 -0.71 0.23 4 -0.68 0.21 4
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.37 0.16 10 1.48 0.17 10 1.39 0.21 8 1.40 0.23 6 1.38 0.21 5
UNITED STATES USA 1.21 0.16 9 1.32 0.17 9 1.18 0.22 7 1.41 0.23 6 1.53 0.21 5
URUGUAY URY 1.00 0.15 10 0.95 0.18 8 1.04 0.22 6 0.74 0.22 5 0.78 0.20 5
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.75 0.10 10 -1.58 0.13 8 -1.39 0.17 6 -1.50 0.19 5 -1.39 0.18 4
VANUATU VUT 0.68 0.20 3 0.89 0.35 1 0.62 0.38 1 0.63 0.35 1 0.47 0.40 1
VENEZUELA VEN -0.46 0.13 13 -0.41 0.17 10 -0.33 0.23 6 0.16 0.22 7 0.06 0.20 6
VIETNAM VNM -1.54 0.14 10 -1.36 0.17 8 -1.53 0.22 5 -1.64 0.23 4 -1.31 0.21 4
VIRGIN ISLANDS (U.S.) VIR 0 . 6 6 0 . 5 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
WEST BANK WBG -1.25 0.21 3 -1.08 0.28 3 -0.89 0.38 2 -0.65 0.35 2 -1.56 0.40 1
YEMEN YEM -0.99 0.14 9 -0.88 0.17 7 -0.72 0.22 5 -0.60 0.23 4 -0.91 0.21 4
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.36 0.14 11 -0.40 0.17 8 -0.24 0.22 6 -0.11 0.23 5 -0.16 0.21 4




















































TABLE C2: Political Stability
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -2.03 0.23 7 -2.25 0.27 4 -2.48 0.37 2 -2.06 0.49 1 -1.82 0.54 1
ALBANIA ALB -0.97 0.26 6 -0.50 0.28 4 -0.61 0.32 5 -0.60 0.29 4 0.20 0.35 3
ALGERIA DZA -1.42 0.21 9 -1.62 0.22 7 -1.75 0.27 5 -2.62 0.27 4 -2.78 0.32 4
A M E R I C A N  S A M O A A S M 0 . 7 5 0 . 5 5 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
A N D O R R A A D O 1 . 3 5 0 . 4 1 2 1 . 3 2 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ANGOLA AGO -0.95 0.22 8 -1.54 0.22 7 -2.32 0.27 5 -2.07 0.27 5 -2.17 0.32 4
ANGUILLA AIA 0.90 0.55 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
A N T I G U A  A N D  B A R B U D A A T G 1 . 3 0 0 . 3 4 3 0 . 8 2 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ARGENTINA ARG -0.24 0.19 12 -0.64 0.19 11 0.48 0.23 10 0.45 0.24 6 0.47 0.27 6
ARMENIA ARM -0.51 0.25 6 -0.57 0.26 5 -0.60 0.33 5 -0.40 0.29 4 0.41 0.38 2
A R U B A A B W 0 . 9 7 0 . 5 5 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.03 0.19 11 1.16 0.20 9 1.34 0.23 8 1.26 0.24 6 1.22 0.27 6
AUSTRIA AUT 1.18 0.20 11 1.27 0.21 8 1.38 0.23 8 1.48 0.24 7 1.38 0.27 6
AZERBAIJAN AZE -1.52 0.22 8 -1.13 0.22 7 -0.63 0.27 6 -0.41 0.26 5 -0.40 0.34 3
BAHAMAS BHS 0.94 0.32 4 0.99 0.36 2 0.71 0.67 1 0.39 0.46 1 0.54 0.68 1
BAHRAIN BHR 0.06 0.22 8 0.42 0.23 6 0.02 0.27 5 0.01 0.27 4 -0.58 0.32 4
BANGLADESH BGD -1.24 0.21 9 -0.65 0.21 8 -0.55 0.27 6 -0.43 0.27 4 -0.53 0.32 4
B A R B A D O S B R B 1 . 5 2 0 . 3 1 4 0 . 8 2 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
BELARUS BLR -0.24 0.24 7 0.18 0.26 5 -0.07 0.31 6 -0.15 0.29 4 0.03 0.38 2
BELGIUM BEL 0.94 0.20 10 1.07 0.20 9 0.97 0.23 8 1.01 0.24 6 0.96 0.27 6
BELIZE BLZ 0.65 0.31 4 0.57 0.36 2 0.99 0.52 2 0.94 0.49 1 0.93 0.54 1
BENIN BEN -0.37 0.29 5 0.65 0.32 3 0.24 0.46 2 0.27 0.43 2 1.20 0.54 1
B E R M U D A B M U 1 . 0 2 0 . 4 0 2 0 . 8 2 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
BHUTAN BTN 0.84 0.31 4 0.81 0.36 2 0.74 0.54 1 0.74 0.49 1 1.00 0.54 1
BOLIVIA BOL -0.65 0.22 9 -0.06 0.21 8 -0.41 0.27 7 0.08 0.26 5 -0.23 0.32 4
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.85 0.24 8 -0.75 0.26 5 -0.34 0.50 3 -0.42 0.49 1 -0.41 0.54 1
BOTSWANA BWA 0.70 0.23 8 0.79 0.21 8 0.90 0.27 6 0.89 0.27 5 0.87 0.32 4
BRAZIL BRA -0.13 0.19 12 0.11 0.19 11 0.20 0.23 9 -0.38 0.24 7 -0.17 0.27 6
BRUNEI BRN 1.06 0.37 3 1.05 0.33 3 1.32 0.46 2 1.46 0.35 2 1.08 0.47 2
BULGARIA BGR 0.13 0.21 10 0.56 0.21 8 0.30 0.26 8 0.44 0.26 5 0.19 0.32 4
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.32 0.29 5 -0.13 0.33 3 -0.17 0.41 3 0.04 0.34 3 -0.28 0.47 2
BURUNDI BDI -2.04 0.31 4 -2.13 0.36 2 -1.87 0.43 3 -2.06 0.49 1 -1.75 0.54 1
CAMBODIA KHM -0.60 0.31 4 -0.25 0.33 3 -0.73 0.52 2 -1.18 0.49 1 -1.15 0.54 1
CAMEROON CMR -0.90 0.22 8 -0.46 0.23 6 -0.55 0.28 6 -0.75 0.26 6 -0.98 0.32 4
C A N A D A C A N1 . 1 3 0 . 1 91 21 . 1 0 0 . 1 91 01 . 3 4 0 . 2 31 01 . 1 8 0 . 2 4 7 1 . 0 2 0 . 2 7 6
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.67 0.41 2 0.82 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S C Y M 1 . 5 8 0 . 4 0 2 0 . 8 2 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.43 0.31 4 -1.74 0.36 2 0.00 0.54 1 0.26 0.49 1 -0.01 0.54 1
CHAD TCD -1.20 0.30 5 -1.54 0.33 3 -0.87 0.54 1 -1.37 0.43 2 -0.68 0.54 1
CHILE CHL 0.89 0.19 11 1.03 0.19 11 0.85 0.23 10 0.61 0.24 6 0.75 0.27 6
CHINA CHN -0.07 0.19 11 0.06 0.19 10 0.13 0.23 9 0.06 0.24 6 0.12 0.27 6
COLOMBIA COL -1.69 0.20 10 -1.95 0.20 10 -1.73 0.23 10 -1.56 0.24 7 -1.25 0.27 6
COMOROS COM -0.13 0.41 2 -0.19 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CONGO COG -1.41 0.27 6 -1.63 0.28 5 -1.74 0.41 3 -1.94 0.33 3 -0.70 0.47 2
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -2.27 0.22 8 -2.35 0.24 6 -2.83 0.32 4 -2.77 0.30 3 -1.73 0.35 3
COSTA RICA CRI 0.98 0.21 10 1.10 0.20 9 1.24 0.26 7 1.08 0.25 6 0.89 0.30 5
CROATIA HRV 0.35 0.22 9 0.48 0.22 7 0.49 0.28 6 0.46 0.27 4 0.24 0.34 3
CUBA CUB 0.18 0.22 8 0.30 0.22 7 -0.10 0.27 5 0.07 0.27 4 0.02 0.32 4
CYPRUS CYP 0.34 0.22 8 0.38 0.22 6 0.62 0.28 4 0.59 0.27 4 0.60 0.32 4
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.84 0.20 11 1.07 0.20 9 0.84 0.23 9 0.97 0.24 7 1.08 0.27 6
DENMARK DNK 1.21 0.19 12 1.26 0.20 9 1.45 0.23 9 1.40 0.24 6 1.27 0.27 6
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.44 0.41 2 -0.69 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
D O M I N I C A D M A 1 . 1 9 0 . 3 4 3 0 . 5 6 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.01 0.22 8 0.24 0.22 7 0.18 0.27 7 -0.06 0.31 3 -0.20 0.40 3
ECUADOR ECU -0.83 0.20 10 -0.68 0.20 9 -1.01 0.25 8 -0.58 0.25 6 -0.61 0.28 5
EGYPT EGY -0.72 0.20 10 -0.49 0.20 8 0.00 0.24 8 -0.15 0.24 7 -0.42 0.27 6
EL SALVADOR SLV -0.23 0.25 7 0.32 0.23 7 0.47 0.30 6 0.20 0.29 4 -0.09 0.36 4
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -0.30 0.36 3 0.24 0.37 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ERITREA ERI -0.14 0.29 5 -0.26 0.32 3 -0.09 0.46 2 -0.22 0.49 1 0.46 0.54 1
ESTONIA EST 0.92 0.20 11 1.02 0.20 9 0.84 0.24 9 0.95 0.26 5 0.84 0.34 3
ETHIOPIA ETH -0.98 0.23 8 -1.20 0.28 5 -0.83 0.40 4 -0.25 0.34 3 -0.61 0.47 2
FIJI FJI 0.10 0.31 4 0.23 0.32 3 -0.02 0.46 2 0.76 0.43 2 0.93 0.54 1
FINLAND FIN 1.65 0.20 11 1.69 0.20 9 1.72 0.23 9 1.60 0.24 6 1.45 0.27 6
F R A N C E F R A 0 . 5 3 0 . 1 91 20 . 7 1 0 . 1 91 01 . 1 4 0 . 2 31 00 . 8 3 0 . 2 4 7 1 . 0 3 0 . 2 7 6
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.48 0.55 1 0.31 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.01 0.22 7 0.25 0.23 6 -0.34 0.27 5 -0.29 0.31 3 -0.15 0.40 3
GAMBIA GMB 0.38 0.32 5 0.56 0.29 4 0.34 0.46 2 0.63 0.35 2 0.20 0.47 2
GEORGIA GEO -1.26 0.24 8 -1.71 0.26 5 -0.79 0.34 5 -0.81 0.34 3 -0.72 0.38 2




















































TABLE C2: Political Stability (cont.)
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
GHANA GHA -0.10 0.21 10 0.03 0.22 7 -0.04 0.28 6 0.02 0.26 6 0.06 0.32 4
GREECE GRC 0.53 0.20 11 0.76 0.20 9 0.87 0.24 7 0.38 0.24 6 0.42 0.27 6
GRENADA GRD 0.95 0.34 3 0.56 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GUAM GUM 0.61 0.55 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GUATEMALA GTM -0.85 0.23 9 -0.43 0.22 8 -0.89 0.30 6 -0.89 0.29 4 -1.14 0.36 4
GUINEA GIN -0.91 0.29 5 -1.41 0.30 4 -1.16 0.46 2 -0.88 0.33 3 -1.33 0.47 2
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -0.53 0.33 4 -0.41 0.29 4 -0.74 0.41 3 -1.14 0.33 3 -0.57 0.47 2
GUYANA GUY -0.53 0.29 5 -0.39 0.33 3 -0.42 0.41 3 0.02 0.35 2 0.10 0.47 2
HAITI HTI -1.87 0.27 6 -1.29 0.28 5 -0.77 0.40 4 -1.27 0.35 2 -0.21 0.47 2
HONDURAS HND -0.69 0.23 8 -0.08 0.22 8 0.26 0.30 6 -0.18 0.29 4 -0.40 0.36 4
HONG KONG HKG 1.30 0.22 9 1.06 0.22 7 1.15 0.27 6 0.96 0.28 5 0.30 0.33 4
HUNGARY HUN 0.85 0.19 11 1.11 0.19 10 0.78 0.23 10 1.19 0.24 7 0.79 0.27 6
ICELAND ISL 1.77 0.26 8 1.59 0.29 5 1.71 0.35 5 1.40 0.33 3 1.22 0.41 3
INDIA IND -0.81 0.19 12 -0.93 0.19 10 -0.40 0.23 9 -0.42 0.24 7 -0.77 0.27 6
INDONESIA IDN -1.38 0.19 12 -1.45 0.19 10 -1.85 0.23 9 -1.47 0.24 6 -0.45 0.27 6
IRAN IRN -0.91 0.20 9 -0.67 0.20 8 -0.20 0.25 6 -0.23 0.25 5 -0.37 0.28 5
IRAQ IRQ -2.87 0.24 6 -1.76 0.23 6 -1.96 0.27 5 -2.48 0.27 4 -2.96 0.32 4
IRELAND IRL 1.22 0.19 12 1.32 0.20 9 1.39 0.23 9 1.52 0.24 7 1.23 0.27 6
ISRAEL ISR -1.01 0.20 11 -1.46 0.20 9 -0.58 0.24 7 -0.40 0.26 5 -0.50 0.27 6
ITALY ITA 0.31 0.20 11 0.85 0.20 9 0.82 0.23 10 1.17 0.24 7 0.75 0.27 6
IVORY COAST CIV -2.28 0.22 8 -2.00 0.22 7 -0.90 0.28 5 -0.03 0.26 6 0.32 0.32 4
JAMAICA JAM -0.28 0.25 7 -0.17 0.24 6 0.28 0.32 4 -0.17 0.29 4 0.64 0.40 3
JAPAN JPN 0.99 0.19 12 1.23 0.19 10 1.25 0.23 9 1.19 0.27 5 1.08 0.27 6
JORDAN JOR -0.12 0.22 9 -0.32 0.22 7 0.21 0.26 6 0.02 0.25 6 0.40 0.30 5
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -0.11 0.20 9 0.38 0.20 8 0.26 0.25 8 0.18 0.25 6 -0.05 0.30 4
KENYA KEN -0.96 0.21 10 -0.98 0.22 7 -0.96 0.27 6 -0.98 0.26 6 -0.38 0.32 4
KIRIBATI KIR 0.77 0.41 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
KOREA, NORTH PRK -0.67 0.27 5 0.70 0.29 4 -0.66 0.41 3 -0.86 0.35 2 -1.20 0.47 2
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.45 0.19 12 0.50 0.19 10 0.49 0.23 9 0.24 0.24 7 0.16 0.27 6
KUWAIT KWT 0.29 0.22 8 0.25 0.22 7 0.76 0.28 4 0.70 0.27 4 0.22 0.32 4
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -0.91 0.25 6 -1.10 0.26 5 -0.09 0.37 3 0.70 0.34 3 0.76 0.38 2
LAOS LAO -0.76 0.31 4 -0.16 0.33 3 0.09 0.46 2 0.60 0.49 1 1.20 0.54 1
LATVIA LVA 0.95 0.22 9 0.95 0.22 7 0.69 0.27 6 0.54 0.26 5 0.77 0.34 3
LEBANON LBN -0.83 0.22 7 -0.63 0.23 6 -0.52 0.27 5 -0.34 0.27 4 -0.37 0.32 4
LESOTHO LSO 0.27 0.30 4 -0.03 0.30 3 1.01 0.54 1 0.38 0.46 2 1.00 0.54 1
LIBERIA LBR -2.20 0.29 5 -2.28 0.29 4 -1.35 0.41 3 -1.20 0.35 2 -2.42 0.47 2
LIBYA LBY -0.02 0.24 6 -0.34 0.23 6 -0.54 0.28 4 -1.22 0.27 4 -1.59 0.32 4
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.39 0.41 2 1.32 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.85 0.21 10 1.03 0.21 8 0.53 0.26 8 0.54 0.26 5 0.68 0.34 3
LUXEMBOURG LUX 1.66 0.26 8 1.68 0.29 5 1.64 0.37 4 1.52 0.33 3 1.39 0.41 3
MACAO MAC 1.14 0.55 1 0.56 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -1.04 0.23 8 -0.94 0.25 4 -0.82 0.36 3 -0.30 0.35 3 0.21 0.44 2
MADAGASCAR MDG -0.02 0.28 6 0.22 0.33 3 0.05 0.40 4 -0.28 0.33 3 0.23 0.47 2
MALAWI MWI -0.33 0.25 7 0.16 0.25 5 0.11 0.31 5 0.12 0.29 5 0.10 0.40 3
MALAYSIA MYS 0.38 0.19 12 0.36 0.19 10 0.35 0.23 10 0.46 0.24 7 0.95 0.27 6
M A L D I V E S M D V 0 . 8 2 0 . 3 4 3 1 . 3 2 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MALI MLI 0.07 0.27 7 -0.10 0.28 5 0.52 0.41 3 0.19 0.33 3 0.64 0.47 2
MALTA MLT 1.46 0.28 6 1.49 0.36 2 1.10 0.67 1 1.37 0.46 1 0.84 0.68 1
M A R S H A L L  I S L A N D S M H L 0 . 6 6 0 . 5 4 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
M A R T I N I Q U E M T Q 1 . 4 7 0 . 4 0 2 0 . 5 6 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MAURITANIA MRT 0.26 0.31 4 0.30 0.36 2 -0.38 0.46 2 0.53 0.49 1 0.73 0.54 1
MAURITIUS MUS 0.91 0.31 4 1.11 0.29 3 1.16 0.38 3 1.27 0.34 4 1.18 0.44 2
MEXICO MEX -0.13 0.19 12 0.25 0.19 11 -0.11 0.23 10 -0.48 0.24 7 -0.36 0.27 6
MICRONESIA FSM 0.83 0.34 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.62 0.24 7 -0.06 0.24 5 -0.09 0.27 6 0.12 0.26 5 -0.14 0.34 3
MONACO MCO 1.13 0.40 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MONGOLIA MNG 0.48 0.27 6 0.95 0.29 4 0.99 0.41 3 0.52 0.35 2 0.80 0.47 2
MOROCCO MAR -0.23 0.21 9 -0.18 0.21 8 0.11 0.28 4 0.16 0.26 6 -0.40 0.28 5
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.15 0.24 8 0.59 0.28 5 -0.28 0.41 3 -0.66 0.32 4 -0.34 0.47 2
MYANMAR MMR -1.21 0.22 8 -1.26 0.22 7 -1.47 0.27 5 -1.17 0.27 4 -1.09 0.32 4
NAMIBIA NAM 0.46 0.21 9 0.43 0.21 8 -0.57 0.31 5 0.51 0.30 4 0.84 0.40 3
N A U R U N R U 0 . 6 6 0 . 5 4 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
NEPAL NPL -1.74 0.25 6 -1.64 0.30 4 -1.13 0.46 2 -0.63 0.49 1 -0.35 0.54 1
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.15 0.20 11 1.30 0.20 9 1.59 0.23 9 1.57 0.24 6 1.52 0.27 6
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES ANT 0.66 0.55 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.51 0.22 9 1.37 0.22 7 1.32 0.24 7 1.51 0.26 5 1.32 0.30 5
NICARAGUA NIC -0.15 0.23 8 0.11 0.22 8 0.22 0.30 6 -0.21 0.29 4 -0.66 0.36 4
NIGER NER -0.56 0.29 5 -0.24 0.33 3 -0.06 0.41 3 -0.40 0.35 2 -0.10 0.47 2




















































TABLE C2: Political Stability (cont.)
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
NORWAY NOR 1.53 0.20 11 1.51 0.21 8 1.44 0.23 8 1.52 0.24 6 1.46 0.27 6
OMAN OMN 0.76 0.22 8 1.05 0.22 7 1.06 0.27 5 0.87 0.27 4 0.74 0.32 4
PALAU PCI 0.66 0.54 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PAKISTAN PAK -1.59 0.20 10 -1.40 0.21 7 -0.60 0.25 7 -0.88 0.24 6 -1.21 0.28 5
PANAMA PAN 0.29 0.21 9 0.39 0.20 9 0.60 0.26 7 0.34 0.27 4 0.36 0.32 4
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.94 0.22 8 -0.71 0.22 6 -0.46 0.27 5 -0.42 0.31 3 -1.18 0.40 3
PARAGUAY PRY -0.71 0.23 8 -1.10 0.22 8 -0.84 0.32 5 -0.36 0.29 4 -0.06 0.40 3
PERU PER -0.68 0.20 11 -0.69 0.19 10 -0.46 0.24 9 -0.47 0.24 7 -0.90 0.27 6
PHILIPPINES PHL -1.01 0.19 12 -0.61 0.19 10 -0.39 0.23 10 0.03 0.24 6 -0.12 0.27 6
POLAND POL 0.35 0.19 12 0.73 0.19 10 0.84 0.23 10 0.80 0.24 7 0.66 0.27 6
PORTUGAL PRT 1.06 0.20 11 1.42 0.21 8 1.47 0.23 8 1.45 0.24 7 1.36 0.27 6
PUERTO RICO PRI 1.07 0.29 4 0.62 0.32 2 0.90 0.46 1 0.83 0.49 1 0.80 0.47 1
QATAR QAT 0.92 0.22 7 0.82 0.25 4 1.45 0.30 4 1.43 0.31 3 0.90 0.37 3
R E U N I O N R E U 0 . 8 3 0 . 5 5 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ROMANIA ROM 0.22 0.20 11 0.34 0.21 8 0.01 0.26 8 0.20 0.27 4 0.56 0.32 4
RUSSIA RUS -0.85 0.19 12 -0.52 0.19 10 -0.60 0.23 10 -0.62 0.24 7 -0.93 0.27 6
RWANDA RWA -0.92 0.36 3 -1.43 0.32 3 -1.56 0.46 2 -2.06 0.49 1 -1.22 0.54 1
SAMOA SAM 0.89 0.34 3 0.82 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
SAN MARINO SMR 1.22 0.54 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP 0.08 0.41 2 0.56 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
SAUDI ARABIA SAU -0.60 0.20 9 -0.12 0.20 8 0.41 0.25 6 0.12 0.25 5 -0.27 0.28 5
SENEGAL SEN -0.21 0.24 7 -0.26 0.24 6 -0.72 0.31 5 -1.08 0.29 4 -0.67 0.40 3
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO YUG -0.97 0.22 8 -0.86 0.23 6 -1.06 0.34 3 -1.68 0.31 3 -1.20 0.40 3
SEYCHELLES SYC 0.84 0.31 4 1.07 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
SIERRA LEONE SLE -0.61 0.29 5 -1.37 0.29 4 -1.53 0.41 3 -2.02 0.35 2 -2.25 0.47 2
SINGAPORE SGP 1.48 0.20 11 1.28 0.20 9 1.52 0.23 9 1.32 0.24 7 1.39 0.27 6
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.65 0.22 9 0.99 0.21 8 0.73 0.25 8 0.95 0.25 6 0.61 0.30 5
SLOVENIA SVN 0.99 0.21 10 1.34 0.20 9 1.00 0.24 8 1.14 0.27 4 1.10 0.34 3
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -0.70 0.41 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
SOMALIA SOM -2.39 0.33 4 -1.97 0.29 4 -1.32 0.41 3 -1.66 0.35 2 -2.14 0.47 2
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF -0.24 0.19 12 -0.23 0.19 10 -0.13 0.23 10 -0.80 0.23 8 -0.97 0.27 6
SPAIN ESP 0.54 0.19 12 0.63 0.19 10 1.08 0.23 10 0.75 0.24 7 0.64 0.27 6
SRI LANKA LKA -1.06 0.21 9 -0.97 0.21 8 -1.83 0.26 6 -1.72 0.27 4 -1.73 0.32 4
S T .  K I T T S  A N D  N E V I S K N A 1 . 4 1 0 . 3 4 3. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
S T .  L U C I A L C A 1 . 4 1 0 . 3 4 3. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 1.31 0.34 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
SUDAN SDN -2.08 0.23 7 -1.99 0.22 7 -2.42 0.27 5 -1.99 0.31 3 -2.73 0.40 3
SURINAME SUR 0.36 0.33 4 0.46 0.36 2 0.11 0.67 1 -0.19 0.46 1 -0.07 0.68 1
SWAZILAND SWZ 0.23 0.30 4 0.25 0.30 3 0.54 0.54 1 -0.14 0.46 2 0.19 0.54 1
SWEDEN SWE 1.38 0.19 11 1.41 0.20 9 1.49 0.23 10 1.51 0.24 6 1.42 0.27 6
SWITZERLAND CHE 1.44 0.20 11 1.56 0.21 8 1.73 0.23 9 1.76 0.24 7 1.59 0.27 6
SYRIA SYR -0.66 0.22 8 -0.20 0.22 7 -0.42 0.27 5 -0.19 0.27 4 -0.56 0.32 4
TAIWAN TWN 0.52 0.19 12 0.82 0.19 10 0.77 0.23 9 0.99 0.24 6 1.01 0.27 6
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.19 0.25 6 -1.17 0.26 5 -1.43 0.35 3 -1.56 0.37 2 -2.67 0.38 2
TANZANIA TZA -0.38 0.21 9 -0.25 0.22 7 -0.33 0.27 6 0.42 0.26 6 0.02 0.32 4
THAILAND THA -0.15 0.19 11 0.45 0.19 10 0.24 0.23 9 0.28 0.24 7 0.20 0.27 6
TIMOR, EAST TMP -0.62 0.34 3 -0.94 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -0.55 0.29 5 0.08 0.33 3 -0.47 0.46 2 -0.99 0.33 3 -0.56 0.47 2
T O N G A T O N 0 . 7 2 0 . 3 4 3. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.04 0.25 7 0.01 0.25 5 0.42 0.32 5 0.68 0.31 3 0.66 0.40 3
TUNISIA TUN 0.16 0.21 9 0.30 0.21 8 0.73 0.27 6 0.48 0.27 5 0.24 0.32 4
TURKEY TUR -0.60 0.19 12 -0.66 0.19 10 -1.01 0.23 10 -1.10 0.24 7 -1.21 0.27 6
TURKMENISTAN TKM -0.92 0.27 5 -0.19 0.28 4 0.10 0.37 2 0.19 0.37 2 0.36 0.38 2
T U V A L U T U V 0 . 8 6 0 . 4 1 2. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
UGANDA UGA -1.27 0.21 9 -1.47 0.22 7 -1.35 0.27 6 -0.95 0.26 6 -1.19 0.32 4
UKRAINE UKR -0.27 0.20 11 0.12 0.20 9 -0.48 0.25 8 -0.19 0.24 7 -0.22 0.28 5
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0.91 0.22 8 0.93 0.23 6 1.17 0.28 4 0.85 0.27 4 0.90 0.32 4
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 0.77 0.19 12 0.69 0.19 10 1.17 0.23 10 0.95 0.24 7 1.11 0.27 6
UNITED STATES USA 0.47 0.20 11 0.21 0.20 9 1.30 0.23 9 1.18 0.24 7 1.06 0.27 6
URUGUAY URY 0.49 0.22 9 0.86 0.21 8 1.04 0.27 7 0.60 0.27 4 0.85 0.32 4
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.37 0.22 7 -1.02 0.23 6 -1.04 0.28 5 -0.27 0.30 4 0.07 0.34 3
VANUATU VUT 0.53 0.41 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
VENEZUELA VEN -1.10 0.19 12 -1.17 0.19 11 -0.44 0.23 8 -0.37 0.24 7 -0.61 0.27 6
VIETNAM VNM 0.16 0.20 10 0.48 0.20 9 0.40 0.24 7 0.59 0.24 6 0.40 0.27 6
VIRGIN ISLANDS (U.S.) VIR 0.68 0.55 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WEST BANK WBG -1.33 0.36 3 -1.81 0.37 2 -0.46 0.88 1 0.16 0.69 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -1.48 0.24 7 -1.40 0.24 6 -1.11 0.32 4 -1.35 0.31 3 -0.90 0.40 3
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.16 0.21 9 -0.02 0.22 7 -0.44 0.27 6 -0.21 0.26 6 -0.37 0.32 4




















































TABLE C3: Government Effectiveness
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.24 0.20 6 -1.43 0.25 4 -1.30 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
ALBANIA ALB -0.36 0.17 8 -0.46 0.17 7 -0.75 0.22 6 -0.54 0.24 5 -0.31 0.21 4
ALGERIA DZA -0.46 0.16 11 -0.60 0.16 9 -0.75 0.20 6 -0.98 0.25 4 -0.77 0.24 4
A M E R I C A N  S A M O A A S M 0 . 0 2 0 . 3 9 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
A N D O R R A A D O 1 . 4 0 0 . 3 7 2 1 . 3 2 0 . 3 3 2. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ANGOLA AGO -1.14 0.17 10 -1.20 0.16 9 -1.70 0.20 6 -1.63 0.20 6 -1.13 0.24 4
ANGUILLA AIA 0.87 0.39 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG 0.31 0.37 2 0.50 0.33 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ARGENTINA ARG -0.33 0.15 13 -0.47 0.15 11 0.28 0.17 11 0.46 0.21 7 0.45 0.20 7
ARMENIA ARM -0.34 0.16 9 -0.39 0.17 8 -0.88 0.23 6 -0.46 0.24 5 -0.32 0.22 3
A R U B A A B W 0 . 8 4 0 . 3 9 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.95 0.17 10 1.93 0.16 9 1.80 0.19 7 1.84 0.25 6 1.96 0.22 6
AUSTRIA AUT 1.76 0.17 9 1.85 0.16 8 1.72 0.20 7 1.56 0.23 7 1.92 0.22 6
AZERBAIJAN AZE -0.81 0.14 12 -0.90 0.14 11 -0.96 0.18 8 -0.76 0.21 6 -1.05 0.19 4
BAHAMAS BHS 1.27 0.32 3 1.38 0.29 3 1.20 0.53 1 0.64 0.79 1 0.71 0.58 1
BAHRAIN BHR 0.76 0.18 8 0.81 0.17 7 0.74 0.24 4 0.40 0.31 3 0.45 0.28 3
BANGLADESH BGD -0.72 0.16 11 -0.55 0.15 10 -0.47 0.19 7 -0.38 0.25 4 -0.67 0.24 4
BARBADOS BRB 1.18 0.34 3 1.30 0.33 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BELARUS BLR -0.93 0.16 10 -1.04 0.16 8 -0.92 0.22 7 -0.83 0.24 5 -1.20 0.22 3
BELGIUM BEL 1.71 0.17 9 1.94 0.16 9 1.48 0.20 7 1.17 0.25 6 1.78 0.22 6
BELIZE BLZ 0.16 0.29 4 -0.04 0.27 3 -0.28 0.38 2 -0.56 0.39 1 -0.39 0.42 1
BENIN BEN -0.39 0.19 8 -0.48 0.24 5 0.05 0.31 3 -0.18 0.34 2 0.01 0.42 1
B E R M U D A B M U 1 . 3 9 0 . 3 9 1 1 . 1 3 0 . 3 4 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
BHUTAN BTN -0.14 0.28 5 0.43 0.24 4 1.48 0.34 2 0.22 0.39 1 0.33 0.42 1
BOLIVIA BOL -0.63 0.17 10 -0.53 0.16 8 -0.40 0.20 7 -0.11 0.22 6 -0.44 0.24 4
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.54 0.15 10 -0.85 0.17 8 -0.54 0.30 4 -0.81 0.29 2 .. .. ..
BOTSWANA BWA 0.83 0.14 13 0.91 0.16 10 0.98 0.20 7 0.52 0.22 5 0.33 0.24 4
BRAZIL BRA 0.02 0.15 13 -0.20 0.15 11 -0.18 0.17 10 -0.10 0.20 8 -0.16 0.20 7
BRUNEI BRN 0.73 0.32 3 0.90 0.29 3 1.03 0.53 1 0.14 0.79 1 1.27 0.58 1
BULGARIA BGR -0.08 0.14 12 -0.02 0.14 11 -0.16 0.18 9 -0.94 0.21 6 -0.45 0.19 5
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.52 0.20 8 -0.59 0.24 5 -0.14 0.28 4 -0.08 0.26 4 -0.76 0.36 2
BURUNDI BDI -1.24 0.23 6 -1.48 0.26 4 -1.25 0.27 4 -1.02 0.39 1 -0.98 0.42 1
CAMBODIA KHM -0.87 0.25 6 -0.51 0.24 5 -0.44 0.33 3 -1.22 0.39 1 -0.58 0.42 1
CAMEROON CMR -0.64 0.18 9 -0.59 0.17 8 -0.44 0.21 7 -0.61 0.21 6 -1.04 0.24 4
CANADA CAN 1.96 0.17 10 2.02 0.16 10 1.94 0.19 9 2.16 0.23 7 1.92 0.22 6
CAPE VERDE CPV -0.19 0.23 5 -0.10 0.26 4 0.33 0.36 2 0.36 0.39 1 -0.05 0.42 1
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 1.39 0.39 1 1.95 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.65 0.23 6 -1.51 0.26 4 -1.06 0.36 2 -0.95 0.32 2 -0.82 0.42 1
CHAD TCD -1.29 0.19 8 -0.68 0.25 5 -0.36 0.36 2 -0.51 0.34 2 -0.58 0.42 1
CHILE CHL 1.27 0.15 13 1.26 0.15 11 1.34 0.17 11 1.41 0.21 7 1.20 0.20 7
CHINA CHN 0.11 0.15 12 0.20 0.15 11 0.22 0.17 10 0.17 0.21 7 0.18 0.20 7
COLOMBIA COL -0.18 0.16 12 -0.40 0.15 10 -0.31 0.17 11 0.10 0.20 8 0.07 0.20 7
COMOROS COM -1.45 0.27 4 -0.98 0.26 4 -1.29 0.36 2 -1.09 0.39 1 -0.63 0.42 1
CONGO COG -1.17 0.22 7 -1.33 0.22 7 -1.66 0.28 4 -0.78 0.28 4 -1.24 0.36 2
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.41 0.17 10 -1.59 0.20 8 -1.79 0.24 5 -2.00 0.32 3 -2.07 0.31 3
COOK ISLANDS COK -0.19 0.63 2 -0.28 0.44 2 0.67 0.53 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
COSTA RICA CRI 0.49 0.16 11 0.45 0.16 9 0.76 0.19 7 0.52 0.24 5 0.16 0.23 5
CROATIA HRV 0.32 0.14 11 0.23 0.14 10 0.15 0.20 7 0.30 0.22 5 -0.17 0.19 4
CUBA CUB -0.47 0.19 8 -0.27 0.18 7 -0.18 0.24 4 -0.48 0.31 3 -0.40 0.28 3
CYPRUS CYP 1.02 0.19 7 1.02 0.18 6 1.06 0.26 3 1.35 0.31 3 1.32 0.28 3
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.63 0.13 13 0.72 0.13 12 0.70 0.17 11 0.72 0.18 9 0.78 0.17 8
DENMARK DNK 2.15 0.17 10 2.05 0.16 9 1.84 0.19 8 2.13 0.25 6 2.04 0.22 6
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.76 0.27 4 -0.87 0.26 4 -1.07 0.36 2 -0.89 0.39 1 -1.11 0.42 1
DOMINICA DMA 0.31 0.31 3 0.11 0.27 3 -0.67 0.41 1 -0.89 0.39 1 -0.88 0.42 1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.46 0.17 10 -0.42 0.16 8 -0.11 0.20 7 -0.73 0.27 3 -0.29 0.26 3
ECUADOR ECU -0.85 0.16 11 -0.94 0.16 9 -1.05 0.18 9 -0.76 0.22 6 -0.65 0.22 5
EGYPT EGY -0.20 0.15 12 -0.29 0.15 11 0.30 0.17 10 -0.03 0.20 7 -0.34 0.21 6
EL SALVADOR SLV -0.22 0.18 9 -0.50 0.17 7 -0.11 0.21 6 -0.04 0.27 3 -0.38 0.25 4
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.40 0.26 5 -1.42 0.25 5 -2.22 0.36 2 -1.67 0.39 1 -1.55 0.42 1
ERITREA ERI -1.05 0.22 7 -0.52 0.24 5 -0.28 0.36 2 0.36 0.39 1 -0.43 0.42 1
ESTONIA EST 0.99 0.14 13 0.85 0.13 12 1.00 0.17 10 0.45 0.21 6 0.61 0.19 4
ETHIOPIA ETH -0.96 0.16 11 -0.78 0.22 7 -0.60 0.27 5 0.02 0.26 4 -0.41 0.36 2
FIJI FJI -0.57 0.27 4 0.13 0.25 4 -0.34 0.34 2 -0.02 0.34 2 -0.04 0.42 1
FINLAND FIN 2.06 0.17 9 2.13 0.16 9 1.89 0.19 8 2.02 0.25 6 1.89 0.22 6
FRANCE FRA 1.42 0.17 10 1.69 0.16 10 1.42 0.19 8 1.64 0.23 7 1.75 0.22 6
F R E N C H  G U I A N A G U F 0 . 6 8 0 . 3 9 1 0 . 8 6 0 . 3 4 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
GABON GAB -0.53 0.17 9 -0.42 0.17 8 -0.59 0.20 6 -0.79 0.27 3 -0.99 0.26 3
GAMBIA GMB -0.49 0.18 8 -0.82 0.22 6 0.17 0.31 3 -0.20 0.37 2 -0.10 0.36 2
GEORGIA GEO -0.80 0.15 10 -0.77 0.17 8 -0.72 0.23 6 -0.40 0.25 4 -0.35 0.22 3




















































TABLE C3: Government Effectiveness (cont.)
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
GHANA GHA -0.17 0.14 13 0.00 0.16 9 0.09 0.21 7 -0.13 0.20 7 -0.07 0.24 4
GREECE GRC 0.74 0.17 9 0.80 0.16 9 0.77 0.20 7 0.78 0.25 6 0.76 0.22 6
GRENADA GRD 0.10 0.31 3 0.36 0.27 3 0.03 0.41 1 -0.23 0.39 1 -0.48 0.42 1
GUAM GUM 0.41 0.39 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GUATEMALA GTM -0.87 0.17 10 -0.58 0.17 8 -0.50 0.20 7 -0.23 0.27 3 -0.56 0.25 4
GUINEA GIN -0.93 0.22 7 -0.76 0.23 6 -0.07 0.31 3 -0.36 0.33 3 -1.21 0.36 2
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -1.25 0.23 6 -1.39 0.22 6 -1.43 0.28 4 -0.37 0.33 3 -0.87 0.36 2
GUYANA GUY -0.20 0.26 5 -0.30 0.25 4 -0.16 0.30 3 -0.14 0.37 2 -0.28 0.36 2
HAITI HTI -1.90 0.22 7 -1.56 0.21 6 -1.47 0.29 4 -1.20 0.37 2 -1.42 0.36 2
HONDURAS HND -0.68 0.17 10 -0.73 0.17 8 -0.45 0.21 6 -0.29 0.27 3 -0.98 0.25 4
HONG KONG HKG 1.49 0.19 8 1.44 0.17 8 1.27 0.21 7 1.61 0.24 6 1.78 0.24 5
HUNGARY HUN 0.68 0.13 14 0.79 0.13 13 0.78 0.16 12 0.78 0.18 9 0.60 0.17 8
ICELAND ISL 2.18 0.24 6 2.05 0.24 5 2.18 0.33 4 1.87 0.41 3 1.48 0.37 3
INDIA IND -0.04 0.15 12 -0.11 0.15 11 -0.07 0.17 10 -0.14 0.20 8 -0.14 0.20 7
INDONESIA IDN -0.36 0.15 13 -0.55 0.14 12 -0.40 0.16 11 -0.52 0.21 7 0.18 0.20 7
IRAN IRN -0.66 0.17 10 -0.46 0.16 9 -0.17 0.22 5 -0.31 0.28 4 -0.30 0.25 4
IRAQ IRQ -1.51 0.20 7 -1.69 0.19 6 -1.49 0.24 4 -2.14 0.31 3 -1.39 0.28 3
IRELAND IRL 1.48 0.17 10 1.67 0.16 9 2.03 0.19 8 1.73 0.23 7 1.80 0.22 6
ISRAEL ISR 0.98 0.18 9 1.08 0.16 9 1.02 0.20 7 0.93 0.26 5 1.32 0.22 6
ITALY ITA 0.58 0.17 9 0.96 0.16 9 0.80 0.18 10 1.05 0.23 7 0.88 0.22 6
IVORY COAST CIV -1.30 0.17 10 -0.89 0.16 9 -0.75 0.21 6 -0.12 0.21 6 -0.11 0.24 4
JAMAICA JAM 0.13 0.19 8 -0.04 0.17 7 -0.19 0.23 4 -0.54 0.25 4 -0.41 0.26 3
JAPAN JPN 1.21 0.17 10 1.11 0.16 10 1.08 0.19 9 1.13 0.31 5 1.36 0.22 6
JORDAN JOR 0.23 0.17 10 0.39 0.16 8 0.40 0.19 6 0.57 0.22 6 0.18 0.23 5
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -0.63 0.14 12 -0.82 0.14 11 -0.54 0.18 9 -0.72 0.20 7 -0.83 0.18 5
KENYA KEN -0.81 0.14 13 -0.81 0.16 9 -0.68 0.19 8 -0.85 0.20 7 -0.60 0.24 4
KIRIBATI KIR -0.61 0.29 4 -0.25 0.33 3 0.05 0.34 2 -0.50 0.39 1 -0.38 0.42 1
KOREA, NORTH PRK -1.68 0.21 6 -1.79 0.26 4 -1.10 0.40 2 -0.12 0.79 1 -1.30 0.58 1
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.95 0.15 12 0.91 0.15 11 0.63 0.17 10 0.50 0.20 8 0.64 0.22 6
KUWAIT KWT 0.55 0.20 7 0.15 0.17 8 0.21 0.26 3 -0.01 0.31 3 0.32 0.28 3
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -0.83 0.16 10 -0.72 0.16 9 -0.63 0.23 5 -0.28 0.25 4 -0.43 0.22 3
LAOS LAO -1.02 0.25 6 -0.50 0.24 5 -0.76 0.30 3 -0.30 0.39 1 -0.04 0.42 1
LATVIA LVA 0.60 0.14 11 0.70 0.14 10 0.36 0.19 7 0.19 0.21 6 0.04 0.19 4
LEBANON LBN -0.33 0.19 8 -0.40 0.16 8 -0.22 0.21 5 0.18 0.25 4 -0.18 0.24 4
LESOTHO LSO -0.33 0.18 8 -0.23 0.23 5 -0.05 0.36 2 -0.23 0.26 3 0.17 0.42 1
LIBERIA LBR -1.86 0.25 5 -1.58 0.25 5 -1.41 0.28 4 -1.86 0.37 2 -2.19 0.36 2
LIBYA LBY -0.73 0.20 7 -0.90 0.19 6 -1.17 0.26 3 -1.49 0.31 3 -0.98 0.28 3
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.48 0.37 2 1.67 0.33 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.70 0.14 12 0.65 0.14 11 0.36 0.17 10 0.18 0.21 6 0.06 0.19 4
LUXEMBOURG LUX 2.08 0.24 6 2.30 0.26 5 2.10 0.41 3 2.11 0.41 3 2.34 0.37 3
MACAO MAC 1.00 0.39 1 0.86 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.17 0.15 10 -0.37 0.15 7 -0.52 0.24 4 -0.43 0.22 4 -0.19 0.20 3
MADAGASCAR MDG -0.43 0.20 8 -0.42 0.24 5 -0.32 0.27 5 -0.45 0.28 4 -0.64 0.36 2
MALAWI MWI -0.81 0.15 11 -0.63 0.18 7 -0.65 0.22 6 -0.54 0.21 6 -0.69 0.26 3
MALAYSIA MYS 0.99 0.15 12 0.96 0.15 11 0.69 0.17 10 0.78 0.20 8 1.07 0.20 7
MALDIVES MDV 0.47 0.29 4 0.52 0.24 4 0.45 0.34 2 0.55 0.39 1 -0.06 0.42 1
MALI MLI -0.29 0.16 11 -0.62 0.22 7 -0.81 0.28 4 -0.13 0.33 3 -0.85 0.36 2
MALTA MLT 1.03 0.25 5 1.20 0.29 3 0.86 0.53 1 0.89 0.79 1 1.27 0.58 1
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL -0.46 0.41 3 -0.22 0.33 3 -0.79 0.34 2 -0.56 0.39 1 .. .. ..
M A R T I N I Q U E M T Q 0 . 8 4 0 . 3 9 1 0 . 8 6 0 . 3 4 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MAURITANIA MRT 0.22 0.26 5 -0.01 0.26 4 -0.30 0.31 3 -0.17 0.39 1 0.25 0.42 1
MAURITIUS MUS 0.60 0.18 7 0.51 0.18 6 0.79 0.22 5 0.35 0.22 4 0.70 0.28 2
MEXICO MEX -0.02 0.15 13 0.21 0.15 11 0.35 0.17 11 0.24 0.20 8 -0.12 0.20 7
MICRONESIA FSM -0.33 0.29 4 -0.29 0.33 3 -0.55 0.34 2 -0.50 0.39 1 .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.73 0.15 10 -0.60 0.15 8 -1.04 0.19 7 -0.49 0.21 6 -0.48 0.19 4
MONACO MCO 1.42 0.82 1 -0.61 0.83 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MONGOLIA MNG -0.46 0.21 8 -0.19 0.21 6 0.15 0.27 4 0.02 0.28 3 -0.27 0.36 2
MOROCCO MAR -0.03 0.16 11 0.06 0.16 10 0.02 0.21 5 0.30 0.20 7 -0.06 0.22 5
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.39 0.15 12 -0.35 0.22 7 -0.31 0.28 4 -0.21 0.24 5 -0.72 0.36 2
MYANMAR MMR -1.57 0.19 8 -1.33 0.18 7 -1.31 0.24 4 -1.64 0.31 3 -0.99 0.28 3
NAMIBIA NAM 0.29 0.14 13 0.10 0.16 10 0.48 0.22 6 0.17 0.22 5 0.44 0.26 3
N A U R U N R U - 1 . 3 6 0 . 8 2 1 - 1 . 1 7 0 . 8 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
NEPAL NPL -0.90 0.19 8 -0.45 0.22 6 -0.62 0.30 3 -1.02 0.39 1 -0.38 0.42 1
NETHERLANDS NLD 2.00 0.17 9 2.20 0.16 9 2.08 0.19 8 2.53 0.25 6 2.32 0.22 6
N E T H E R L A N D S  A N T I L L E S A N T 0 . 8 2 0 . 3 9 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
NEW ZEALAND NZL 2.05 0.19 8 2.01 0.17 7 1.45 0.21 6 1.96 0.26 5 2.31 0.24 5
NICARAGUA NIC -0.71 0.17 10 -0.85 0.17 8 -0.71 0.21 6 -0.53 0.27 3 -0.46 0.25 4
NIGER NER -0.87 0.22 7 -0.84 0.24 5 -1.04 0.28 4 -0.90 0.37 2 -0.82 0.36 2
NIGERIA NGA -1.02 0.14 13 -1.11 0.16 10 -1.04 0.18 9 -1.33 0.20 7 -1.22 0.22 5




















































TABLE C3: Government Effectiveness (cont.)
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
NORWAY NOR 1.97 0.17 9 1.90 0.16 8 1.55 0.20 7 2.08 0.25 6 2.18 0.22 6
OMAN OMN 0.91 0.20 7 0.67 0.17 8 0.99 0.24 4 1.21 0.31 3 0.79 0.28 3
P A L A U P C I0 . 3 9 0 . 8 2 1 - 0 . 3 3 0 . 8 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
PAKISTAN PAK -0.57 0.16 11 -0.53 0.16 9 -0.54 0.19 8 -0.69 0.22 6 -0.40 0.22 5
PANAMA PAN 0.01 0.17 10 -0.11 0.16 9 -0.03 0.19 7 0.01 0.25 4 -0.55 0.24 4
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -1.01 0.17 10 -0.77 0.16 8 -0.68 0.20 6 -0.62 0.27 3 -0.41 0.26 3
PARAGUAY PRY -1.07 0.17 10 -1.25 0.17 8 -1.27 0.23 5 -1.12 0.25 4 -0.69 0.26 3
PERU PER -0.58 0.16 12 -0.46 0.15 10 -0.27 0.18 10 0.30 0.21 7 -0.18 0.21 6
PHILIPPINES PHL -0.23 0.15 12 -0.07 0.15 11 0.08 0.17 10 0.22 0.21 7 0.19 0.20 7
POLAND POL 0.47 0.13 14 0.64 0.13 13 0.38 0.16 12 0.86 0.18 9 0.63 0.17 8
PORTUGAL PRT 0.92 0.17 9 1.05 0.16 8 1.06 0.20 7 1.49 0.23 7 1.11 0.22 6
PUERTO RICO PRI 1.05 0.28 3 1.21 0.28 2 1.58 0.43 1 1.61 0.53 1 1.57 0.49 1
QATAR QAT 0.87 0.21 6 0.75 0.18 6 0.96 0.24 4 0.69 0.31 3 0.71 0.28 3
REUNION REU 1.03 0.39 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ROMANIA ROM -0.15 0.14 13 -0.30 0.14 11 -0.59 0.17 10 -0.61 0.22 5 -0.55 0.19 5
RUSSIA RUS -0.21 0.13 14 -0.40 0.13 13 -0.62 0.16 12 -0.62 0.18 9 -0.50 0.17 8
RWANDA RWA -0.56 0.22 6 -0.72 0.24 5 -0.11 0.36 2 -0.69 0.39 1 -1.26 0.42 1
SAMOA SAM 0.09 0.29 4 0.08 0.24 4 0.58 0.34 2 -0.06 0.39 1 -0.27 0.42 1
S A N  M A R I N O S M R - 0 . 2 3 0 . 8 2 1 - 0 . 3 3 0 . 8 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP -0.89 0.27 4 -0.68 0.26 4 -0.70 0.36 2 -0.82 0.39 1 -0.55 0.42 1
SAUDI ARABIA SAU -0.06 0.17 9 -0.08 0.16 9 0.06 0.22 5 -0.29 0.28 4 -0.09 0.25 4
SENEGAL SEN -0.13 0.16 11 -0.11 0.17 8 0.23 0.22 6 0.15 0.23 5 -0.40 0.26 3
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO YUG -0.21 0.14 11 -0.69 0.14 9 -1.00 0.25 3 -1.02 0.28 3 -0.60 0.32 2
SEYCHELLES SYC -0.31 0.26 5 -0.22 0.26 4 -0.94 0.36 2 -0.56 0.39 1 -0.58 0.42 1
SIERRA LEONE SLE -1.32 0.21 7 -1.48 0.22 6 -1.39 0.28 4 -0.50 0.37 2 -0.24 0.36 2
SINGAPORE SGP 2.25 0.17 10 2.39 0.16 9 2.44 0.19 9 2.59 0.23 7 2.51 0.22 6
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.67 0.14 12 0.43 0.14 10 0.28 0.18 9 0.08 0.20 7 0.28 0.18 6
SLOVENIA SVN 1.02 0.14 13 0.89 0.13 12 0.82 0.17 9 0.68 0.22 5 0.61 0.19 4
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -1.76 0.29 4 -0.92 0.33 3 -1.04 0.34 2 -0.82 0.39 1 -1.06 0.42 1
SOMALIA SOM -2.32 0.25 5 -1.98 0.26 4 -2.59 0.30 3 -2.15 0.37 2 -2.19 0.36 2
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.74 0.13 15 0.59 0.15 12 0.43 0.17 12 0.17 0.18 9 0.33 0.20 7
SPAIN ESP 1.29 0.17 10 1.58 0.16 10 1.78 0.19 9 2.05 0.23 7 1.59 0.22 6
SRI LANKA LKA -0.27 0.16 11 0.01 0.15 10 -0.32 0.19 7 -0.42 0.25 4 -0.30 0.24 4
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA -0.16 0.31 3 -0.26 0.42 2 0.11 0.41 1 -0.23 0.39 1 -0.24 0.42 1
ST. LUCIA LCA 0.19 0.31 3 0.01 0.42 2 0.16 0.41 1 -0.17 0.39 1 0.36 0.42 1
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 0.23 0.31 3 -0.19 0.42 2 -0.01 0.41 1 -0.23 0.39 1 -0.27 0.42 1
SUDAN SDN -1.28 0.17 10 -1.09 0.16 9 -1.46 0.20 6 -1.68 0.27 3 -1.53 0.26 3
SURINAME SUR -0.23 0.30 4 -0.22 0.29 3 0.17 0.53 1 -0.12 0.79 1 -0.36 0.58 1
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.60 0.20 7 -0.40 0.23 5 -0.55 0.36 2 -0.53 0.26 3 -0.45 0.42 1
SWEDEN SWE 1.92 0.17 10 1.91 0.16 9 1.72 0.19 9 1.97 0.25 6 1.98 0.22 6
SWITZERLAND CHE 2.25 0.17 9 2.34 0.16 8 2.18 0.19 8 2.47 0.23 7 2.43 0.22 6
SYRIA SYR -0.72 0.19 8 -0.58 0.18 7 -0.83 0.24 4 -1.36 0.31 3 -0.43 0.28 3
TAIWAN TWN 1.15 0.16 11 1.12 0.16 10 1.06 0.19 9 1.69 0.25 6 1.42 0.22 6
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.05 0.16 10 -1.13 0.16 9 -1.39 0.22 5 -1.37 0.26 3 -1.47 0.22 3
TANZANIA TZA -0.37 0.14 13 -0.50 0.16 9 -0.28 0.20 7 -0.39 0.20 7 -1.18 0.24 4
THAILAND THA 0.38 0.15 12 0.29 0.15 11 0.20 0.18 10 0.12 0.20 8 0.47 0.20 7
T I M O R ,  E A S T T M P - 1 . 2 1 0 . 3 6 2 - 0 . 9 3 0 . 3 3 2. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
TOGO TGO -1.31 0.22 7 -1.16 0.24 5 -1.40 0.31 3 -0.44 0.33 3 -0.66 0.36 2
TONGA TON -0.73 0.29 4 -0.46 0.33 3 -0.47 0.34 2 -0.43 0.39 1 -0.19 0.42 1
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.47 0.20 7 0.50 0.18 6 0.64 0.22 5 0.54 0.27 3 0.09 0.26 3
TUNISIA TUN 0.57 0.16 11 0.67 0.16 10 1.24 0.20 7 0.86 0.20 6 0.49 0.24 4
TURKEY TUR 0.01 0.15 13 -0.16 0.15 12 -0.07 0.17 11 -0.31 0.20 8 0.01 0.20 7
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.37 0.17 7 -1.50 0.17 6 -1.38 0.26 3 -1.41 0.26 3 -1.36 0.22 3
TUVALU TUV -0.79 0.35 3 -0.26 0.44 2 1.29 0.53 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
UGANDA UGA -0.43 0.14 13 -0.38 0.16 9 -0.16 0.20 7 -0.11 0.20 7 -0.37 0.24 4
UKRAINE UKR -0.67 0.13 13 -0.76 0.13 12 -0.78 0.18 9 -0.97 0.19 8 -0.61 0.18 6
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 1.20 0.19 7 0.83 0.17 7 0.72 0.26 3 0.27 0.31 3 0.68 0.28 3
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.85 0.17 10 2.08 0.16 10 2.01 0.18 10 2.47 0.23 7 2.08 0.22 6
UNITED STATES USA 1.80 0.17 9 1.73 0.16 9 1.80 0.19 9 1.74 0.23 7 2.02 0.22 6
URUGUAY URY 0.52 0.17 10 0.52 0.16 8 0.71 0.19 8 0.67 0.25 4 0.61 0.24 4
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.04 0.15 11 -1.04 0.14 10 -0.96 0.19 7 -1.33 0.21 5 -0.89 0.19 4
VANUATU VUT -0.60 0.29 4 -0.28 0.33 3 -0.47 0.34 2 -0.43 0.39 1 -0.23 0.42 1
VENEZUELA VEN -0.96 0.15 13 -1.13 0.15 11 -0.83 0.18 9 -0.89 0.20 8 -0.72 0.20 7
VIETNAM VNM -0.31 0.15 12 -0.29 0.15 11 -0.30 0.18 8 -0.17 0.22 6 -0.10 0.21 6
VIRGIN ISLANDS (U.S.) VIR 0.77 0.39 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WEST BANK WBG -1.05 0.35 2 -1.00 0.32 2 0.47 0.70 1 0.01 0.56 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -0.84 0.19 8 -0.84 0.18 7 -0.68 0.23 4 -0.47 0.27 3 -0.59 0.26 3
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.84 0.14 13 -0.77 0.16 9 -0.72 0.20 7 -0.36 0.20 7 -0.86 0.24 4




















































TABLE C4: Regulatory Quality
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -2.05 0.26 4 -1.80 0.29 2 -3.64 0.46 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
ALBANIA ALB -0.08 0.22 8 -0.36 0.20 7 -0.06 0.29 6 -0.58 0.24 6 0.16 0.31 5
ALGERIA DZA -0.93 0.18 10 -0.58 0.18 8 -0.76 0.26 5 -1.20 0.33 4 -0.68 0.27 5
A M E R I C A N  S A M O A A S M0 . 6 2 0 . 6 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
A N D O R R A A D O1 . 3 2 0 . 6 2 1 1 . 4 4 0 . 3 0 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ANGOLA AGO -1.40 0.20 9 -1.37 0.19 7 -1.79 0.26 5 -1.19 0.26 5 -1.60 0.27 5
ANGUILLA AIA 0.96 0.62 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
A N T I G U A  A N D  B A R B U D AA T G0 . 7 3 0 . 6 2 1 0 . 7 1 0 . 3 0 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ARGENTINA ARG -0.81 0.18 10 -0.81 0.17 9 0.45 0.24 8 0.87 0.21 6 0.82 0.21 7
ARMENIA ARM 0.05 0.21 9 0.11 0.20 8 -0.39 0.29 6 -0.47 0.24 6 -0.74 0.33 4
A R U B A A B W 0 . 9 3 0 . 6 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.62 0.21 8 1.64 0.18 7 1.51 0.29 5 1.28 0.23 5 1.38 0.22 6
AUSTRIA AUT 1.41 0.21 8 1.67 0.18 7 1.53 0.29 5 1.21 0.23 6 1.51 0.22 6
AZERBAIJAN AZE -0.57 0.18 11 -0.87 0.17 10 -0.51 0.26 7 -1.10 0.24 6 -1.21 0.26 5
BAHAMAS BHS 0.78 0.32 3 1.35 0.25 3 0.95 0.54 2 1.17 0.52 2 0.68 0.49 2
BAHRAIN BHR 0.71 0.20 8 0.98 0.19 7 1.02 0.37 3 1.01 0.40 3 0.61 0.29 4
BANGLADESH BGD -1.15 0.19 10 -1.05 0.18 9 -0.16 0.27 6 -0.08 0.33 4 -0.54 0.27 5
BARBADOS BRB 0.91 0.35 3 1.14 0.27 2 0.53 0.64 1 0.84 0.60 1 0.36 0.54 1
BELARUS BLR -1.78 0.21 9 -1.66 0.20 7 -2.70 0.31 5 -2.01 0.24 6 -1.08 0.33 4
BELGIUM BEL 1.25 0.21 8 1.47 0.18 8 0.76 0.28 6 1.07 0.23 5 1.32 0.22 6
BELIZE BLZ 0.32 0.31 4 0.14 0.25 3 -0.17 0.41 3 0.17 0.42 2 0.12 0.43 2
BENIN BEN -0.49 0.24 7 -0.48 0.24 4 -0.04 0.31 3 -0.07 0.42 3 0.16 0.43 2
B E R M U D A B M U 0 . 9 8 0 . 6 2 1 1 . 4 4 0 . 3 0 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
BHUTAN BTN 0.00 0.39 4 -0.38 0.26 3 0.25 0.37 2 -0.18 0.51 1 0.08 0.59 1
BOLIVIA BOL 0.05 0.19 9 -0.12 0.18 8 0.67 0.29 6 0.90 0.33 5 0.82 0.27 5
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.66 0.22 9 -0.90 0.21 7 -0.73 0.38 4 -1.30 0.27 3 -2.09 0.60 1
BOTSWANA BWA 0.96 0.18 11 0.79 0.18 9 0.79 0.26 6 0.69 0.26 5 0.69 0.27 5
BRAZIL BRA 0.19 0.18 10 0.24 0.17 9 0.37 0.24 8 0.29 0.21 7 0.21 0.21 7
BRUNEI BRN 1.08 0.43 2 1.05 0.27 2 0.28 0.71 1 -0.06 0.72 1 2.58 0.75 1
BULGARIA BGR 0.60 0.18 11 0.62 0.17 10 0.22 0.28 7 0.47 0.24 6 -0.08 0.25 6
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.26 0.22 8 -0.17 0.22 5 0.01 0.29 4 -0.23 0.29 4 -0.27 0.40 3
BURUNDI BDI -1.35 0.29 5 -1.29 0.25 3 -0.86 0.29 4 -1.27 0.42 2 -1.31 0.59 1
CAMBODIA KHM -0.25 0.26 6 -0.44 0.24 5 -0.07 0.34 4 -0.22 0.42 2 -0.29 0.59 1
CAMEROON CMR -0.71 0.19 9 -0.77 0.18 8 0.00 0.26 6 -0.15 0.26 6 -0.82 0.27 5
CANADA CAN 1.57 0.21 8 1.65 0.18 8 1.38 0.29 6 1.17 0.23 6 1.37 0.22 6
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.27 0.30 4 -0.25 0.24 4 -0.07 0.31 3 -0.57 0.42 2 -0.56 0.43 2
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S C Y M 0 . 9 6 0 . 6 2 1 1 . 4 4 0 . 3 0 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.28 0.25 6 -0.85 0.24 4 -0.65 0.33 2 -0.57 0.51 1 -0.29 0.59 1
CHAD TCD -0.84 0.23 8 -0.96 0.23 5 -0.28 0.31 3 -0.67 0.42 3 0.01 0.59 1
CHILE CHL 1.62 0.18 10 1.48 0.17 9 1.38 0.24 8 1.22 0.21 6 1.52 0.21 7
CHINA CHN -0.45 0.18 10 -0.43 0.17 9 -0.21 0.24 8 -0.07 0.21 6 -0.06 0.21 7
COLOMBIA COL -0.12 0.18 10 -0.07 0.17 9 0.12 0.24 8 0.51 0.21 7 0.49 0.21 7
COMOROS COM -1.06 0.38 3 -1.01 0.25 3 -0.90 0.33 2 -0.70 0.51 1 -0.72 0.59 1
CONGO COG -1.16 0.26 6 -1.06 0.21 6 -1.03 0.29 4 -0.96 0.39 4 -0.70 0.40 3
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.80 0.21 8 -1.64 0.22 6 -2.65 0.26 5 -2.78 0.33 4 -2.38 0.35 4
COOK ISLANDS COK 0.21 0.82 1 -0.04 0.69 1 0.01 0.50 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
COSTA RICA CRI 0.67 0.19 9 0.78 0.18 8 0.92 0.29 6 1.00 0.33 5 0.68 0.24 6
CROATIA HRV 0.19 0.18 11 0.19 0.17 10 0.31 0.29 6 0.34 0.24 5 -0.08 0.26 5
CUBA CUB -1.81 0.21 7 -1.19 0.19 6 -1.50 0.37 3 -1.06 0.40 3 -0.77 0.29 4
CYPRUS CYP 1.23 0.22 6 1.23 0.20 5 1.08 0.37 3 1.13 0.40 3 0.78 0.29 4
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.97 0.17 12 1.12 0.16 11 0.67 0.24 9 0.78 0.18 8 1.18 0.20 8
DENMARK DNK 1.76 0.21 8 1.74 0.18 7 1.41 0.29 5 1.40 0.23 5 1.64 0.22 6
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.76 0.30 4 -0.65 0.24 4 -0.66 0.31 3 -0.79 0.42 2 0.01 0.59 1
DOMINICA DMA 0.53 0.45 2 0.77 0.27 2 -0.13 0.48 1 -0.57 0.51 1 -0.21 0.59 1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.28 0.19 9 -0.13 0.18 8 0.52 0.29 6 0.23 0.39 3 0.14 0.29 4
ECUADOR ECU -0.60 0.19 9 -0.58 0.18 8 -0.19 0.27 7 0.19 0.33 5 -0.05 0.27 5
EGYPT EGY -0.58 0.18 10 -0.46 0.18 9 0.01 0.23 8 0.16 0.22 6 -0.14 0.24 6
EL SALVADOR SLV 0.56 0.20 8 0.07 0.19 7 1.15 0.34 5 1.42 0.39 3 0.73 0.26 5
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -0.78 0.28 5 -1.41 0.23 5 -1.31 0.31 3 -2.11 0.42 2 -0.95 0.59 1
ERITREA ERI -1.29 0.29 5 -1.08 0.25 3 -0.40 0.33 2 0.08 0.51 1 -0.14 0.59 1
ESTONIA EST 1.61 0.17 12 1.41 0.16 11 1.33 0.25 8 1.06 0.24 6 1.41 0.26 5
ETHIOPIA ETH -1.19 0.18 10 -0.99 0.21 6 -0.62 0.29 5 -0.14 0.29 4 -0.72 0.40 3
FIJI FJI -0.36 0.33 3 -0.09 0.25 3 -0.81 0.41 2 -0.61 0.42 3 -0.51 0.43 2
FINLAND FIN 1.79 0.21 8 1.96 0.18 8 1.81 0.29 5 1.51 0.23 5 1.50 0.22 6
FRANCE FRA 0.91 0.21 8 1.22 0.18 8 0.78 0.29 6 0.97 0.23 6 1.18 0.22 6
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.19 0.62 1 0.95 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.46 0.19 9 -0.21 0.18 8 -0.29 0.26 5 0.10 0.39 3 -0.51 0.29 4




















































TABLE C4: Regulatory Quality (cont.)
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
GEORGIA GEO -0.64 0.22 9 -0.80 0.21 7 -0.56 0.31 5 -0.79 0.25 5 -0.84 0.33 4
GERMANY DEU 1.29 0.21 8 1.57 0.18 8 1.38 0.29 6 1.19 0.23 6 1.54 0.22 6
GHANA GHA -0.28 0.18 11 -0.23 0.18 8 0.11 0.26 6 0.21 0.26 6 -0.14 0.27 5
GREECE GRC 0.85 0.21 8 1.12 0.18 8 0.93 0.27 6 0.83 0.23 5 0.80 0.22 6
GRENADA GRD 0.37 0.45 2 0.41 0.27 2 0.28 0.48 1 0.21 0.51 1 -0.14 0.59 1
GUAM GUM 0.57 0.62 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GUATEMALA GTM -0.07 0.20 8 -0.08 0.19 7 0.46 0.32 6 0.85 0.39 3 0.03 0.26 5
GUINEA GIN -0.94 0.23 7 -0.75 0.21 6 -0.09 0.29 4 0.14 0.39 4 0.01 0.40 3
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -0.86 0.27 5 -0.93 0.22 5 -1.09 0.29 4 -1.30 0.39 4 -0.06 0.52 2
GUYANA GUY -0.14 0.27 5 -0.37 0.23 4 -0.04 0.38 3 0.31 0.39 3 0.22 0.40 3
HAITI HTI -1.11 0.25 6 -0.94 0.22 5 -1.15 0.38 4 -0.99 0.39 3 -1.23 0.40 3
HONDURAS HND -0.33 0.20 8 -0.34 0.19 7 0.32 0.34 5 0.58 0.39 3 -0.29 0.26 5
HONG KONG HKG 1.89 0.21 8 1.45 0.18 8 1.83 0.27 6 1.60 0.23 6 2.07 0.22 6
HUNGARY HUN 1.22 0.17 12 1.19 0.16 11 1.12 0.24 9 1.15 0.18 8 0.60 0.20 8
ICELAND ISL 1.82 0.26 6 1.55 0.22 5 1.39 0.35 4 0.84 0.25 4 0.53 0.31 3
INDIA IND -0.59 0.18 10 -0.35 0.17 9 -0.17 0.24 8 -0.08 0.21 7 -0.09 0.21 7
INDONESIA IDN -0.42 0.18 11 -0.67 0.17 10 -0.34 0.23 9 0.10 0.21 6 0.27 0.21 7
IRAN IRN -1.33 0.20 8 -1.23 0.19 7 -1.29 0.37 3 -1.56 0.40 3 -1.62 0.29 4
IRAQ IRQ -1.79 0.23 6 -2.26 0.19 6 -3.43 0.37 3 -3.99 0.40 3 -2.26 0.29 4
IRELAND IRL 1.63 0.21 8 1.63 0.18 7 1.70 0.29 5 1.54 0.23 6 1.58 0.22 6
ISRAEL ISR 0.69 0.21 8 1.01 0.18 8 0.95 0.27 6 0.73 0.23 5 1.24 0.22 6
ITALY ITA 0.97 0.21 8 1.13 0.18 8 0.78 0.27 7 0.81 0.23 6 0.86 0.22 6
IVORY COAST CIV -0.83 0.19 9 -0.38 0.18 8 -0.32 0.26 6 0.18 0.26 6 -0.15 0.27 5
JAMAICA JAM 0.15 0.20 8 0.30 0.19 7 0.41 0.35 4 0.63 0.39 4 0.54 0.29 4
JAPAN JPN 1.04 0.21 8 0.98 0.18 8 0.84 0.27 6 0.55 0.23 5 0.84 0.22 6
JORDAN JOR 0.13 0.18 10 0.10 0.18 8 0.68 0.29 5 0.59 0.25 6 0.06 0.24 6
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -0.89 0.18 10 -0.71 0.17 9 -0.47 0.29 6 -0.35 0.24 6 -0.27 0.28 4
KENYA KEN -0.43 0.18 11 -0.52 0.18 8 -0.16 0.24 7 -0.18 0.26 6 -0.48 0.27 5
KIRIBATI KIR -0.49 0.43 3 -1.10 0.46 2 -0.78 0.37 2 -0.96 0.51 1 -0.36 0.59 1
KOREA, NORTH PRK -2.05 0.22 5 -1.89 0.25 3 -1.70 0.54 2 -1.75 0.52 2 -2.43 0.49 2
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.69 0.18 10 0.84 0.17 9 0.47 0.24 7 0.30 0.21 7 0.69 0.22 6
KUWAIT KWT 0.10 0.22 6 0.36 0.19 7 -0.13 0.37 3 -0.07 0.40 3 0.16 0.29 4
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -0.06 0.22 9 -0.42 0.21 8 -0.36 0.27 6 -0.72 0.25 5 -0.16 0.38 3
LAOS LAO -1.24 0.26 6 -1.25 0.24 5 -1.24 0.34 3 -1.18 0.42 2 -1.17 0.43 2
LATVIA LVA 1.02 0.18 11 0.92 0.17 10 0.53 0.28 6 0.72 0.24 6 0.53 0.26 5
LEBANON LBN -0.49 0.20 8 -0.49 0.18 8 0.29 0.31 4 0.53 0.33 4 0.22 0.27 5
LESOTHO LSO -0.26 0.25 7 -0.41 0.23 5 -0.38 0.31 3 0.05 0.30 3 -0.71 0.43 2
LIBERIA LBR -1.83 0.34 3 -1.53 0.25 3 -1.35 0.31 3 -2.35 0.46 2 -2.91 0.52 2
LIBYA LBY -1.52 0.21 7 -1.57 0.19 6 -2.01 0.37 3 -3.00 0.40 3 -1.96 0.29 4
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.62 0.62 1 1.69 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 1.16 0.18 11 1.04 0.17 10 0.52 0.26 8 0.21 0.24 6 0.38 0.26 5
LUXEMBOURG LUX 2.02 0.26 6 1.93 0.22 5 1.90 0.38 3 1.27 0.25 4 1.50 0.28 4
MACAO MAC 1.50 0.62 1 0.71 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.19 0.19 10 -0.09 0.19 7 0.13 0.44 2 -0.16 0.29 3 -0.16 0.31 3
MADAGASCAR MDG 0.10 0.22 8 -0.22 0.22 5 -0.17 0.29 5 -0.46 0.39 4 -0.07 0.40 3
MALAWI MWI -0.57 0.18 10 -0.39 0.18 7 -0.10 0.29 5 0.10 0.29 5 -0.43 0.29 4
MALAYSIA MYS 0.44 0.18 10 0.55 0.17 9 0.36 0.25 7 0.57 0.21 7 0.86 0.21 7
MALDIVES MDV 0.00 0.43 3 0.71 0.26 3 0.07 0.37 2 0.21 0.51 1 0.23 0.59 1
MALI MLI -0.26 0.21 9 -0.39 0.21 6 0.24 0.29 4 0.13 0.39 4 0.16 0.40 3
MALTA MLT 1.30 0.28 5 1.11 0.25 3 0.45 0.54 2 0.55 0.52 2 0.22 0.49 2
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL -0.55 0.51 2 -0.76 0.46 2 -0.66 0.37 2 -0.83 0.51 1 .. .. ..
M A R T I N I Q U E M T Q 0 . 8 0 0 . 6 2 1 0 . 9 5 0 . 3 0 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MAURITANIA MRT 0.04 0.28 5 0.09 0.24 4 -0.38 0.31 3 -0.47 0.42 2 -0.65 0.43 2
MAURITIUS MUS 0.33 0.21 7 0.52 0.19 6 0.74 0.29 4 0.45 0.30 4 0.17 0.35 2
MEXICO MEX 0.55 0.18 10 0.45 0.17 9 0.68 0.24 8 0.78 0.21 7 0.59 0.21 7
MICRONESIA FSM 0.04 0.43 3 -0.65 0.46 2 -0.56 0.37 2 -0.70 0.51 1 .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.49 0.18 10 -0.16 0.18 8 -1.11 0.29 6 -0.39 0.24 6 0.07 0.26 5
MONGOLIA MNG 0.18 0.24 7 -0.10 0.22 5 0.37 0.32 4 0.27 0.39 3 -0.57 0.40 3
MOROCCO MAR -0.26 0.18 10 -0.01 0.18 9 0.32 0.26 5 0.25 0.26 6 -0.01 0.27 5
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.29 0.21 10 -0.52 0.21 6 -0.05 0.29 4 -0.29 0.29 5 -0.98 0.40 3
MYANMAR MMR -2.34 0.21 7 -1.83 0.19 6 -1.40 0.37 3 -1.25 0.40 3 -1.12 0.29 4
NAMIBIA NAM 0.45 0.18 11 0.25 0.18 9 0.35 0.29 5 0.40 0.29 4 0.26 0.33 3
NEPAL NPL -0.60 0.21 7 -0.51 0.24 5 -0.39 0.34 3 -0.34 0.42 2 -0.22 0.43 2
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.67 0.21 8 1.90 0.18 8 1.91 0.29 5 1.51 0.23 5 1.77 0.22 6
N E T H E R L A N D S  A N T I L L E S A N T 0 . 8 0 0 . 6 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.78 0.21 8 1.69 0.18 7 1.45 0.29 5 1.60 0.23 5 1.97 0.22 6
NICARAGUA NIC -0.15 0.20 8 -0.41 0.19 7 0.32 0.34 5 0.45 0.39 3 -0.21 0.26 5




















































TABLE C4: Regulatory Quality (cont.)
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
NIGERIA NGA -1.26 0.18 11 -1.18 0.18 9 -0.38 0.24 7 -0.48 0.26 6 -0.97 0.27 5
NORWAY NOR 1.33 0.21 8 1.52 0.18 7 0.95 0.29 5 1.25 0.23 5 1.54 0.22 6
OMAN OMN 0.43 0.22 6 0.63 0.19 7 0.79 0.37 3 0.44 0.40 3 0.61 0.29 4
PAKISTAN PAK -1.03 0.19 10 -0.80 0.18 8 -0.58 0.26 7 -0.15 0.25 5 -0.57 0.27 5
PANAMA PAN 0.22 0.20 8 0.47 0.18 8 1.00 0.29 6 1.23 0.33 4 0.65 0.27 5
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.64 0.21 8 -0.46 0.19 6 -0.61 0.27 5 -0.48 0.39 3 -0.78 0.33 3
PARAGUAY PRY -0.60 0.20 8 -0.56 0.19 7 -0.79 0.35 4 -0.26 0.39 4 0.58 0.29 4
PERU PER 0.17 0.19 9 0.19 0.18 8 0.59 0.27 7 0.89 0.25 6 0.65 0.24 6
PHILIPPINES PHL -0.06 0.18 10 0.05 0.17 9 0.35 0.25 7 0.71 0.21 6 0.45 0.21 7
POLAND POL 0.64 0.17 12 0.65 0.16 11 0.62 0.24 9 0.83 0.18 8 0.45 0.20 8
PORTUGAL PRT 1.14 0.21 8 1.47 0.18 7 1.05 0.29 6 1.19 0.23 6 1.46 0.22 6
PUERTO RICO PRI 0.75 0.43 3 1.23 0.29 2 1.20 0.46 1 1.13 0.52 1 0.97 0.56 1
QATAR QAT -0.16 0.22 6 0.15 0.19 6 0.52 0.37 3 0.47 0.40 3 0.18 0.33 3
REUNION REU 0.91 0.62 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ROMANIA ROM -0.06 0.17 12 0.04 0.17 10 -0.27 0.26 8 0.30 0.24 5 -0.43 0.25 6
RUSSIA RUS -0.51 0.17 12 -0.35 0.16 11 -1.58 0.24 9 -0.37 0.18 8 -0.41 0.20 8
RWANDA RWA -0.42 0.26 5 -0.89 0.24 4 -0.54 0.31 3 -0.94 0.42 2 -1.09 0.59 1
SAMOA SAM 0.39 0.43 3 -0.06 0.26 3 -0.03 0.34 3 -0.70 0.51 1 -0.21 0.59 1
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP -0.47 0.38 3 -0.43 0.25 3 -0.52 0.33 2 -0.96 0.51 1 -0.36 0.59 1
SAUDI ARABIA SAU -0.34 0.21 7 0.06 0.19 7 -0.10 0.37 3 -0.14 0.40 3 0.07 0.29 4
SENEGAL SEN -0.31 0.19 9 -0.23 0.18 7 -0.05 0.29 5 -0.26 0.39 4 -0.45 0.29 4
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO YUG -0.72 0.19 10 -0.59 0.17 9 -0.83 0.71 1 -1.93 0.72 1 -1.18 0.33 3
SEYCHELLES SYC -1.21 0.35 4 -0.49 0.25 3 -1.34 0.33 2 -1.22 0.51 1 -1.17 0.59 1
SIERRA LEONE SLE -1.02 0.24 6 -1.28 0.23 4 -1.05 0.29 4 -1.41 0.39 3 -0.45 0.40 3
SINGAPORE SGP 1.87 0.19 9 1.91 0.18 8 2.31 0.27 7 1.65 0.23 6 2.29 0.22 6
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 1.15 0.17 12 0.75 0.16 11 0.37 0.25 8 0.29 0.20 7 0.27 0.23 7
SLOVENIA SVN 0.89 0.17 12 0.85 0.16 11 0.66 0.25 8 0.74 0.24 5 0.50 0.26 5
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -1.47 0.43 3 -1.89 0.46 2 -1.55 0.37 2 -1.09 0.51 1 -1.24 0.59 1
SOMALIA SOM -2.63 0.34 3 -2.01 0.27 2 -2.40 0.38 3 -2.52 0.39 3 -2.91 0.52 2
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.44 0.17 12 0.53 0.17 10 0.12 0.22 9 0.33 0.19 8 0.27 0.21 7
SPAIN ESP 1.13 0.21 8 1.40 0.18 8 1.39 0.29 6 1.16 0.23 6 1.16 0.22 6
SRI LANKA LKA 0.21 0.19 10 0.16 0.18 9 0.32 0.26 6 0.72 0.33 4 0.34 0.27 5
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 0.44 0.45 2 0.14 0.53 1 0.28 0.48 1 0.47 0.51 1 -0.14 0.59 1
ST. LUCIA LCA 0.46 0.45 2 0.14 0.53 1 0.28 0.48 1 0.47 0.51 1 -0.14 0.59 1
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 0.48 0.45 2 0.14 0.53 1 0.28 0.48 1 0.34 0.51 1 -0.21 0.59 1
SUDAN SDN -1.04 0.21 8 -1.19 0.19 7 -0.84 0.26 5 -1.14 0.39 3 -1.67 0.29 4
SURINAME SUR -0.52 0.30 4 -0.61 0.25 3 -0.97 0.54 2 -0.70 0.52 2 -0.86 0.49 2
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.36 0.25 7 -0.14 0.23 5 -0.37 0.31 3 0.21 0.30 3 0.02 0.43 2
SWEDEN SWE 1.54 0.21 8 1.70 0.18 7 1.39 0.29 6 1.14 0.23 5 1.46 0.22 6
SWITZERLAND CHE 1.55 0.21 8 1.62 0.18 7 1.55 0.29 5 1.18 0.23 6 1.41 0.22 6
SYRIA SYR -1.21 0.21 7 -0.94 0.19 6 -0.78 0.37 3 -1.13 0.40 3 -1.03 0.29 4
TAIWAN TWN 1.29 0.19 9 1.04 0.18 8 0.95 0.27 6 1.11 0.23 5 1.17 0.22 6
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.16 0.22 9 -1.26 0.21 8 -1.33 0.27 5 -1.71 0.25 4 -1.88 0.38 3
TANZANIA TZA -0.55 0.18 11 -0.50 0.18 8 0.07 0.26 6 0.21 0.26 6 -0.52 0.27 5
THAILAND THA -0.01 0.18 10 0.31 0.17 9 0.70 0.24 8 0.27 0.21 7 0.49 0.21 7
TIMOR, EAST TMP -0.43 0.57 2 -1.25 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -0.77 0.23 7 -0.61 0.22 5 -0.47 0.29 4 -0.64 0.39 4 0.24 0.52 2
TONGA TON -0.43 0.43 3 -1.22 0.46 2 -0.18 0.37 2 -1.09 0.51 1 -0.14 0.59 1
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.61 0.21 7 0.66 0.19 6 0.81 0.34 5 0.82 0.39 3 0.44 0.29 4
TUNISIA TUN -0.22 0.18 10 -0.03 0.18 9 0.37 0.26 6 0.50 0.26 5 0.05 0.27 5
TURKEY TUR -0.07 0.18 11 0.05 0.17 10 0.24 0.24 8 0.86 0.21 7 0.51 0.21 7
TURKMENISTAN TKM -2.22 0.23 7 -1.89 0.21 6 -2.18 0.31 4 -2.45 0.25 4 -2.68 0.38 3
TUVALU TUV 0.76 0.57 2 0.35 0.69 1 0.43 0.50 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
UGANDA UGA 0.07 0.18 11 -0.02 0.18 8 0.16 0.26 6 0.42 0.26 6 0.10 0.27 5
UKRAINE UKR -0.48 0.18 11 -0.62 0.17 10 -1.22 0.28 7 -0.89 0.20 7 -0.59 0.23 6
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0.95 0.21 7 0.98 0.19 7 0.53 0.37 3 0.43 0.40 3 1.02 0.29 4
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.62 0.21 8 1.78 0.18 8 1.69 0.27 7 1.60 0.23 6 1.82 0.22 6
UNITED STATES USA 1.22 0.21 8 1.48 0.18 8 1.53 0.27 7 1.51 0.23 6 1.56 0.22 6
URUGUAY URY 0.30 0.19 9 0.47 0.18 8 1.05 0.27 7 1.02 0.33 4 0.97 0.27 5
UZBEKISTAN UZB -2.10 0.19 10 -1.44 0.18 9 -1.40 0.27 6 -1.82 0.25 5 -1.44 0.28 4
VANUATU VUT -0.33 0.43 3 -1.20 0.46 2 -0.74 0.37 2 -0.31 0.51 1 -0.06 0.59 1
VENEZUELA VEN -1.24 0.18 10 -0.54 0.17 9 -0.55 0.24 8 0.13 0.21 7 -0.08 0.21 7
VIETNAM VNM -0.57 0.19 10 -0.68 0.18 9 -0.65 0.26 6 -0.58 0.25 5 -0.56 0.24 6
VIRGIN ISLANDS (U.S.) VIR 0 . 9 6 0 . 6 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
WEST BANK WBG -1.02 0.51 2 -0.98 0.29 2 0.66 0.96 1 -0.16 0.98 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -1.04 0.20 7 -0.61 0.19 6 -0.43 0.38 3 -0.39 0.39 3 -0.72 0.29 4
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.49 0.18 11 -0.56 0.18 8 0.33 0.26 6 0.32 0.26 6 0.27 0.27 5




















































TABLE C5: Rule of Law
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.81 0.17 7 -1.62 0.23 4 -2.31 0.40 2 -1.13 0.72 1 -1.19 0.74 1
ALBANIA ALB -0.80 0.15 9 -0.94 0.17 8 -0.76 0.17 8 -0.93 0.21 7 -0.32 0.25 5
ALGERIA DZA -0.73 0.13 13 -0.62 0.14 11 -0.80 0.18 9 -0.79 0.21 7 -0.62 0.18 6
A M E R I C A N  S A M O A A S M0 . 8 0 0 . 3 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
A N D O R R A A D O1 . 4 3 0 . 3 0 2 1 . 5 2 0 . 3 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ANGOLA AGO -1.33 0.14 11 -1.53 0.15 10 -1.47 0.18 9 -1.45 0.21 8 -1.44 0.18 6
ANGUILLA AIA 1.00 0.31 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
A N T I G U A  A N D  B A R B U D AA T G0 . 9 1 0 . 3 0 2 0 . 9 9 0 . 3 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ARGENTINA ARG -0.71 0.12 15 -0.78 0.13 15 0.17 0.14 14 0.17 0.17 11 0.28 0.15 10
ARMENIA ARM -0.58 0.14 12 -0.48 0.15 10 -0.52 0.16 9 -0.35 0.19 8 -0.46 0.22 5
A R U B A A B W 1 . 0 0 0 . 3 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.82 0.13 12 1.80 0.13 11 1.98 0.16 10 1.99 0.19 9 1.89 0.15 9
AUSTRIA AUT 1.76 0.13 11 1.87 0.13 11 2.08 0.16 10 2.10 0.18 10 1.98 0.15 9
AZERBAIJAN AZE -0.85 0.12 15 -0.84 0.13 13 -0.99 0.15 11 -0.81 0.18 9 -0.86 0.16 6
BAHAMAS BHS 1.28 0.22 4 1.30 0.25 3 1.09 0.39 2 0.99 0.41 2 0.80 0.44 2
BAHRAIN BHR 0.68 0.14 11 0.90 0.14 9 0.77 0.21 7 1.03 0.24 6 0.74 0.18 6
BANGLADESH BGD -0.86 0.13 13 -0.74 0.13 12 -0.65 0.18 10 -0.72 0.21 7 -0.68 0.18 6
BARBADOS BRB 1.21 0.22 4 1.38 0.26 2 1.34 0.45 1 0.55 0.48 1 -0.28 0.52 1
BELARUS BLR -1.31 0.14 11 -1.13 0.16 9 -0.99 0.17 9 -1.08 0.21 7 -1.01 0.26 4
BELGIUM BEL 1.47 0.13 11 1.46 0.13 11 1.62 0.16 10 1.29 0.19 9 1.65 0.15 9
BELIZE BLZ 0.25 0.20 5 0.02 0.23 4 0.38 0.28 4 0.03 0.32 3 0.70 0.47 2
BENIN BEN -0.47 0.17 9 -0.38 0.21 6 -0.39 0.25 5 -0.38 0.29 4 -0.01 0.47 2
B E R M U D A B M U 1 . 1 0 0 . 3 1 1 1 . 2 5 0 . 3 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
BHUTAN BTN 0.27 0.23 5 0.22 0.24 4 -0.39 0.35 3 -0.07 0.39 2 -1.19 0.74 1
BOLIVIA BOL -0.55 0.13 12 -0.65 0.14 12 -0.52 0.16 11 -0.35 0.20 9 -0.66 0.18 7
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.76 0.14 11 -0.86 0.16 10 -0.84 0.19 6 -1.04 0.24 4 -0.19 0.74 1
BOTSWANA BWA 0.73 0.13 14 0.68 0.14 12 0.67 0.20 9 0.66 0.24 7 0.80 0.20 5
BRAZIL BRA -0.21 0.12 15 -0.32 0.13 15 -0.16 0.14 13 -0.08 0.17 12 -0.26 0.15 10
BRUNEI BRN 0.56 0.28 3 0.61 0.29 3 0.93 0.54 2 0.91 0.54 2 0.71 0.56 2
BULGARIA BGR 0.05 0.12 14 0.01 0.13 14 -0.13 0.14 12 -0.22 0.18 9 -0.09 0.16 7
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.62 0.17 9 -0.51 0.21 6 -0.54 0.24 6 -0.42 0.29 5 -0.75 0.41 3
BURUNDI BDI -1.50 0.21 6 -1.43 0.25 4 -0.93 0.21 6 -0.85 0.32 3 -0.19 0.74 1
CAMBODIA KHM -0.98 0.17 9 -0.90 0.18 7 -0.77 0.22 6 -0.73 0.26 4 -0.91 0.37 2
CAMEROON CMR -1.00 0.14 10 -1.19 0.15 10 -1.06 0.20 9 -0.92 0.23 8 -1.18 0.20 5
CANADA CAN 1.75 0.13 12 1.77 0.13 13 1.99 0.15 12 1.98 0.18 10 1.87 0.15 9
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.26 0.20 6 0.17 0.22 4 0.47 0.28 3 0.67 0.33 2 0.09 0.52 1
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S C Y M 1 . 1 7 0 . 3 1 1 1 . 5 2 0 . 3 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.44 0.18 7 -1.03 0.22 5 -0.66 0.32 3 -0.87 0.39 2 -0.19 0.74 1
CHAD TCD -1.15 0.16 9 -0.82 0.21 6 -0.81 0.27 4 -0.98 0.29 4 -0.19 0.74 1
CHILE CHL 1.16 0.12 15 1.24 0.13 14 1.31 0.14 14 1.27 0.17 11 1.26 0.15 10
CHINA CHN -0.47 0.12 14 -0.26 0.13 13 -0.33 0.14 12 -0.22 0.18 10 -0.45 0.15 9
COLOMBIA COL -0.70 0.12 15 -0.82 0.13 14 -0.65 0.14 14 -0.66 0.17 12 -0.46 0.15 10
COMOROS COM -1.04 0.25 4 -1.00 0.26 3 -1.19 0.33 2 -0.97 0.42 1 .. .. ..
CONGO COG -1.18 0.17 9 -1.23 0.18 9 -1.19 0.20 7 -1.23 0.23 6 -1.27 0.30 4
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.74 0.14 11 -1.81 0.18 9 -1.86 0.19 8 -1.97 0.23 6 -1.82 0.28 5
COOK ISLANDS COK 0.57 0.57 1 0.91 0.47 1 0.75 0.71 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
COSTA RICA CRI 0.57 0.13 14 0.67 0.14 13 0.78 0.16 11 0.90 0.18 10 0.64 0.17 8
CROATIA HRV 0.07 0.12 13 0.09 0.13 13 0.14 0.15 10 -0.04 0.18 8 -0.53 0.16 6
CUBA CUB -1.12 0.14 10 -0.96 0.15 9 -0.64 0.21 7 -0.50 0.24 6 -0.74 0.18 6
CYPRUS CYP 0.85 0.14 9 0.81 0.15 8 0.99 0.21 6 0.88 0.24 6 0.61 0.18 6
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.69 0.11 15 0.69 0.12 14 0.59 0.13 13 0.62 0.15 12 0.64 0.14 10
DENMARK DNK 1.91 0.13 12 1.93 0.13 12 1.95 0.16 11 1.99 0.19 9 2.03 0.15 9
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.61 0.21 5 -0.57 0.22 4 -0.55 0.28 3 -0.33 0.33 2 .. .. ..
DOMINICA DMA 0.66 0.26 3 0.65 0.28 2 -0.32 0.39 1 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.54 0.13 12 -0.42 0.14 11 -0.20 0.16 10 -0.06 0.22 6 -0.52 0.19 5
ECUADOR ECU -0.71 0.13 13 -0.65 0.13 12 -0.67 0.15 12 -0.67 0.19 10 -0.39 0.17 8
EGYPT EGY -0.02 0.12 14 0.05 0.13 13 0.21 0.15 12 0.17 0.18 10 0.23 0.16 8
EL SALVADOR SLV -0.34 0.15 11 -0.43 0.16 9 -0.45 0.19 9 -0.15 0.23 7 -0.48 0.19 6
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.05 0.20 6 -1.22 0.21 5 -1.51 0.28 3 -1.69 0.33 2 .. .. ..
ERITREA ERI -0.78 0.20 7 -0.44 0.24 5 -0.07 0.30 4 -0.05 0.39 2 -0.19 0.74 1
ESTONIA EST 0.91 0.12 15 0.78 0.12 14 0.71 0.13 13 0.54 0.18 9 0.35 0.16 6
ETHIOPIA ETH -1.00 0.14 12 -0.44 0.20 8 -0.38 0.23 7 -0.23 0.29 5 -0.27 0.41 3
FIJI FJI -0.19 0.20 5 -0.38 0.22 5 -0.69 0.30 3 -0.40 0.29 4 0.09 0.47 2
FINLAND FIN 1.97 0.13 11 1.96 0.13 12 2.11 0.16 11 2.06 0.19 9 2.08 0.15 9
FRANCE FRA 1.33 0.13 12 1.30 0.13 12 1.47 0.15 12 1.44 0.18 10 1.65 0.15 9
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.50 0.31 1 0.99 0.32 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.51 0.13 11 -0.26 0.14 10 -0.57 0.18 9 -0.48 0.22 6 -0.31 0.19 5
GAMBIA GMB -0.32 0.17 9 -0.53 0.20 7 -0.34 0.25 5 -0.29 0.29 4 0.25 0.56 2
GEORGIA GEO -0.87 0.13 13 -1.20 0.15 11 -0.57 0.16 9 -0.74 0.19 7 -0.84 0.22 5




















































TABLE C5: Rule of Law (cont.)
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
GHANA GHA -0.16 0.12 15 -0.16 0.14 12 -0.08 0.18 10 -0.06 0.20 9 -0.12 0.18 6
GREECE GRC 0.75 0.13 11 0.77 0.13 11 0.73 0.16 9 0.66 0.19 9 0.78 0.15 9
GRENADA GRD 0.46 0.26 3 0.25 0.28 2 0.39 0.39 1 0.30 0.42 1 .. .. ..
GUAM GUM 0.90 0.31 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GUATEMALA GTM -0.96 0.13 14 -0.84 0.14 12 -0.77 0.17 10 -0.70 0.20 8 -0.64 0.18 7
GUINEA GIN -1.09 0.18 8 -0.73 0.21 7 -0.96 0.25 5 -0.89 0.27 5 -1.08 0.41 3
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -1.26 0.19 7 -1.07 0.20 7 -1.27 0.24 6 -1.24 0.27 5 -1.59 0.56 2
GUYANA GUY -0.48 0.20 6 -0.46 0.22 5 -0.14 0.26 5 0.06 0.29 4 0.01 0.41 3
HAITI HTI -1.66 0.18 9 -1.78 0.19 7 -1.50 0.25 6 -0.99 0.29 4 -1.23 0.41 3
HONDURAS HND -0.61 0.14 13 -0.77 0.14 11 -0.89 0.17 10 -0.56 0.20 8 -0.85 0.18 7
HONG KONG HKG 1.42 0.13 9 1.21 0.14 10 1.64 0.17 8 1.73 0.20 8 1.71 0.16 7
HUNGARY HUN 0.85 0.11 16 0.84 0.12 15 0.84 0.13 14 0.78 0.15 12 0.66 0.14 10
ICELAND ISL 2.01 0.16 8 1.96 0.18 7 2.06 0.19 7 1.90 0.23 6 1.70 0.24 5
INDIA IND -0.09 0.12 14 0.04 0.13 14 0.22 0.14 12 0.21 0.17 11 -0.01 0.15 9
INDONESIA IDN -0.91 0.12 16 -0.89 0.12 15 -0.93 0.14 13 -0.97 0.18 10 -0.36 0.15 9
IRAN IRN -0.83 0.13 12 -0.57 0.14 11 -0.44 0.19 8 -0.49 0.22 7 -0.77 0.17 7
IRAQ IRQ -1.97 0.15 8 -1.65 0.15 8 -1.50 0.21 7 -1.68 0.24 6 -1.57 0.18 6
IRELAND IRL 1.62 0.13 12 1.68 0.13 12 1.84 0.16 11 1.81 0.18 10 1.77 0.15 9
ISRAEL ISR 0.77 0.13 11 0.90 0.13 12 1.07 0.17 9 1.08 0.20 8 1.18 0.15 9
ITALY ITA 0.74 0.13 11 0.79 0.13 12 0.93 0.15 12 1.07 0.18 10 0.89 0.15 9
IVORY COAST CIV -1.42 0.14 11 -1.24 0.15 10 -0.57 0.20 8 -0.52 0.23 8 -0.69 0.20 5
JAMAICA JAM -0.32 0.14 10 -0.46 0.15 9 -0.15 0.18 7 -0.24 0.21 7 -0.21 0.19 5
JAPAN JPN 1.39 0.13 12 1.37 0.13 13 1.80 0.16 11 1.72 0.20 8 1.60 0.15 9
JORDAN JOR 0.30 0.13 13 0.34 0.14 10 0.55 0.16 9 0.60 0.19 9 0.20 0.17 7
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -0.98 0.12 15 -0.92 0.13 13 -0.77 0.14 12 -0.80 0.17 10 -0.73 0.16 6
KENYA KEN -0.98 0.12 16 -1.03 0.14 11 -0.94 0.17 10 -1.02 0.20 9 -0.77 0.18 6
KIRIBATI KIR 0.25 0.24 4 0.62 0.36 2 0.02 0.37 2 -0.65 0.42 1 .. .. ..
KOREA, NORTH PRK -1.15 0.16 7 -0.98 0.23 5 -1.08 0.34 4 -1.21 0.38 3 -1.04 0.41 3
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.67 0.12 14 0.83 0.13 14 0.64 0.15 12 0.82 0.17 11 0.81 0.15 9
KUWAIT KWT 0.65 0.14 9 0.79 0.14 10 1.18 0.21 6 1.16 0.24 6 0.65 0.18 6
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -1.04 0.13 13 -0.77 0.15 11 -0.90 0.16 8 -0.67 0.19 7 -0.69 0.24 4
LAOS LAO -1.27 0.17 8 -0.96 0.18 7 -1.00 0.22 6 -1.07 0.26 4 -1.36 0.32 3
LATVIA LVA 0.48 0.12 13 0.42 0.13 12 0.24 0.14 10 0.08 0.18 9 0.19 0.16 6
LEBANON LBN -0.32 0.14 10 -0.28 0.14 10 -0.10 0.19 8 0.16 0.21 7 -0.27 0.18 6
LESOTHO LSO -0.03 0.16 9 -0.08 0.19 7 -0.05 0.27 4 -0.13 0.31 4 -0.31 0.47 2
LIBERIA LBR -1.76 0.24 5 -1.62 0.25 5 -1.55 0.28 5 -1.79 0.35 3 -2.15 0.56 2
LIBYA LBY -0.65 0.14 9 -0.83 0.15 8 -0.91 0.21 6 -1.11 0.24 6 -1.00 0.18 6
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.36 0.30 2 1.52 0.32 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.60 0.12 14 0.45 0.13 13 0.25 0.14 12 0.19 0.18 9 -0.15 0.16 6
LUXEMBOURG LUX 1.98 0.18 7 2.05 0.21 7 2.07 0.29 5 1.92 0.27 5 1.78 0.26 5
MACAO MAC 1.49 0.31 1 0.73 0.32 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.44 0.13 11 -0.45 0.14 9 -0.32 0.20 5 -0.33 0.23 5 -0.56 0.19 3
MADAGASCAR MDG -0.30 0.17 9 -0.25 0.21 6 -0.67 0.23 7 -1.01 0.27 5 -0.85 0.41 3
MALAWI MWI -0.29 0.13 13 -0.44 0.15 10 -0.46 0.19 9 -0.51 0.21 8 -0.20 0.19 5
MALAYSIA MYS 0.52 0.12 15 0.52 0.13 14 0.53 0.14 13 0.82 0.17 11 0.85 0.15 9
MALDIVES MDV -0.57 0.24 4 0.28 0.25 3 -0.64 0.37 2 -0.65 0.42 1 .. .. ..
MALI MLI -0.34 0.15 12 -0.47 0.19 9 -0.71 0.24 6 -0.57 0.27 5 -0.77 0.41 3
MALTA MLT 1.23 0.19 6 1.06 0.25 3 0.74 0.39 2 0.69 0.41 2 0.04 0.44 2
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL -0.11 0.36 3 -0.05 0.36 2 -0.58 0.37 2 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
M A R T I N I Q U E M T Q 0 . 9 5 0 . 3 1 1 1 . 2 5 0 . 3 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MAURITANIA MRT -0.62 0.20 6 -0.38 0.22 5 -0.53 0.25 5 -0.48 0.32 3 -0.61 0.47 2
MAURITIUS MUS 0.84 0.14 9 0.86 0.15 8 0.86 0.17 8 0.96 0.22 7 0.71 0.20 3
MEXICO MEX -0.26 0.12 16 -0.31 0.13 15 -0.38 0.14 14 -0.38 0.17 12 -0.12 0.15 10
MICRONESIA FSM 0.40 0.24 4 -0.22 0.36 2 -0.54 0.37 2 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.65 0.12 12 -0.53 0.14 10 -0.55 0.15 10 -0.13 0.18 9 -0.20 0.16 6
MONACO MCO 0.77 0.71 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MONGOLIA MNG 0.18 0.17 9 0.34 0.20 7 0.22 0.25 6 0.02 0.23 5 0.48 0.41 3
MOROCCO MAR -0.05 0.13 14 0.07 0.13 12 0.30 0.18 8 0.53 0.20 9 0.19 0.17 7
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.60 0.13 14 -0.59 0.18 9 -0.65 0.20 7 -1.02 0.23 7 -1.24 0.30 4
MYANMAR MMR -1.62 0.15 9 -1.61 0.16 8 -1.15 0.25 6 -1.06 0.28 5 -1.32 0.20 5
NAMIBIA NAM 0.22 0.13 14 0.43 0.14 12 1.06 0.22 8 1.14 0.26 6 0.36 0.22 3
NAURU NRU 0.77 0.71 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
NEPAL NPL -0.82 0.14 11 -0.42 0.18 8 -0.36 0.22 6 -0.25 0.26 4 -0.36 0.32 3
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.78 0.13 11 1.80 0.13 12 1.95 0.16 11 2.02 0.19 9 1.94 0.15 9
N E T H E R L A N D S  A N T I L L E S A N T 0 . 7 5 0 . 3 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.93 0.13 10 1.86 0.14 9 1.97 0.17 9 2.17 0.20 8 2.08 0.16 8
NICARAGUA NIC -0.65 0.14 13 -0.67 0.15 10 -0.91 0.19 9 -0.82 0.23 7 -0.68 0.19 6
NIGER NER -0.92 0.18 8 -0.80 0.21 6 -0.82 0.24 6 -0.70 0.29 4 -1.25 0.41 3




















































TABLE C5: Rule of Law (cont.)
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
NORWAY NOR 1.95 0.13 11 1.92 0.13 11 1.99 0.16 10 2.21 0.19 9 2.10 0.15 9
OMAN OMN 0.98 0.14 9 0.83 0.14 10 1.24 0.21 7 1.27 0.24 6 1.12 0.18 6
PALAU PCI 0.77 0.71 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PAKISTAN PAK -0.78 0.12 14 -0.71 0.14 12 -0.62 0.17 11 -0.72 0.18 9 -0.44 0.17 7
PANAMA PAN -0.04 0.13 13 -0.03 0.14 13 -0.04 0.16 11 -0.03 0.21 8 0.26 0.18 7
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.82 0.14 11 -0.93 0.15 9 -0.43 0.18 9 -0.32 0.22 6 -0.33 0.20 4
PARAGUAY PRY -1.09 0.14 12 -1.16 0.14 11 -0.83 0.18 9 -0.75 0.21 8 -0.50 0.19 6
PERU PER -0.63 0.12 14 -0.50 0.13 14 -0.53 0.15 13 -0.48 0.18 11 -0.35 0.16 9
PHILIPPINES PHL -0.62 0.12 14 -0.55 0.13 13 -0.51 0.14 13 -0.04 0.18 10 -0.11 0.15 9
POLAND POL 0.51 0.11 16 0.58 0.12 16 0.62 0.13 14 0.57 0.15 12 0.46 0.14 10
PORTUGAL PRT 1.16 0.13 11 1.26 0.13 11 1.14 0.16 10 1.30 0.18 10 1.35 0.15 9
PUERTO RICO PRI 0.74 0.23 3 1.11 0.25 2 1.08 0.43 1 0.89 0.54 1 0.75 0.60 1
QATAR QAT 0.79 0.16 8 0.82 0.16 6 1.09 0.25 5 1.39 0.29 4 0.95 0.22 3
REUNION REU 0.87 0.31 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ROMANIA ROM -0.18 0.12 15 -0.15 0.13 14 -0.22 0.14 12 -0.25 0.18 8 -0.29 0.16 7
RUSSIA RUS -0.70 0.11 16 -0.84 0.12 16 -0.87 0.13 14 -0.78 0.15 12 -0.84 0.14 10
RWANDA RWA -0.90 0.19 7 -0.94 0.21 6 -0.83 0.25 5 -1.20 0.32 3 -0.19 0.74 1
SAMOA SAM 0.62 0.24 4 1.04 0.25 3 -0.01 0.30 3 -0.97 0.42 1 .. .. ..
SAN MARINO SMR 0 . 7 7 0 . 7 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP -0.55 0.25 4 -0.52 0.26 3 -0.69 0.33 2 -0.97 0.42 1 .. .. ..
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 0.20 0.13 11 0.40 0.14 11 0.62 0.19 8 0.89 0.22 7 0.75 0.17 7
SENEGAL SEN -0.20 0.13 13 -0.23 0.15 10 -0.34 0.19 9 -0.26 0.21 7 -0.17 0.19 5
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO YUG -0.72 0.14 11 -0.95 0.14 10 -0.98 0.22 4 -0.91 0.27 4 -1.20 0.22 3
SEYCHELLES SYC -0.17 0.23 5 0.48 0.26 3 -0.44 0.33 2 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
SIERRA LEONE SLE -1.10 0.18 9 -1.23 0.23 6 -0.90 0.24 6 -0.72 0.29 4 -1.02 0.41 3
SINGAPORE SGP 1.82 0.12 12 1.71 0.13 11 2.10 0.16 11 2.24 0.18 10 2.13 0.15 9
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.49 0.12 14 0.35 0.12 13 0.30 0.13 12 0.13 0.17 10 0.12 0.15 8
SLOVENIA SVN 0.93 0.12 15 1.06 0.12 14 0.87 0.13 12 0.91 0.18 8 0.52 0.16 6
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -1.15 0.24 4 -1.53 0.36 2 -1.34 0.37 2 -0.65 0.42 1 .. .. ..
SOMALIA SOM -2.31 0.24 5 -2.04 0.27 4 -1.72 0.26 5 -1.80 0.29 4 -1.69 0.56 2
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.32 0.11 17 0.11 0.12 16 0.28 0.14 14 0.21 0.17 12 0.35 0.15 9
SPAIN ESP 1.12 0.13 12 1.12 0.13 13 1.36 0.15 12 1.35 0.18 10 1.23 0.15 9
SRI LANKA LKA -0.03 0.13 14 0.22 0.13 12 -0.17 0.16 10 -0.11 0.21 7 0.29 0.18 6
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 0.71 0.26 3 0.31 0.49 1 0.39 0.39 1 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
ST. LUCIA LCA 0.75 0.26 3 0.31 0.49 1 0.39 0.39 1 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 0.76 0.26 3 0.63 0.49 1 0.39 0.39 1 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
SUDAN SDN -1.59 0.15 10 -1.30 0.16 9 -1.10 0.20 8 -1.31 0.26 5 -1.46 0.21 4
SURINAME SUR -0.25 0.21 5 -0.32 0.25 3 -0.62 0.39 2 -0.73 0.41 2 -0.83 0.44 2
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.95 0.16 8 -0.64 0.19 6 -0.08 0.27 4 -0.17 0.31 4 0.40 0.47 2
SWEDEN SWE 1.85 0.13 12 1.88 0.13 12 1.96 0.15 12 1.95 0.19 9 2.03 0.15 9
SWITZERLAND CHE 1.98 0.13 11 1.98 0.13 11 2.20 0.16 11 2.36 0.18 10 2.17 0.15 9
SYRIA SYR -0.40 0.14 10 -0.40 0.15 9 -0.33 0.21 7 -0.25 0.24 6 -0.53 0.18 6
TAIWAN TWN 0.83 0.12 13 0.87 0.13 12 0.86 0.16 11 1.17 0.19 9 1.02 0.15 9
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.18 0.14 11 -1.29 0.16 10 -1.28 0.17 7 -1.42 0.23 5 -1.41 0.29 3
TANZANIA TZA -0.49 0.12 15 -0.46 0.14 12 -0.28 0.17 10 -0.28 0.20 9 -0.70 0.18 6
THAILAND THA -0.05 0.12 14 0.23 0.13 13 0.41 0.15 12 0.40 0.17 11 0.49 0.15 9
TIMOR, EAST TMP -0.60 0.27 4 -1.12 0.32 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -1.01 0.18 8 -0.69 0.21 6 -0.93 0.25 5 -0.83 0.27 5 -1.23 0.56 2
TONGA TON -0.11 0.24 4 0.04 0.36 2 -0.39 0.37 2 -0.65 0.42 1 .. .. ..
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.17 0.14 9 0.30 0.15 8 0.47 0.18 8 0.38 0.22 6 0.36 0.19 5
TUNISIA TUN 0.24 0.13 13 0.28 0.13 12 0.44 0.17 10 0.44 0.21 8 0.07 0.18 6
TURKEY TUR 0.04 0.12 15 -0.05 0.13 15 0.05 0.14 13 0.19 0.17 11 0.03 0.15 9
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.43 0.14 9 -1.15 0.16 8 -1.13 0.16 6 -1.19 0.20 6 -1.20 0.24 4
TUVALU TUV 0.76 0.27 3 1.79 0.47 1 1.49 0.71 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
UGANDA UGA -0.79 0.12 16 -0.76 0.14 12 -0.58 0.17 10 -0.11 0.20 9 -0.88 0.18 6
UKRAINE UKR -0.83 0.12 16 -0.84 0.12 14 -0.72 0.13 12 -0.76 0.16 11 -0.67 0.15 8
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0.85 0.14 9 0.97 0.14 9 1.41 0.21 6 1.27 0.24 6 0.78 0.18 6
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.71 0.13 12 1.76 0.13 13 1.91 0.15 12 2.05 0.18 10 1.94 0.15 9
UNITED STATES USA 1.58 0.13 11 1.62 0.13 12 1.90 0.16 11 1.77 0.18 10 1.79 0.15 9
URUGUAY URY 0.42 0.13 12 0.54 0.14 11 0.65 0.16 11 0.54 0.21 8 0.53 0.18 7
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.30 0.12 14 -1.23 0.13 12 -0.95 0.15 10 -1.04 0.18 8 -1.02 0.17 5
VANUATU VUT -0.07 0.24 4 -0.21 0.36 2 -0.28 0.37 2 -0.65 0.42 1 .. .. ..
VENEZUELA VEN -1.10 0.12 16 -1.06 0.13 14 -0.82 0.15 12 -0.64 0.17 12 -0.66 0.15 10
VIETNAM VNM -0.59 0.12 15 -0.42 0.13 13 -0.74 0.15 11 -0.81 0.18 9 -0.50 0.16 8
VIRGIN ISLANDS (U.S.) VIR 1 . 2 4 0 . 3 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
WEST BANK WBG -0.95 0.28 2 -0.32 0.30 2 0.33 0.67 1 1.38 0.56 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -1.11 0.14 11 -1.23 0.16 9 -0.90 0.20 7 -0.68 0.22 6 -1.04 0.19 5
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.54 0.12 15 -0.52 0.14 12 -0.44 0.17 10 -0.34 0.20 9 -0.35 0.18 6




















































TABLE C6: Control of Corruption
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.33 0.21 6 -1.32 0.27 3 -1.56 0.44 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
ALBANIA ALB -0.72 0.16 7 -0.83 0.18 6 -0.61 0.18 7 -0.92 0.20 5 0.05 0.42 2
ALGERIA DZA -0.49 0.14 10 -0.72 0.16 9 -0.62 0.20 7 -0.70 0.21 5 -0.34 0.24 4
A M E R I C A N  S A M O A A S M0 . 0 6 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
A N D O R R A A D O1 . 1 7 0 . 4 1 1 1 . 2 9 0 . 3 8 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ANGOLA AGO -1.12 0.15 9 -1.17 0.16 9 -1.44 0.20 7 -1.05 0.18 6 -1.00 0.24 4
ANGUILLA AIA 0.78 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
A N T I G U A  A N D  B A R B U D AA T G0 . 8 8 0 . 4 1 1 0 . 8 4 0 . 3 8 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ARGENTINA ARG -0.44 0.13 13 -0.78 0.14 12 -0.34 0.15 13 -0.22 0.16 10 -0.12 0.17 7
ARMENIA ARM -0.53 0.14 9 -0.69 0.16 8 -0.74 0.18 7 -0.71 0.18 6 -0.65 0.37 2
A R U B A A B W 1 . 1 7 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
AUSTRALIA AUS 2.02 0.13 11 1.87 0.14 10 2.07 0.18 8 2.21 0.19 7 1.86 0.17 7
AUSTRIA AUT 2.10 0.15 10 1.85 0.16 8 1.95 0.19 8 2.02 0.17 9 1.66 0.17 7
AZERBAIJAN AZE -1.04 0.12 12 -1.04 0.13 11 -1.06 0.13 10 -1.01 0.17 7 -0.97 0.25 3
BAHAMAS BHS 1.36 0.35 2 1.41 0.33 2 0.87 0.66 1 0.67 0.76 1 0.37 0.61 1
BAHRAIN BHR 0.76 0.17 8 0.96 0.17 7 0.38 0.22 5 0.41 0.26 4 0.08 0.24 4
BANGLADESH BGD -1.09 0.14 10 -0.95 0.14 10 -0.60 0.16 8 -0.40 0.21 5 -0.47 0.24 4
B A R B A D O S B R B0 . 8 1 0 . 3 4 2 1 . 2 9 0 . 3 8 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
BELARUS BLR -0.91 0.15 8 -0.76 0.17 7 -0.05 0.18 7 -0.60 0.19 6 -0.92 0.50 1
BELGIUM BEL 1.53 0.15 9 1.61 0.16 9 1.38 0.19 8 1.23 0.18 8 1.12 0.17 7
BELIZE BLZ -0.07 0.26 3 -0.24 0.31 2 0.18 0.36 2 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
BENIN BEN -0.34 0.19 6 -0.52 0.26 4 0.00 0.42 2 -0.76 0.31 2 .. .. ..
B E R M U D A B M U 0 . 8 8 0 . 4 1 1 1 . 2 9 0 . 3 8 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
BHUTAN BTN 0.69 0.22 4 0.88 0.22 3 0.55 0.24 2 0.46 0.37 1 .. .. ..
BOLIVIA BOL -0.78 0.15 10 -0.82 0.15 9 -0.65 0.17 9 -0.41 0.19 8 -0.87 0.24 4
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.54 0.14 9 -0.61 0.17 7 -0.48 0.22 4 -0.35 0.23 2 .. .. ..
BOTSWANA BWA 0.86 0.15 11 0.80 0.16 10 1.02 0.21 7 0.53 0.19 5 0.40 0.27 3
BRAZIL BRA -0.15 0.13 13 -0.06 0.14 12 0.04 0.15 12 0.10 0.16 11 -0.11 0.17 7
BRUNEI BRN 0.23 0.35 2 0.32 0.33 2 -0.12 0.66 1 0.06 0.76 1 0.37 0.61 1
BULGARIA BGR -0.04 0.12 12 -0.15 0.13 11 -0.13 0.14 11 -0.50 0.16 8 -0.67 0.24 4
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.35 0.20 6 0.13 0.26 4 -0.68 0.31 4 -0.51 0.23 3 -0.31 0.61 1
BURUNDI BDI -1.16 0.24 4 -0.98 0.28 3 -1.27 0.27 4 -0.80 0.37 1 .. .. ..
CAMBODIA KHM -0.97 0.19 6 -0.95 0.19 5 -0.72 0.20 4 -1.27 0.27 2 -0.94 0.47 1
CAMEROON CMR -0.78 0.17 8 -1.04 0.19 7 -1.05 0.22 7 -1.11 0.18 6 -1.10 0.27 3
CANADA CAN 1.99 0.14 11 2.05 0.15 10 2.32 0.17 10 2.51 0.18 8 2.14 0.17 7
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.31 0.25 4 0.46 0.28 3 0.32 0.42 2 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S C Y M 1 . 1 7 0 . 4 1 1 1 . 2 9 0 . 3 8 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.36 0.24 4 -1.17 0.28 3 -1.02 0.42 2 -0.55 0.37 1 .. .. ..
CHAD TCD -1.14 0.19 6 -0.94 0.27 4 -0.57 0.42 2 -0.84 0.31 2 .. .. ..
CHILE CHL 1.44 0.13 12 1.53 0.14 12 1.56 0.15 13 1.20 0.16 10 1.28 0.17 7
CHINA CHN -0.51 0.12 12 -0.35 0.13 12 -0.34 0.15 12 -0.14 0.14 9 -0.01 0.17 7
COLOMBIA COL -0.16 0.13 12 -0.51 0.14 11 -0.40 0.15 13 -0.61 0.16 11 -0.43 0.17 7
COMOROS COM -1.14 0.26 3 -0.92 0.28 3 -0.97 0.42 2 -0.80 0.37 1 .. .. ..
CONGO COG -1.02 0.18 7 -1.02 0.20 7 -0.98 0.25 5 -0.99 0.24 4 -0.81 0.40 2
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.31 0.15 9 -1.42 0.18 8 -1.49 0.22 6 -1.58 0.24 4 -1.98 0.33 3
COOK ISLANDS COK -0.24 0.41 1 0.03 0.31 1 -0.22 0.27 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
COSTA RICA CRI 0.78 0.14 12 0.91 0.15 10 1.05 0.16 9 0.71 0.17 9 0.76 0.22 5
CROATIA HRV 0.08 0.13 11 0.25 0.14 10 0.04 0.16 9 -0.33 0.17 6 -0.48 0.25 3
CUBA CUB -0.62 0.17 7 -0.16 0.17 7 -0.32 0.22 5 -0.29 0.26 4 0.01 0.24 4
CYPRUS CYP 0.80 0.16 7 0.89 0.18 6 1.11 0.24 4 1.38 0.26 4 1.58 0.24 4
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.30 0.12 13 0.36 0.13 12 0.40 0.14 13 0.35 0.14 10 0.59 0.17 7
DENMARK DNK 2.38 0.14 11 2.25 0.15 9 2.38 0.18 9 2.57 0.18 8 2.24 0.17 7
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.94 0.26 3 -0.72 0.28 3 -1.15 0.42 2 -0.80 0.37 1 .. .. ..
DOMINICA DMA 0.25 0.28 2 0.54 0.31 2 -0.19 0.46 1 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.50 0.15 9 -0.40 0.16 8 -0.30 0.18 8 -0.53 0.23 4 -0.33 0.26 3
ECUADOR ECU -0.75 0.15 11 -1.00 0.15 10 -0.96 0.16 11 -0.74 0.19 8 -0.75 0.23 5
EGYPT EGY -0.21 0.14 12 -0.28 0.15 11 -0.17 0.16 11 -0.25 0.16 8 0.11 0.22 6
EL SALVADOR SLV -0.39 0.17 8 -0.49 0.18 7 -0.16 0.19 7 -0.27 0.22 5 -0.75 0.27 3
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.65 0.24 4 -1.86 0.27 4 -2.05 0.42 2 -0.80 0.37 1 .. .. ..
ERITREA ERI -0.64 0.22 5 -0.09 0.26 4 0.08 0.33 3 0.46 0.37 1 .. .. ..
ESTONIA EST 0.82 0.12 13 0.72 0.13 12 0.78 0.14 12 0.49 0.16 8 0.05 0.25 3
ETHIOPIA ETH -0.85 0.16 9 -0.32 0.23 6 0.06 0.27 5 -0.25 0.23 3 -0.98 0.61 1
FIJI FJI -0.14 0.25 3 0.15 0.27 3 0.53 0.35 2 0.20 0.31 2 .. .. ..
FINLAND FIN 2.53 0.15 10 2.45 0.16 9 2.56 0.18 9 2.55 0.18 8 2.23 0.17 7
FRANCE FRA 1.44 0.14 11 1.39 0.15 10 1.48 0.17 9 1.75 0.18 8 1.39 0.17 7
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.59 0.41 1 0.84 0.38 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.58 0.15 9 -0.52 0.17 8 -0.74 0.20 7 -0.90 0.23 4 -1.24 0.26 3




















































TABLE C6: Control of Corruption (cont.)
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
GEORGIA GEO -0.91 0.13 11 -1.03 0.15 8 -0.71 0.16 8 -0.64 0.18 5 -1.05 0.37 2
GERMANY DEU 1.90 0.14 11 1.81 0.15 10 1.74 0.17 9 2.21 0.17 9 1.76 0.17 7
GHANA GHA -0.17 0.13 13 -0.39 0.16 10 -0.34 0.20 8 -0.44 0.17 7 -0.47 0.24 4
GREECE GRC 0.56 0.15 10 0.58 0.16 9 0.82 0.18 8 0.85 0.18 8 0.37 0.17 7
GRENADA GRD 0.52 0.28 2 0.73 0.31 2 0.19 0.46 1 -0.04 0.37 1 .. .. ..
GUAM GUM 0.45 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GUATEMALA GTM -0.74 0.15 12 -0.71 0.16 9 -0.64 0.17 9 -0.63 0.19 6 -0.96 0.24 4
GUINEA GIN -0.81 0.23 5 -0.66 0.25 5 -0.41 0.38 3 -0.82 0.30 3 0.37 0.61 1
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -0.71 0.22 5 -0.59 0.24 5 -0.53 0.31 4 -0.57 0.30 3 -0.98 0.61 1
GUYANA GUY -0.35 0.24 4 -0.48 0.28 3 -0.37 0.32 3 -0.26 0.35 2 -0.31 0.61 1
HAITI HTI -1.49 0.22 6 -1.68 0.23 5 -1.00 0.28 4 -0.85 0.35 2 -0.98 0.61 1
HONDURAS HND -0.71 0.15 10 -0.76 0.16 9 -0.64 0.18 8 -0.75 0.19 6 -0.97 0.24 4
HONG KONG HKG 1.57 0.13 10 1.43 0.14 9 1.52 0.17 9 1.73 0.14 9 1.50 0.17 6
HUNGARY HUN 0.65 0.12 13 0.59 0.13 13 0.78 0.13 14 0.69 0.14 11 0.63 0.17 7
ICELAND ISL 2.43 0.17 7 2.19 0.20 5 2.49 0.24 5 2.33 0.23 4 1.77 0.22 4
INDIA IND -0.31 0.12 13 -0.36 0.13 12 -0.25 0.15 12 -0.17 0.13 11 -0.31 0.17 7
INDONESIA IDN -0.90 0.12 15 -1.15 0.12 13 -1.00 0.13 13 -0.95 0.14 9 -0.47 0.17 7
IRAN IRN -0.59 0.15 9 -0.36 0.16 9 -0.59 0.22 6 -0.63 0.25 5 -0.83 0.23 5
IRAQ IRQ -1.45 0.18 6 -1.44 0.18 6 -1.18 0.22 5 -1.37 0.26 4 -1.36 0.24 4
IRELAND IRL 1.61 0.14 11 1.67 0.15 9 1.57 0.18 9 2.15 0.17 9 1.84 0.17 7
ISRAEL ISR 0.79 0.14 10 1.03 0.15 9 1.27 0.17 8 1.41 0.19 7 1.48 0.17 7
ITALY ITA 0.66 0.15 10 0.80 0.16 9 0.91 0.16 11 1.00 0.17 9 0.46 0.17 7
IVORY COAST CIV -1.01 0.17 8 -0.92 0.18 8 -0.60 0.22 6 -0.35 0.18 6 0.41 0.27 3
JAMAICA JAM -0.52 0.16 7 -0.45 0.17 7 -0.17 0.22 5 -0.26 0.21 5 -0.33 0.26 3
JAPAN JPN 1.19 0.13 12 1.20 0.14 11 1.39 0.16 11 1.16 0.15 9 1.22 0.17 7
JORDAN JOR 0.35 0.14 10 0.04 0.16 8 0.15 0.19 7 0.21 0.18 7 -0.10 0.22 5
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -1.10 0.13 12 -1.06 0.14 11 -0.85 0.16 10 -0.86 0.16 8 -0.85 0.24 4
KENYA KEN -0.89 0.13 14 -1.09 0.16 9 -1.04 0.18 9 -0.92 0.17 7 -1.05 0.24 4
KIRIBATI KIR -0.02 0.24 3 0.20 0.27 2 -0.21 0.24 2 -0.55 0.37 1 .. .. ..
KOREA, NORTH PRK -1.46 0.23 4 -1.17 0.29 3 -0.93 0.41 2 -0.55 0.76 1 -0.31 0.61 1
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.17 0.12 13 0.36 0.13 11 0.37 0.15 12 0.11 0.13 11 0.54 0.17 7
KUWAIT KWT 0.71 0.17 7 1.01 0.16 8 0.90 0.24 4 1.07 0.26 4 0.63 0.24 4
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -0.92 0.13 10 -0.83 0.14 9 -0.85 0.15 7 -0.69 0.18 5 -0.79 0.37 2
LAOS LAO -1.15 0.19 5 -0.97 0.19 5 -0.81 0.20 4 -0.70 0.27 2 -0.94 0.47 1
LATVIA LVA 0.23 0.13 11 0.09 0.14 10 0.04 0.15 9 -0.10 0.16 8 -0.56 0.25 3
LEBANON LBN -0.51 0.16 7 -0.37 0.16 8 -0.50 0.20 6 -0.32 0.21 5 -0.18 0.24 4
LESOTHO LSO -0.05 0.18 7 -0.18 0.23 5 0.32 0.42 2 0.03 0.24 2 .. .. ..
LIBERIA LBR -0.86 0.30 3 -1.30 0.27 4 -1.29 0.31 4 -1.44 0.35 2 -1.66 0.61 1
LIBYA LBY -0.91 0.18 6 -0.79 0.18 6 -0.91 0.24 4 -0.91 0.26 4 -0.90 0.24 4
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.69 0.41 1 1.29 0.38 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.36 0.12 12 0.26 0.13 11 0.29 0.14 12 0.07 0.17 7 -0.13 0.25 3
LUXEMBOURG LUX 2.16 0.20 6 2.17 0.25 4 2.07 0.36 3 2.17 0.26 4 1.80 0.24 3
M A C A O M A C 1 . 6 5 0 . 4 1 1 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 3 8 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MACEDONIA MKD -0.52 0.14 9 -0.73 0.16 6 -0.45 0.21 4 -0.30 0.20 4 -0.99 0.33 1
MADAGASCAR MDG -0.15 0.21 6 0.05 0.26 4 -0.76 0.27 5 -0.80 0.30 3 0.37 0.61 1
MALAWI MWI -0.83 0.14 10 -0.85 0.17 8 -0.21 0.20 7 -0.50 0.18 6 -0.99 0.26 3
MALAYSIA MYS 0.29 0.12 14 0.36 0.13 12 0.28 0.16 11 0.73 0.14 10 0.51 0.17 7
MALDIVES MDV 0.12 0.24 3 -0.05 0.22 3 -0.45 0.24 2 -0.55 0.37 1 .. .. ..
MALI MLI -0.52 0.17 9 -0.11 0.22 7 -0.54 0.31 4 -0.58 0.30 3 -0.31 0.61 1
MALTA MLT 1.25 0.26 4 0.80 0.33 2 0.21 0.66 1 0.67 0.76 1 0.37 0.61 1
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL -0.84 0.28 2 -1.06 0.27 2 -0.73 0.24 2 -0.55 0.37 1 .. .. ..
M A R T I N I Q U E M T Q 0 . 6 9 0 . 4 1 1 0 . 8 4 0 . 3 8 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MAURITANIA MRT 0.02 0.24 4 0.20 0.28 3 -0.66 0.33 3 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
MAURITIUS MUS 0.33 0.15 7 0.49 0.18 6 0.59 0.20 6 0.20 0.18 5 0.48 0.28 2
MEXICO MEX -0.27 0.13 14 -0.21 0.14 12 -0.36 0.15 13 -0.39 0.16 10 -0.34 0.17 7
MICRONESIA FSM -0.30 0.24 3 -0.26 0.27 2 -0.35 0.24 2 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.86 0.13 10 -0.90 0.14 8 -0.84 0.15 9 -0.51 0.17 7 -0.21 0.25 3
MONGOLIA MNG -0.51 0.20 6 0.11 0.20 5 -0.21 0.21 4 -0.28 0.23 3 0.37 0.61 1
MOROCCO MAR -0.02 0.14 11 -0.05 0.16 9 0.37 0.21 6 -0.10 0.17 7 0.22 0.23 5
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.79 0.14 11 -0.84 0.20 7 -0.32 0.25 5 -0.77 0.19 5 -0.52 0.40 2
MYANMAR MMR -1.49 0.19 6 -1.36 0.20 6 -1.23 0.25 4 -1.30 0.32 3 -1.17 0.27 3
NAMIBIA NAM 0.18 0.15 11 0.16 0.16 10 1.13 0.23 6 0.24 0.21 4 0.77 0.30 2
NEPAL NPL -0.61 0.16 8 -0.37 0.18 6 -0.56 0.20 4 -0.59 0.27 2 -0.28 0.47 1
NETHERLANDS NLD 2.08 0.15 10 2.16 0.16 9 2.36 0.18 9 2.48 0.18 8 2.13 0.17 7
N E T H E R L A N D S  A N T I L L E S A N T 1 . 0 2 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
NEW ZEALAND NZL 2.38 0.15 8 2.27 0.16 7 2.38 0.18 7 2.55 0.19 7 2.22 0.17 6
NICARAGUA NIC -0.34 0.16 10 -0.46 0.17 8 -0.88 0.19 7 -0.75 0.22 5 -0.15 0.27 3



















































TABLE C6: Control of Corruption (cont.)
2004 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
NIGERIA NGA -1.11 0.13 14 -1.32 0.15 11 -1.06 0.17 10 -1.01 0.16 8 -1.20 0.23 5
NORWAY NOR 2.11 0.15 10 1.99 0.16 8 2.13 0.19 8 2.35 0.18 8 2.01 0.17 7
OMAN OMN 0.78 0.17 7 1.00 0.16 8 0.75 0.22 5 0.89 0.26 4 0.12 0.24 4
PAKISTAN PAK -0.87 0.14 12 -0.81 0.15 9 -0.80 0.16 9 -0.76 0.18 8 -0.98 0.23 5
PANAMA PAN -0.06 0.14 11 -0.24 0.15 10 -0.33 0.16 9 -0.28 0.21 6 -0.50 0.24 4
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.90 0.15 9 -0.75 0.15 8 -0.85 0.16 7 -0.70 0.23 4 -0.27 0.26 3
PARAGUAY PRY -0.99 0.15 9 -1.20 0.16 9 -1.01 0.19 7 -0.97 0.21 6 -0.50 0.26 3
PERU PER -0.35 0.14 12 -0.23 0.15 11 -0.07 0.16 12 -0.17 0.17 9 -0.10 0.22 6
PHILIPPINES PHL -0.55 0.12 13 -0.50 0.13 12 -0.46 0.15 12 -0.26 0.14 9 -0.40 0.17 7
POLAND POL 0.16 0.12 14 0.40 0.13 13 0.49 0.13 14 0.49 0.14 10 0.41 0.17 7
PORTUGAL PRT 1.23 0.15 10 1.33 0.16 8 1.44 0.18 8 1.56 0.17 9 1.22 0.17 7
PUERTO RICO PRI 0.88 0.27 3 1.18 0.30 2 1.41 0.44 1 1.46 0.48 1 1.18 0.50 1
QATAR QAT 0.55 0.21 6 0.92 0.20 5 0.74 0.25 4 0.81 0.32 3 -0.06 0.27 3
REUNION REU 1.02 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ROMANIA ROM -0.25 0.12 13 -0.32 0.13 11 -0.45 0.14 12 -0.38 0.17 7 -0.18 0.24 4
RUSSIA RUS -0.72 0.12 14 -0.92 0.13 13 -1.02 0.13 14 -0.69 0.14 11 -0.74 0.17 7
RWANDA RWA -0.36 0.24 4 -0.34 0.26 4 0.06 0.33 3 -0.55 0.37 1 .. .. ..
SAMOA SAM 0.05 0.24 3 0.22 0.22 3 -0.12 0.24 2 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP -0.66 0.26 3 -0.31 0.28 3 0.06 0.42 2 -0.80 0.37 1 .. .. ..
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 0.15 0.17 8 0.51 0.16 9 0.11 0.22 6 0.35 0.25 5 -0.32 0.23 5
SENEGAL SEN -0.40 0.15 10 -0.19 0.17 8 -0.38 0.20 7 -0.45 0.21 5 -0.39 0.26 3
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO YUG -0.48 0.14 9 -0.74 0.15 8 -1.05 0.23 3 -0.97 0.23 4 -0.92 0.30 2
SEYCHELLES SYC 0.01 0.24 4 0.35 0.28 3 0.19 0.42 2 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
SIERRA LEONE SLE -0.88 0.22 6 -0.79 0.24 5 -0.79 0.31 4 -0.72 0.35 2 -1.66 0.61 1
SINGAPORE SGP 2.44 0.13 11 2.32 0.14 10 2.51 0.16 11 2.50 0.14 9 2.18 0.17 7
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.39 0.12 11 0.29 0.13 11 0.27 0.14 11 -0.08 0.15 8 0.41 0.22 5
SLOVENIA SVN 0.97 0.12 12 0.91 0.13 12 1.10 0.14 11 0.83 0.17 6 1.05 0.25 3
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -1.23 0.24 3 -1.58 0.27 2 -0.95 0.24 2 -0.55 0.37 1 .. .. ..
SOMALIA SOM -1.58 0.30 3 -1.18 0.29 3 -1.60 0.32 3 -1.44 0.35 2 -1.66 0.61 1
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.48 0.12 15 0.35 0.14 13 0.57 0.15 13 0.42 0.14 11 0.63 0.17 7
SPAIN ESP 1.45 0.14 11 1.44 0.15 10 1.69 0.17 10 1.59 0.17 9 0.77 0.17 7
SRI LANKA LKA -0.16 0.14 11 -0.13 0.14 10 -0.09 0.15 8 -0.24 0.21 5 -0.23 0.24 4
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 0.34 0.28 2 0.41 0.46 1 0.19 0.46 1 -0.04 0.37 1 .. .. ..
ST. LUCIA LCA 0.29 0.28 2 0.41 0.46 1 0.58 0.46 1 -0.04 0.37 1 .. .. ..
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 0.34 0.28 2 0.41 0.46 1 0.19 0.46 1 -0.04 0.37 1 .. .. ..
SUDAN SDN -1.30 0.17 8 -1.03 0.18 8 -1.08 0.22 6 -0.75 0.28 3 -1.08 0.30 2
SURINAME SUR 0.36 0.30 3 0.19 0.33 2 0.21 0.66 1 0.06 0.76 1 -0.31 0.61 1
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.95 0.19 6 -0.30 0.24 4 -0.13 0.42 2 -0.19 0.24 2 .. .. ..
SWEDEN SWE 2.20 0.14 10 2.24 0.15 9 2.50 0.17 10 2.55 0.18 8 2.19 0.17 7
SWITZERLAND CHE 2.17 0.15 10 2.17 0.16 8 2.24 0.18 9 2.58 0.17 9 2.11 0.17 7
SYRIA SYR -0.74 0.17 7 -0.28 0.17 7 -0.72 0.22 5 -0.58 0.26 4 -0.71 0.24 4
TAIWAN TWN 0.64 0.13 12 0.72 0.14 11 0.67 0.16 11 0.86 0.15 9 0.74 0.17 7
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.11 0.15 8 -1.07 0.15 8 -1.05 0.17 5 -1.12 0.21 3 -1.64 0.50 1
TANZANIA TZA -0.57 0.13 12 -0.97 0.16 10 -0.97 0.19 8 -0.95 0.17 7 -1.03 0.24 4
THAILAND THA -0.25 0.12 12 -0.28 0.13 12 -0.30 0.15 12 -0.26 0.14 10 -0.32 0.17 7
T I M O R ,  E A S T T M P - 0 . 2 9 0 . 3 0 3 - 0 . 5 2 0 . 3 8 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
TOGO TGO -0.92 0.23 5 -0.68 0.26 4 -0.63 0.38 3 -0.45 0.30 3 -0.98 0.61 1
TONGA TON -0.68 0.24 3 -0.73 0.27 2 -0.59 0.24 2 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.02 0.16 7 -0.04 0.18 6 0.38 0.20 6 0.13 0.23 4 0.33 0.26 3
TUNISIA TUN 0.29 0.14 10 0.44 0.15 10 0.70 0.19 8 0.11 0.18 6 -0.05 0.24 4
TURKEY TUR -0.23 0.13 13 -0.40 0.15 12 -0.28 0.16 12 -0.01 0.16 10 0.08 0.17 7
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.34 0.15 6 -1.21 0.16 6 -1.12 0.20 4 -1.13 0.19 4 -1.43 0.37 2
TUVALU TUV -0.78 0.30 2 0.47 0.31 1 -0.07 0.27 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
UGANDA UGA -0.71 0.13 13 -0.92 0.16 10 -0.86 0.19 8 -0.62 0.17 7 -0.52 0.24 4
UKRAINE UKR -0.89 0.12 14 -0.97 0.13 12 -0.96 0.15 11 -0.89 0.15 10 -0.74 0.22 5
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 1.23 0.17 7 1.17 0.17 7 0.69 0.24 4 0.78 0.26 4 0.19 0.24 4
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 2.06 0.14 11 1.93 0.15 10 2.19 0.16 11 2.33 0.17 9 1.91 0.17 7
UNITED STATES USA 1.83 0.13 11 1.75 0.14 10 1.79 0.17 10 1.95 0.18 8 1.71 0.17 7
URUGUAY URY 0.50 0.15 10 0.81 0.15 9 0.76 0.16 10 0.42 0.20 7 0.45 0.24 4
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.21 0.13 11 -1.03 0.13 10 -0.80 0.14 8 -0.98 0.17 6 -0.99 0.25 3
VANUATU VUT -0.53 0.24 3 -0.83 0.27 2 -0.83 0.24 2 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
VENEZUELA VEN -0.94 0.13 14 -0.94 0.14 12 -0.61 0.16 11 -0.77 0.16 10 -0.72 0.17 7
VIETNAM VNM -0.74 0.12 13 -0.67 0.13 12 -0.71 0.14 10 -0.60 0.15 8 -0.64 0.22 6
VIRGIN ISLANDS (U.S.) VIR 0 . 8 8 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
WEST BANK WBG -0.60 0.34 2 -0.92 0.35 2 0.79 0.49 1 0.49 0.49 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -0.84 0.16 8 -0.70 0.18 7 -0.67 0.22 5 -0.57 0.23 4 -0.25 0.26 3
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.74 0.13 12 -0.91 0.16 10 -0.82 0.19 8 -0.56 0.17 7 -0.98 0.24 4
ZIMBABWE ZWE -1.01 0.14 11 -1.22 0.16 10 -0.87 0.18 8 -0.13 0.15 9 -0.12 0.22 5   130
Appendix D:  Definition and Construction of Governance Indicators 
 
D1:  Definition of Governance Indicators 
 
We construct six aggregate governance indicators, motivated by a broad 
definition of governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country 
is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them. This classification of 
indicators into clusters corresponding to this definition of governance is not intended to 
be definitive. Rather, it simply reflects our views of what constitutes a consistent and 
useful organization of the data that is concordant with prevailing notions of governance. 
 
The first two governance clusters are intended to capture the first part of our 
definition of governance: the process by which those in authority are selected and 
replaced. We refer to the first of these as “Voice and Accountability”, and include in it a 
number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties 
and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country 
are able to participate in the selection of governments. We also include in this category 
indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in 
holding monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions. The 
second governance cluster is labeled “Political Stability and Absence of Violence”. In this 
index we combine several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional 
and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. This index captures the 
idea that the quality of governance in a country is compromised by the likelihood of 
wrenching changes in government, which not only has a direct effect on the continuity of 
policies, but also at a deeper level undermines the ability of all citizens to peacefully 
select and replace those in power.
2  
 
The next two clusters summarize various indicators of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies. In “Government Effectiveness” 
we combine responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from 
political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The 
main focus of this index is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce 
and implement good policies and deliver public goods. The second cluster, which we 
refer to as “Regulatory Quality”, is more focused on the policies themselves. It includes 
measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or 
inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by 
excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.  
 
The last two clusters summarize in broad terms the respect of citizens and the 
state for the institutions which govern their interactions. In “Rule of Law” we include 
several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
                                                  
2 It is worth noting that there is some ambiguity regarding the normative direction of a few of the 
subcomponents this indicator. For example, a few of our sources rank countries such as Cuba 
and North Korea highly in terms of their political stability, which simply reflects the longevity of the 
governments in power in these countries.   131
abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. 
Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an 
environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social 
interactions, and importantly, the extent to which property rights are protected. The final 
cluster, which we refer to as Control of Corruption, measures perceptions of corruption, 
conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. Despite this 
straightforward focus, the particular aspect of corruption measured by the various 
sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get 
things done,” to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring 
“grand corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in 
“state capture”. The presence of corruption is often a manifestation of a lack of respect 
of both the corrupter (typically a private citizen or firm) and the corrupted (typically a 
public official or politician) for the rules which govern their interactions, and hence 
represents a failure of governance according to our definition. 
 
D2.  Aggregation Methodology 
 
For each of the governance clusters, we combine the component indicators into 
an aggregate governance indicator using the same methodology used to calculate our 
first set of indicators, as documented in detail in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 
(1999a). We use an extension of the standard unobserved components model which 
expresses the observed data in each cluster as a linear function of the unobserved 
common component of governance, plus a disturbance term capturing perception errors 
and/or sampling variation in each indicator.
3 In particular, we assume that we can write 
the observed score of country j on indicator k, y(j,k), as a linear function of unobserved 
governance, g(j), and a disturbance term, ε(j,k), as follows: 
 
(D1)  () ) k , j ( ) j ( g ) k ( ) k ( ) k , j ( y ε + ⋅ β + α =  
 
where α(k) and β(k) are unknown parameters which map unobserved governance g(j) 
into the observed data y(j,k). As a choice of units, we assume that g(j) is a random 
variable with mean zero and variance one. We assume that the error term has zero 
mean and a variance is the same across countries, but differs across indicators, i.e. 
[ ] ) k ( ) k , j ( E
2 2
ε σ = ε . Finally we assume that the errors are independent across sources, i.e. 
[] 0 ) l , j ( ) k , j ( E = ε ⋅ ε  for l different from k. This assumption imposes the identifying 
assumption that the only reason why two sources might be correlated with each other is 
because they are both measuring the same underlying unobserved governance 
dimension.
4  
                                                  
3 Unobserved components models were pioneered in economics by Goldberger (1972), and the 
closely-related hierarchical and empirical Bayes models in statistics by Efron and Morris (1971, 
1972). 
4 For some pairs of sources, this assumption may not be literally true. For example, it will be 
violated if different risk rating agencies base their own assessments on the assessments of other 
agencies included in our sample. We have to the best of our knowledge excluded any source of 
governance data where we found that it was explicitly based on another one of our sources. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of correlated errors remains. The main consequence of this is that 
our standard errors will be biased downwards -- see Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 
(1999a) for an example. This underscores the importance of caution in comparing governance 
estimates across countries and over time, that we emphasize throughout.  132
 
The disturbance term ε(j,k) captures two sources of uncertainty in the relationship 
between true governance and the observed indicators. First, the particular aspect of 
governance covered by indicator k is imperfectly measured in each country, reflecting 
either perception errors on the part of experts (in the case of polls of experts), or 
sampling variation (in the case of surveys of citizens or entrepreneurs). Second, the 
relationship between the particular concept measured by indicator k and the 
corresponding broader aspect of governance may be imperfect. For example, even if the 
particular aspect of corruption covered by some indicator k, (such as the prevalence of 
“improper practices”) is perfectly measured, it may nevertheless be a noisy indicator of 
corruption if there are differences across countries in what “improper practices” are 
considered to be. Both of these sources of uncertainty are reflected in the indicator-
specific variance of the error term,  ) k (
2
ε σ . 
 
Given estimates of the parameters of the model, α(k), β(k), and σ(k), we can 
compute estimates of governance for each country, as well as measures of the precision 
of these estimates. Formally, the estimate of governance for a country produced by the 
unobserved components model is the mean of the distribution of unobserved 
governance conditional on the K(j) observed data points for that country. This conditional 
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proportional to the variance of the error term of that source. As we discuss in more detail 
in the final section of the paper, we find that the efficiency gains from precision-weighting 
are substantial relative to the alternative of simply averaging re-scaled scores from each 
source for each country.  We also report the standard deviation of this conditional 
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This standard deviation is declining in the number of individual indicators in which a 
particular country appears, and is increasing in the variance of the disturbance term on 
each of these indicators.  
 
The assumptions of the unobserved components model ensure that the 
distribution of unobserved governance in each country is normal, conditional on the data 
for that country. Therefore, these conditional means and standard deviations for each 
country have a natural interpretation. For example, a useful interpretation of the reported 
estimates and standard deviations for each country is to note that there is a 90% 
probability that the “true” level of governance in a country is in an interval of plus or 
minus 1.64 times the reported standard deviation centered on the point estimate itself.  133
We refer to such a range as a 90% confidence interval around the estimate of 
governance for a country.
5  
 
  In order to implement this approach, we require estimates of all of the unknown 
survey-specific parameters, α(k), β(k), and  ) k (
2
ε σ . We do this in a two-stage procedure. 
First, we assume that governance and the error terms in Equation (D1) are jointly 
normally distributed, and then apply maximum likelihood methods using only the 
representative sources to retrieve the parameters of interest for each governance 
cluster. This is nothing more than a standard application of the unobserved components 
model. We cannot however include our many non-representative sources in the first 
stage of the estimation procedure. This is because the distribution of unobserved 
governance in the subset of countries covered by these surveys is not the same as that 
in the world as a whole. As a result, for these sources we cannot make the assumption 
that unobserved governance in the countries covered by these surveys follows a 
standard normal distribution, as is required by the maximum likelihood procedure.  
 
We instead obtain the parameters of the non-representative sources in a two-
stage procedure. First, we estimate the parameters of the model only for the 
representative sources, and construct preliminary estimates of governance based only 
on these sources. In the second stage, we treat these preliminary estimates as an 
observable proxy for governance, and obtain the parameters of interest for the non-
representative sources by regressing these indicators on observable governance, i.e. by 
directly estimating Equation (D1).
6 We then use all the estimated parameters of the 
unobserved components model to construct a final set of estimates of governance. 
 
  The resulting estimates of governance have an expected value (across 
countries) of zero, and a standard deviation (across countries) of one. Due to sampling 
variability, this will not be exactly true for any one of our governance indicators in any 
period. To avoid any confusion regarding the units of the governance indicators, we 
rescale the estimates of governance by subtracting the mean (across countries) and 
dividing by the standard deviation (across countries) for each indicator, so that each 
indicator has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each period.  
 
  It is also important to note that we have assumed that the distribution of 
unobserved governance is the same in every period. In particular, this imposes the 
restriction that the mean or world average of governance is the same in each period. As 
a result, our indicators are not informative about global trends in governance, although 
they are potentially informative about changes in countries’ relative positions over time. 
 
                                                  
5 This is a slight abuse of terminology, as these are not confidence intervals in the usual 
frequentist sense of a stochastically varying interval centered around a fixed unknown parameter. 
Rather, we treat governance as a random variable, and the 90% confidence interval is simply the 
5
th and 95
th percentiles of the conditional distribution of governance given the observed data. 
 
6 In order to get consistent estimates of the parameters of the non-representative sources, we 
need to adjust for attenuation bias caused by the fact that our observable proxy for governance is 
a noisy indicator of true governance. Fortunately, we can use the information on the standard 
errors associated with the governance estimates obtained in the first stage to do this. 